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Abstract

RULES OF ORDER: OR SO TO SPEAK
fcy
Arthur E. Blank

Adviser: Professor Stanley Milgram
How members of a social unit acquire their shared .
knowledge about the social world was approached in Sherif's
(1935* 1936) writings on norm formation and in.the
phenomenological descriptions of Schutz (1971* 1973) and
Berger and Luckmann (1967 )*

Both traditions presume that

shared understandings originate in face-to-face encounters,
but they diverge in that the phenomenologists argue that
talk, and the construction of "typifications," plays a
prominent role in the acquisition of shared knowledge.

For

the phenomenologists, a "typification" enables members to
categorize behavior as a known event and permits individuals
to consider disparate behaviors as belonging to the same
class of events.

Furthermore,

"types" are presumed to be

known to, and useable by, any other member of the social
unit even though the details of the original encounter
are masked by the "typification."

•

•

•

111

The research reported here is an attempt to explore the
formation of "types," and examine the role that everyday
conversation may have in the construction of shared
understandings.

By varying how members come to acquire

their knowledge about the social world— through direct
participation or through the. words and deeds of others— a
series of four studies was conducted.

The first part of

each study always begins in the same manners participants
are requested to judge how far in front of the screen a
figure from a Julesz stereogram appears to be.

The later

part of each study always has one member who continues to
see, or has been told about, the extended figure while (s)he
interacts with a partner who views, unbeknownst to the other,
a recessed figure.

The task to be solved remains the same

as that in the first part: to reach a decision about
extension.

This alteration in perspective was to provide

a challenge to the knowledge formed during the first part
of the encounter and to make visible any taken-for-granted
assumptions that may have been acquired.
Contrary to expectations,
interactions,

60.71$,

never uncovered.

in the majority of the

the alteration in perspective was

An analysis of the members’ talk revealed

that during the first part of the study the participants
constructed a vocabulary and exchanged a set of expressions
with each other that took the meaning and reference of
those terms for granted.

As there was no challenge to this

usage, in the later parts of the study the partner who saw

or was told about an extended figure continued to presume
that these words can be re-used unproblematically, and the
task was presented to the partner with a vocabulary that
masked the exact reference of the expressions.

With this

vagueness as to reference, the individual who saw recession
used the "meaning" of these words to describe the recessed
display (s)he saw and successfully concealed the disparity.
It is argued that these expressions presumed useable by any
other be considered "typifications."
By examining what is concealed and by understanding
i

the role talk plays in this masking, the issue of what
members are presumed to "share" is addressed.

As the notion

of "sharedness" is also at the heart of the concept of norm,
some of the implications of this examination for the concept
of norm are examined.

v
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. . . any object which remains uncontradicted
is ipso factor believed and posited as absolute
reality.
William James, 1890
Principles of Psychology
Vol. II, p. 289

There seems to be a single starting point for
psychology, exactly as for all other sciences;
the world as we find it, naively and uncritically.
. . . M o s t people live permanently in a world
such as this, which is for them the world, and
hardly ever find serious problems in its
fundamental problems.
Wolfgang Kohler, 19^7
Gestalt Psychology,
P. 7

. . . the everyday life-^orld is to be understood
that province of reality which the wide-awake
and normal adult simply takes for granted in the
attitude of common-sense. By this taken-forgrantedness, we designate everything which we
experience as unquestionable; every state of
affairs is for us unproblematic until further
notice.
Alfred Schutz, 1973
The Structures of the Life-World,
p. 4
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INTRODUCTION
Rules of order: Or, so to speak

By choice of words and design,

social psychology has

positioned the individual in a matrix of social influence
and causation.

What more appropriate way to reflect this

social nexus than through the concept norm,

for the term

directs our concern to the social sharedness of, and social
A

restraints on, behavior and thought.

Out of the array of

conceptual expressions available to us as psychologists,
what can it mean for social psychologists to have selected
that general and- abstract constraint on thought and action
called norms?
In the mid-30's Muzafer Sherif (1935. 1936) embedded
the concept of "norm" in a general problem:

if we survey

the anthropological literature it is clear that there are
various and contrasting immediate and natural perceptions
of the social world.

These numerous and culturally

influenced modes of a "preparedness to see in the nature

A cursory glance at introductory social psychology
texts confirms this conception of norm— that they are
assumed to be socially shared and that they place real or
imagined constraints on thought and action (Berkowitz, 1976;
Brown, 1965? Hollander, 1976; Newcomb, Turner, and Converse,
1965 ; Secord and Backman, 196^; and Worchel and Cooper, 1976).
Also Rommetveit's (195*0 monograph explicitly draws our
attention to the presumption that these cognitive and
behavioral restrictions are shared frames of reference.

that surrounds us much to what another period would be
totally blind" (Sherif,
intriguing questions.

1936, p. 6*0 raised a set of
First, how do we account for a

particular manner of knowing the world which arises in one
social unit

and not in another; second, how do we account

for the apparent sharedness of these ways of being prepared
to see the world within that social unit; and third, how
do we account for the apparent naturalness of these ways of
knowing the world?

The concept of "norm" assumes that
!
(a) social actors are able to make the appropriate social

discriminations, and (b) that these social demarcations are
shared and not idiosyncratic: i.e. any other member of that
social unit in those particular circumstances should be
capable of making similar distinctions.
In part, Sherif sought to link these issues by
postulating a psychological need to develop a frame of
3
reference,
but this leaves vague the specifics of how the

2
The use of the term social unit is meant to convey that
at any one time within a society and across societies there
exists more than one way of knowing the world.
The term norm
then also relies on an assumption of the social distribution
of knowledge.
The question of why one form of knowing
dominates becomes a critical concern and is artificially
separated here.
But in claiming that there are different
ways of being prepared to see the world, I am not implying
that there exist different cognitive processes or capacities
(Cole & Scribner, 197*0 • At any time the depth and breadth
of the expression shared is undetermined.
^The research of Alexander, Zucker, and Brody (1970) has
critiqued this postulation of a need to develop a stable
framework. A reply in support of Sherif can be found in the
writings of Pollis, Montgomery, and Smith (197*0*

critical components of norms— their reference to an immediate,
natural, and shared frame for perception and action— develop.
The questions can be rephrased to ask: as members of a
social unit, how do we come to acquire the socially shared
stock: of knowledge which permits us to act and think as
recognizably competent adult members of a society?
If we assess the research in social psychology most
closely aligned with Sherif's concerns we can determine how
these issues have been answered.

But when we examine the
i

"arbitrary tradition" literature (Rohrer, Baron, Hoffman, &
Swander,

195^; Rose & Felton,

Weick & Gilfillan,

1956; Jacobs & Campbell,

1961;

1971; and Moschetti, 1977) it becomes

evident that there has been a shift in emphasis.

Rohrer,

et a l . , basically replicated the original Sherif research
and pursued the question of persistence: how durable is the
laboratory induced norm.

The authors concluded that an

individual will retain the experimentally established norm
for a period of at least one year.

The research of Rose and

Felton utilized Rorschach tests to create an experimental
culture, and by replacing subjects to gauge the type of
culture formed (open or closed) and the type of cultural
transmission which occurred (invention, borrowing,

and habit

formation).
Citing the original Sherif research, the work of Rose
and Felton, and the conceptual arguments of Gerard,
Kluckholm and Rapoport (1956), Jacobs and Campbell

formulated their empirical task to be one of understanding
"the perpetuation of 'cultural' characteristics that
transcends the replacement of individual persons" (p. 6^9)*
Guided by Sumner's dictum that the "mores can make anything
right," the authors utilized the autokinetic effect to
address the question of whether a functionless norm would
persist over time.

That is, would an experimentally induced

norm of 15 inches of apparent motion endure if there was a
'normal' assessment of approximately 8 inches of motion?
As with Rose and Felton, persistence was scrutinized by
replacing culturally sophisticated subjects with culturally
naive subjects.

The resulting alteration in judgments of

apparent motion would be how the duration of the norm was
measured.

Under the laboratory constraints provided,

the

arbitrary norm was not transmitted for more than four or
five generations.
the tradition to:

The authors attributed the brevity of
(a) the role of autonomous decline;

(b) the

role of forgetting; and (c) the influence of new members.
Jacobs and Campbell concluded that mores could not adequately
account for how traditions were perpetuated.

In 1967, Sherif

also addressed the persistence of norms and replicated the
Jacobs and Campbell study.

He concluded that the durability

of a norm will deteriorate as its arbitrariness increased.
Weick and Gilfillan (1971) v/ere critical of the
concept of arbitrariness employed by Jacobs and Campbell,

and separated "warranted" from "unwarranted" arbitrariness.^
The authors argued that the rapid decline of the norm could
be explained as a result of the combination of unwarranted
arbitrariness and the seemingly unreal assessment of
apparent motion-^-that is, the press of reality was not
considered.

In contrast to Jacobs and Campbell, and Sherif,

Weick and Gilfillan argued that in ". . . a

situation where

a bit of artificial culture is not blatantly unreal nor
unwarrantedly arbitrary, and only a tendency to spontaneous
innovations counteracts tradition, we would expect to see
adherence increase with age"

(p. 181).

Thus, if aligned

with the "pressures of reality" a warranted arbitrary
context was deemed sufficient to account for the perpetuation
of a tradition.

The results of their game study supported

their hypotheses.
The research of Moschetti (1977) criticized the Weick
and Gilfillan work on at least two grounds.
noted that a salient aspect of interaction,

First, Moschetti
communication

between the subjects, was omitted from the study and suggests
that had there been communication the distinction between

^"We will use the phrase 'unwarranted arbitrariness' to
refer to those situations where real and relevant differences
exist among choice alternatives, but these are ignored and
the choice is made on a nonevidential basis.
A situation of
'warranted arbitrariness' exists when the choice alternatives
are equally valid and where real and relevant differences
are inconsequential." (1971* P* 180)

unwarranted and warranted arbitrariness would not have held.
Second, Moschetti cites the writings of Pareto to argue that
the persistence of a norm is due not to its actual and
objective effectiveness but to its presumed effectiveness:
"the actors can be mistaken concerning the causal contingency
between the tradition and the outcomes in the situation"
(p* 79) •

However, as there was no actual transmission of

the tradition in this study the claim can not be assessed.
The concern with comprehending why and for how long
I

norms or arbitrary traditions will persist is critical, but
it represents a shift in emphasis.

To specify the conditions

under which norms endure is vastly different from inquiring
how some individual(s) acquire social competency— under
standing the process by which social knowledge is formed
and transmitted.

But while these studies do not critically

examine this issue, they do rely upon some presumptions about
these processes.

For in successfully producing something

which could be maintained, something had to be formed and
transmitted.

How has each study accomplished the construc

tion of a social convention,
knowledge?

a slice of socially shared

It was precisely this formation of a socially

constructed "preparedness to see"— a norm— which made the
autokinetic effect so dramatic.

And that a human artifact,

a social convention, has been produced in each of these
studies should serve to remind us that a notion of'feonvention"
is also at the core of what it means to employ that general

and abstract constraint on human thought and action called
"norm."
Sherif's (1935* 1936) reliance on anthropological data
brings into relief the argument that the world of "norms,"
though natural and shared, is an arbitrary world.

The

social traditions common to one setting are not necessarily
common to any other setting.

Whatever traditions are

involved we are left with the broader task of coming to
grips with and displaying how these "norms," "preparedness
to see," acquire their apparent naturalness and commonality
within some social unit.

In that each study in the "arbi

trary tradition" literature proposes that a social tradition
was generated,

each study has let the process of that

production pass without comment.
It is incumbent upon the discipline to account for how
a particular frame of reference has become common.

Indeed,

I would maintain .that if we do not conceptually and empir
ically grapple with how social traditions and conventions
are formed and become shared the concept of "norm" will have
little explanatory value.

For all we will know is that

members of a social unit have this knowledge and are capable
of using it, but we will lack an in-depth comprehension of
how that social knowledge was formed.
This request to study the formation of social knowledge
is similar to the urgings of Moscovici:
The proper domain of our discipline (social
psychology) is the study of cultural processes

8
which are responsible for the organization
of knowledge in a society . . . for the
codification of inter-individual and inter
group conduct which creates a common social
reality with its norms and values. (1972,
P. 55)
and Pepitone:
The third stage of inquiry for a social
psychology of normative social behavior is
the most important and the most divergent
from the way social psychology is organized
at the present time. It deals with the
origin of normative values and beliefs.
(1976, p. 61*9 )
How can we begin to probe the problem as to how that social
artifact— a socially constructed slice of life— was formed?
Sherif (1935» 1936) did put forth some basic assertions as
to how norms came to be formed and shared.

Fundamentally

the concrete interaction of individuals was considered
sufficient to create knowledge, momentarily.

And it was

further suggested that alterations in the social context
would influence the knowledge formed and result, perhaps,
in emendations to it.^

•^The durability of this knowledge— its "emergence and
standardization" and its "gaining of authority and prestige"
(Sherif, 1936, p. 87)— is a process which is e x t e n d e d i n
time.
Though Sherif labeled the knowledge formed during the
interactions "norms," I want to reserve that expression for
a "preparedness to see" which can be demonstrated^to be
durable.
I will consider what was made known during the
encounters a slice of knowledge— a temporarily shared
understanding.
Obviously, the question of how well what
is formed in the experimental encounters persists is the
concern which has been addressed by the "arbitrary tradition"
literature.

Other presumptions ahout the conditions of knowledge
construction can be explicated by paying careful attention
to the experimental constraints reported in the literature.
It is apparent that any subject in these experiments was
placed in a context where a set of instructions defined a
task to be solved.

As Sherif originally intimated, this

pragmatic involvement with a task at hand would play a role
in framing how the social world would be known and what
would be shared by the parties to this encounter.
»

But note

that what is finally considered to be normative, is not
unilaterally invoked.

It is a consequence of the members'

negotiations with each other, and it is this socially
arbitrated and socially constructed artifact which is
transmitted to future generations and renegotiated if the
knowledge becomes removed from the press of reality (Weick &
Gilfillan,

1971)-

Is this how some social knowledge comes

to be formed,, shared, and perceptually natural: that the
concrete actions of individuals engaged with the pragmatic
and mundane considerations of a task at hand generated a

6

This process of negotiation is clearest in the studies
of Sherif, and Rose and Felton, though it exists in the
other studies— especially at the time of replacement.
In
the Sherif research, individual judgments converge to form
a near consensus as to the judgment of apparent motion.
In
the other studies, a newcomer can alter this assessment—
argue about how far it "really" moves. One critical issue^
here is the equivalent status of the participants.
Differing
configurations may lead to alternate assessments and the
ability to "control" reality.

10
manner of knowing the world?

Sherif's endeavor to demon

strate the formation of a "norm" in an ambiguous context
appears to have worked under these constraints,

and to have

been replicated in the experimental settings of the
"arbitrary tradition" research.
At this point it is interesting to proceed to the
writings of others who are attempting to elucidate the
processes "by which any body of knowledge comes to be
socially established as a reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967»
p. 3).

The phenomenological descriptions of Alfred Schutz

(1971, 1973) represent an attempt to characterize how the
objective world is socially experienced,

and how an indi

vidual incorporates the existing stock of social knowledge.
In explicating these problems, Schutz presents a conception
of everyday life which can be heuristically compared with
the work of Sherif.

Schutz argues that the social world

which we encounter daily seems natural and unproblematic
for us because it is a social world resting on a circumscribed
set of social presuppositions which the member of the social
unit can take for granted.

The research of Harold Garfinkel

(1967) has empirically pursued the writings of Schutz and
provides an apt demonstration of the problem.
The term "anthropologically strange" is employed by
Garfinkel to indicate that there is a body of taken for
granted social knowledge which is presupposed by members of
the social unit, and to suggest a manner of displaying that

11
knowledge— by taking the position of an outsider or by
disrupting the social unit.

This tactic of disruption makes

visible the domain of typically invisible^ social rules
which we, as members of some unit, must rely upon in order
to make recognizable to our self and to others the social
world which we naively know.

As with norms, it is this

reliance on socially shared presumptions which enable the
actor to proceed with his everyday life.

For example,

in

one study students were asked to pretend to be boarders in
their parent's home.

This wrenching of a socially shared

assumption— superficially rendered as, that if you left m y
home this morning as my son, daughter, wife or husband I
expect to find you as a member of that same social category
when I see you later— created consternation and strain for
both the subject and the parent.

The parents expended a

great deal of effort to restore events to their typical,
usual, and recognizable pattern so that the interaction
could again proceed normally and naturally.

That we can

rely on this usual, mundane, pragmatic, uneventful,
remarkably regular world points to its naturalness.

and
That

we presume it is shared with others, to its taken-forgrantedness.

^Invisible is not to be taken as meaning unconscious.
It refers to a domain of behavior and thought called nonconscious by Bern (1967) . Bern also uses the concept of
taken for granted to refer to a system of social beliefs
which inhibit the ability to envision alternate modes of
thought and action.

The force of this conjecture can he further demonstrated
by noting the tenuous position which a foreigner is placed
in when visiting a non-familiar culture.

The writings of

E. T. Hall (1966 , 1973» 1977) relate numerous instances
where individuals mistakenly assume that their natural and
usually tacit social preparedness to see can be unalterably
applied in alien settings.

The research on proxemics (Hall,

1966 ) argues that Americans and Arabs employ different
physical distances from their partners when conducting
business transactions.

The closeness of this distance for

the Arab is unsettling to the Americans used to a greater
degree of physical separation.

What is perfectly "natural"
O

becomes problematic for the actors.

The ability to

accomplish a smooth interaction is in jeopardy, and the
potential for insult and embarrassment has arisen.

In

discussing how time is a culturally embedded concept, Hall
(1973) provides another example.

An American diplomat

arrives in the host country and seeks to contact the
appropriate diplomatic counterpart.

Having made an appoint

ment to meet with the diplomatic representative of the host
country,

the American arrives at the scheduled time.

waiting for 10 to 20 minutes,

After

the American begins to resent

Q

Problematic is intended to convey that what is usually
done or seen uneventfully becomes an issue. The event does
not proceed smoothly and the issue of social competency,
for self or other, may arise.

13
the delay and feel insulted.

The social assumption which

has been unwittingly transported is that there is a "correct"
amount of time to keep someone waiting.

But the judgment of

"correctness" is culturally embedded, and the host's
conception of waiting time differs from the visitor's.
possible departure of the American,

The

and his feeling of

insult, would not be readily comprehended by the host.
The tactic

of disruption and the concept of "anthro

pologically strange" are useful to demonstrate that the
discomfort and social bizarreness are the result of the
violation of social conventions automatically employed and
culturally shared.

The possible estrangement from the

context points to the error made and its usually unproblematic,
taken-for-granted aspect.
The display of differences is not to raise the issue of
how we account for the differences, but to direct our focus
to a topic already raised: how do we explain the culturally
entrenched and shared procedures for seeing and acting that
are present in some social unit.

If we can agree that the

concept of "norm," and its components of sharedness,
naturalness,

and convention, refers to what an actor must

know in order to be acknowledged as a competent member of a
society,

then our use of "norm" must account for each of

these issues.

Given the surface similarity of the taken-for-

granted world and norms, can we gain any further directions
from, the phenomenologists as to how social knowledge is
formed?

1^
To describe how the social actor comes to know the
social world, Schutz (1973) and then Berger and Luckmann
(1967 ) make use of the concept of "typification."

The idea

of "typification,” or type, refers to the individual's
abstraction from detail those ingredients which permit a
member to identify a specific event as a socially known
type.

In a specific interaction, it is assumed that the in-

depth details and uniqueness will be subsumed under a broad
category.

Berger and Luckmann illustrate this concern by

noting how social detail is lost when the participants
locate the interaction under the broad rubric of "mother-inlaw trouble."

Aaron Cicourel (197*0 is similarly concerned

with how a particular incident is recognized as belonging to
some general class of events.

He draws from the writings of
g
Schutz and Chomsky's theory of generative grammar^ to argue
that norms are surface elements for which a sense, a meaning,
is ascribed by deep structure.

Cicourel labels this

^Cicourel is in an ambiguous position vis-a-vis Chomsky's
theory of generative grammar.
He borrows the notion of
surface and deep structure, but does not accept the
rationalist dimension of the theory.
Further, Chomsky is
explicit about the nature of the rules which enable one to
move from surface to deep structure; Cicourel is not.
ChomsTcy is also hesitant about.the applicability of his
approach to areas outside of linguistics, but the suggestive
ness of the approach is worth pursuing— even if it is
discarded later.
In addition, the formulation of the problem
as one of recognizing a particular event as a member of some
broader category permits a tentative link to be made with
the research on pattern recognition in cognitive psychology
(Neisser, 1967 )*

assignment of sense "interpretive procedures" and suggests
that a particular encounter is identified as an instance of
a general class by specification of meaning.

The "interpre

tive procedures" which allow a social member to select from a
display those socially germane particulars that will permit
the categorization of the event are assumed shared by the
members and are, in part, formed prior to language.
Whether or not a generative concept is warranted, the
problem of how a member realizes that a specific encounter
belongs to some general category is a critical addition in
understanding what has to be reckoned with when we attempt
to dissect the issue of knowledge acquisition.

An example

from the research of Latane and Darley (I970 ) -will illustrate
the concern.

In their explanation of helping behavior,

Latane and Darley present a decision tree which has at its
first and second nodes the problem of recognition.

The

authors report an incident— someone lying on the floor,
someone who fell from a chair,

someone screaming— which must

first be categorized as an incident requiring assistance
before any other decision as to help or not to help will be
implemented.

As the Kitty Genovese case documented,

this

categorization is not straight-forward and the decision is
not made with ease.

What are the shared procedures that

members must utilize so that a unique instance can be
recognized as belonging to a general class of events?
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Within the framework of "interpretive procedures" or
"typification," norm represents a summary term which enables
individuals to conveniently categorize an entire range of
possibly disparate behaviors as members of the same class.

10

By selecting a category the details and uniqueness of the
action are hidden in the dimensions which are shared with
other events in the category.

To a large extent then the

concept of "type," the assignment of sense, the notion of
"norms," are assumed to be idealizations of specific
incidents.

However, Schutz carefully argues that with the

process of typification:
It should be emphasized that the interpreta
tion of the world in terms of types, as under
stood here, is not the outcome of a process of
ratiocination, let alone of scientific concep
tualization. . . . Thus typifications...on the
common-sense level— in contradistinction to
typifications made by the scientist— emerge on
the everyday experience of the world as takenfor-granted without any formulation of judgments
or of neat propositions with logical subjects
and predicates. (Schutz, 1973, p. 120)
As with norms, typifications appear natural and are
presumed shared with others.

This assumption of sharedness

is expressed by noting that experience is anonymized in a
type:

any other member of the social unit is thought,

in

principle, to be capable of recognizing and duplicating the
category.

It is shared for it is not supposed to be a

unique incident tied to the personal biographies of the
10

Mischel's (1973) use of trait as a summary term raises
similar issues.
However, it must be stressed again that types
and norms are not thought of as being equivalent, just
analogous.
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actors.

Given the resemblance with norms, will considering

how types are formed offer any more details as to how
socially constructed knowledge comes to be acquired and
shared?
Schutz, and then Berger and Luckmann indicate that a
type evolves from a "situationally adequate solution to a
problematic situation" (Schutz,

1973, p. 231) and is taken-

for granted-until-further-notice.
becomes problematic,

When a typification

Schutz argues that the resolution will

be guided by the principle of "pragmatic motive": the member
will question only that knowledge which permits him or her
to master the problem.

At the time of the disruption, the

uncritical attitude toward the taken-for-granted social
world may be sustained, modified, or abandoned.

But only

that knowledge which is called into question by the disruption
is challenged.

In that a type is formed and altered within

and in response to specific contextual constraints another
similarity with norm formation is revealed.

A further linkage

with Sherif's discussion of norms is that typifications are
assumed to be shaped within the bounds of face-to-face
interactional settings.

The writings of Berger and Luckmann,

and Schutz, diverge from Sherif in that they claim that talk
plays an essential role in type construction.
11

11

Schutz, and Berger and Luckmann refer to language.
I am using the expressions talk, speech conversation,
discourse, words, utterances, and exchange of words to follow
the accepted linguistic practice that language refers to a
grammar and talk to use in context— pragmatics.
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While Moschetti (1977) did address how pervasive speech
is during interactions, he offered no suggestions as to its
possible function on norm formation, maintenance, or
transmission.
products,

12

In order to create and sustain cultural

discourse played an integral part of the Rose and

Felton experiments but no systematic, or even cursory,
examination of that discourse was provided.

Given the

prominence of talk in everyday life, it is surprising that
social psychologists have not paid more attention to the
conditions of its use and its possible contribution

to the

13
structuring of shared knowledge. ^
In the writings of Schutz and Berger and Luckmann,
conversations during face-to-face interactions involve:
(a) the process of externalization— the placing of subjective
intent into speech; and (b) the process of objectivation— by
placing my experience in words I make available to myself
and others the "elements" from which a common world can be
constructed.

Discourse is then linked to type construction

for it enables the parties to the face-to-face encounter to

12

Moschetti actually referred to communication.
I am
concerned with talk.
Obviously non-verbal components are
an integral part of the communicative picture, and at times
may outweigh the verbal message (Argyle, 1967).
*^The handbook article by Miller and McNeil (1969) and
the text by R. Brown (1965) tried to draw our attention to
some of the issues involved with speech and language. With
the recent upsurge in sociolinguistics (Bauman & Sherzer,
197^, Gumperz & Hymes, 1972, Hymes, 197^J and Fishman, 1968,
1972, 1975)t some corrections in this omission have begun.

comment on, comprehend, and categorize their experience for
self and others.

Out of an exchange of words during an

interaction a typification results.

But the typification

stands in a special relationship to the encounter.

For as

Schutz asserted, the detailed step-by-step development of
the interaction (its "polythetic character") is caught with
a theme (its "monothetic grasp").

And it is this thematic

grasp which is a type and which is taken-for-granted-untilik

further-notice.
This retention of a sense is assumed responsible for
the eventual sedimentation of knowledge and for how specific
incidents are recognized as having been previously
experienced— as a particular instance of a-general class.
During face-to-face encounters talk provides the elements
from which a shared world can be negotiated and constructed.
And what are negotiated and constructed through dialogue and
presumably shared and taken-for-granted are typifications.

1|l

To prevent a possible misunderstanding, I am not
arguing that talk is the way knowledge is formed and shared.
Obviously, some of the "arbitrary tradition" research
succeeded in producing something without speech. Even for
Schutz it is in principle possible to construct a type without
words.
I am only arguing that talk is a prominent means by
which such knowledge is formed, shared, and sustained._
Furthermore, if the interaction is not novel but familiar the
typifications are selected from "a system of relevances and
typifications as it exists at any historical moment . .
which ". . . i s itself part of the social heritage as' such
is handed down in the educational process to the members of
the in-group." (Schutz, 1973» p. 120)

The expositions of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann,

then

raise the phenomenological claim that discourse is influential
in coming to know a world that is naively and uncritically
shared.

Is there any empirical research which can support

the theoretical claims made about the role of talk during
interaction?

The research of J. S. Sachs (19&7. 197**) and

Bransford and Franks (1971) offer some interesting suggestions
that are worth briefly examining.

Sachs was concerned with

whether subjects would recognize a previously encountered
sentence if that sentence had been either semantically or
formally (syntactic but not semantic change) altered.

The

■

research clearly demonstrated that semantic alterations were
readily noted while formal changes were not, and that the
loss of detail about the exact wording of the sentences
occurred rather quickly— within 27 seconds (1967) 311(1 23
seconds (197*0 •

Sachs concluded that the memory for meaning

was retained, and that this memory was not dependent on the
original form of the sentence nor was the meaning retained
the simple summation of the individual words (1967 )*

In

197**» Sachs noted that the meaning stored did not necessarily
correspond to the temporal order of the input.
Bransford and. Franks'

(1971) research attempted to

investigate that memory is "not for individual words or
sentences" but for "wholistic semantic ideas."

A series of

sentences were presented to the subjects, and during the
recognition task these original sentences were given to the
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subject with a sentence that.combined the semantic sense of
the original sentence.

The subjects had never seen this

sentence, but "recognized" it as having appeared more
frequently than those sentences which were actually
presented.

Furthermore,

the subjects were very confident

that these sentences had been part <?f the original set of
sentences.

Bransford and Franks concluded that:

In general, Ss did not store representations
of particular sentences.
Individual sentences
lost their unique status in memory in favor
of a more wholistic representation of semantic
events. (1971. P* 34*8)15
As the unit of analysis in the research cited is
sentences and not conversational discourse, the empirical
support for Schutz is at best indirect.

What is corroborated

is the general argument for the retention of some thematic
grasp— a construction in which details are lost in favor of
a summation, a sense.

If these are warranted arguments,

typifications should not necessarily be assumed to be direct
replicas of the specific ingredients of the conversation.
That is, the speech which is being employed for the
construction and negotiation of an event need not produce
a summary statement that has as its marker any of the
specific expressions that went into the evolution, of the
theme.

Or, to paraphrase Sachs and gestalt psychology,

the

"^Research by James and Hillinger (1976) severely
questioned the results produced by the Bransford and Franks
experiment, but leave the general position— a constructivist
interpretation— unscathed.
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typifications are not the simple summation of individual
words.
The connection between talk and typification is then
preliminarily construed to be:

(a) that talk permits

individuals to place their subjective intent into words *
which are then manipulable for self and others;

(b) this

objectivation provides the elements from which a common
world can be shaped;

(c) the selection of elements from the

world sustains typifications which have allowed participants
to locate the event into either an already existing category
or to generate a new category; and (d) these types represent
a manner of pragmatically knowing a particular world which
is taken-for-granted-until-further-notice. .• But is this
outcome particularly astounding when Posner (1973) notes
that:
It has long been known that human memory
is not developed for the exact reproduction
of previous events, but has rather evolved
for the purpose of abstracting the general
form of events, (p. 44)
What is striking then is not that a sense is constructed,
or that abstraction from detail occurs, but that every
interaction has the potentially confining and unintentionally
produced social construction of a "preparedness to see."
Does the social use of speech have the paradoxical result of
constraining knowledge at the same time it is being interactionally employed to create knowledge?

The question frames a dilemma but is overdrawn if it
implies that any knowledge can be produced.

It has been

noted that in the construction of a type, or of a norm,
actors are pragmatically engaged.

Talk is then assumed to

mediate between the task one

is involved with and theactor’s

subjective intent.

constraints of thetask at

From the

hand,

socially constructed knowledge may be formed or recognized
as an instance of the general class.

As Berger and Luckmann

attest:
. . . most conversation
does not in so
many words define the nature of the world.
Rather it takes place against the background
of a world that is silently taken-forgranted. (1967, p. 152)
Yet it seems implausible to argue that- the mere use of
speech is sufficient to construct a new type or to result in
the classification of the engagement into an existing scheme
of typifications.

Are there any specifiable conditions

which can suggest when a thematic grasp will occur?

G. H.

1969 ), A. Schutz

Mead (1934/1962), W. James (D. Schultz,

(1973.) and A. Kaplan (1964-) have each commented on the
separation between a continuous stream of experience and the
reflection on that experience.

It seems reasonable that a

context which causes the members to reflect on their activity
may occasion the grasping of a theme.

One possible reading

of the "arbitrary tradition" literature is that at the point
where information had to be transmitted,

the subjects looked

back, at their prior experience and generated an abstract

2k
schemata.

Garfinkel's tactic of disruption and Hall's

foreigner examples also suggest that when the context is
made problematic, reflection takes place.

The research of

Sachs, and Bransford and Franks demonstrated that subjects
will schematize when presented with a recognition task, but
whether the experimentally imposed meanings are the same
ones that the Ss would have produced is left open.
It does not appear implausible to suggest that a
socially constructed sense, a typification, will occur at
points of reflection, and we can argue that a backwards
glance at prior activities will come about when (a) a
request to transmit information occurs,

(b) a disruption in

the social context makes the setting problematic, and (c) a
natural request for reflection is provided— a probe that
requests an explanation of what has transpired.
Given that- reflection may happen at any of these
prompts it would be incorrect to assume that (1) typifications
emerge solely as a summary statement at the end of the
conversation, and (2) that a single type is the outcome of a
pragmatic encounter with the world.

It is assumed that a

type or thematic grasp is a backwards, reflective look at
lived experiences i.e., it is post-hoc.

What remains entirely

open are the particular thematic grasps that may evolve in a
particular interaction.
While we may suggest that types occur at the point of
reflection, it must be apparent that a critical issue is still
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unresolved.

Specifically, how does any member decide which

elements are to form the edifice for the typifications?

It

can be tentatively proposed that what is selected for the
types are the situationally adequate "results" of the
pragmatic encounter.

Omitted are the non-pragmatically

related details and the step-by-step construction of the
socially arbitrated locating activity.

At the time of

reflection the preceding activity becomes known, typified
and taken-for-granted, by its "result(s)."
Why presume that typifications are a "result" of
pragmatic encounters?

There are two reasons: first, Schutz

defined types as solutions to a problematic situation and
one manner of defining solution is in terms of its outcome,
its results; and second, Schutz makes the assertion that it
is the result which is objectivated as knowledge.

And with

the close analytic connection between typification and
objectivation, it seems plausible to suspect a similar
mechanism for type formation.
The assumption behind the conjecture(that the social
construction is omitted is the claim by Schutz that
typifications are anonymized— the "result" is thought to
any.-one*s product, and as such doable and recognizable
by any competent adult member of the social unit.

This

process of anonymization loses the social authorship of the
construction, for if retained these details would demonstrate
that the outcome is highly contextualized,

the product of
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unique biographies, and not any-one*s result.

16

The

pragmatic loss of the arbitration provides an event for
any-other.
A further aspect of anonymization is pertinent here.
As the negotiated "result" is transmitted to others, and
then to someone else, the outcome is further removed from
the situation of origin,

as

this distancing from the

original situation increases an unembedded result is h a n d e d •
over matter-of-factly, as the way things are.

The recipient

knows that part of the social world through the situationally
detached typifications of others and not .through the active
constructive work of the original problem solving attempt.
It is then apparent that the initial parties to the
construction stand in a different relationship to the
socially negotiated knowledge than does the recipient.

The

founding members to the construction know of the results
embedded and arbitrated character while the receiver of the
transmission may not.
As the recipient is further removed from a knowledge
of the "results" construction, what takes place when prag
matic constraints make the types problematic?

How readily

will the member who knows the world through the talk of
others— through second-hand typifications— renegotiate its

joke's failure as noted by the comment 'you had to
be there,.' indicates the teller's inability to make the joke
anyone's .
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outcome?

To the extent that the recipient has accepted the

transmission matter-of-factly,

as an outcome doable and

recognizable by any-other, and is unaware of the socially
negotiated fundament of that "result," it is assumed that it
will be harder to reinsert a constructive process: i.e., the
outcome will be less readily re-negotiated the further
removed the recipient is from the original construction.
Have we progressed in answering the original query:
how do we as members of some social unit come to acquire the
socially shared stock of knowledge which enables us to think
and to act as recognizably competent adult members of a
society?

Sherif's (1935» 1936) basic formulation has been

retained but the function of talk and typification are now
affixed as critical dimensions.

In assessing how shared

social knowledge is acquired, we can now state the following
conjectures:
Given a problematic context
la: talk during an interaction provides
the elements from which a common
world can be constructed;
lb: reflection on this preceding talk
generates typifications which select
from this step-by-step process those
elements which permit the grasping
of a pragmatic result;
2: the transmission of this result to
others omits its social construction
so the results can look like anyone’s;
3: as the "knower" of the result is
further and further removed from the
original situation the harder it is
for that recipient to renegotiate the
result.
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It then appears that the conversational discourse of
interacting adults pragmatically engaged with a task at hand
will provide the elements for the negotiation and construction
of a "preparedness to see"; and which upon reflection produce
typifications that shall remain unproblematic until-furthernotice.
To empirically address the phenomenological claims
about the relation of speech to knowledge construction and
type formation, a context must be discovered or created that
enables the parties to the interaction to become pragmatically
engaged in a problematic situation; to offer the opportunity
for reflection; and to allow different stances toward the
situationally shaped knowledge.

However,

any-empirical

setting that attempts to verify these conjectures amongst
interacting adults is methodologically confounded.
For the participants who enter the context are
sophisticated adults who are immersed in, and continually
rely upon a system of cultural recipes that permit social
comprehension and action.

In such encounters where there

already is the "background of a world that is silently
taken-for-granted" (Berger & Luckmann,

19^7, p. 152), talk

is already presumed to be a system of anonymized typifica
tions, and a type is a "variation on typifications already
on hand, however plain and ill-defined they may be" (Schutz,
1973, p. 232).

Though the participants' talk-in-context presumes a
world of pre-existing shared knowledge and types, a novel
environment can "be created and sustained in an experimental
setting.

The construction of such a context would make the

"stock of knowledge" on hand problematic and offer the
opportunity to observe the formulation of shared knowledge
and the grasping of a theme.

The stimulus utilized to

support such a context must enable the members to become
pragmatically engaged with it, and allow them to come to
"know" it in line with some task-at-hand.

Yet the members

must be surprised by the same stimulus at some future point
so what they have come to know through their conversation
can be challenged.

The stereograms developed by Bela

Julesz (1971) are appropriate stimuli.
When seen without a visual aid, the stereogram appears
to be a series of dots but when viewed through a set of
color-coded goggles a previously- hidden figure becomes
visible.

The figure seen appears to separate from the

center of the previously undefined visual field and to
either move forward and out (extension) or back and away
(recession) depending on the color arrangement of the
goggles.

The ability to project and sustain an extended

or recessed image provides the opportunity for the partici
pants to be engaged with and come to know a particular
visual world which can be socially and consensually
validated through talk about that world.

By exchanging

the goggles this socially formed world can surprise its
members.

That is, in an experimental setting where each

participant begins by viewing an extended figure, it is
possible to solve a problem related to that display— how far
in front of the pattern of dots is the figure that appears.
The next part of the context would proceed by presenting
one of the. original members or a new partner with a pair of
goggles which made recession visible, while the other member
continued to view extension.

The problem to be.resolved

remains the same as the one presented earlier, but the
alteration in visual alignment disrupts the prior resolution
and permits the occasion for reflection on what has been made
known and the possible renegotiation of the task.

And with

such a context and task we can begin to address the con
jectures put forth about the consequences of talk.
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METHOD

Overview:
can:

Four exploratory studies have been devised which

(a) sustain a novel and problematic context during

which an experimental task is to be solved;

(b) provide an

opportunity to experimentally manipulate the occasion for
reflection;

(c) offer the chance to renegotiate the initial

solution; and (d) manipulate how a member acquires the
information about how the task is to be performed.
study

has at least two parts and

begins

viewing an extended Julesz stereogram.

Each

with two (2)subjects

The subjects

are

asked

to arrive at a cooperative

judgment about how far in

front

of the pattern of dots the

figure

that appears is.

ensuing dialogue allows the subjects to consensually validate
their judgments,

and the manner of knowing constructed in

these contexts refers to the derivation of a particular
solution to the task at hand.
begin with one member,

The later parts of each study

either one of. the original pair or a

new member, wearing a set of color-coded goggles which makes
the figure in the stereogram appear recessed.

The other

partner continues to view an extended figure and the task to
be resolved remains unchanged.

The later part of each study

is then shaped so that the manner of knowing which emerged
during the initial interaction is made problematic and open
to renegotiation.

In addition, the new member's stance

The

toward the negotiated knowledge is such that (s)he is
informed about the visual world and the task to be performed
either through their own speech and sight or through the talk
and explanation of others.
Materials:

The stimuli presented in all four studies are

Julesz stereograms— either a diamond or triangle.

When the

stereograms are viewed a set of goggles are worn which have
red and green acetate lenses.

When the goggles worn have red

acetate over the right eye and green over the left, the figure
appears to move forward and out from the center of the visual
field (extension).

If the colors are reversed, the figure

appears to have receded back and away from the center of the
display (recession).

At all times a 3 x 5 ’unruled index card

with the experimental problem typed on it is on the table and
in full view of the subjects.

Also on the table in front of

the participants is a Panasonic RQ-32^S cassette recorder
with three SONY F-2? microphones attached.

The stereograms

are projected on an American Optical Hs Opaque Projector

1000 .
Study One (The B a s e ) :1^
Subjects: •Seven teams of subjects from the Brooklyn College
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'The rationale for the first part of each study should
be clear, it offers an opportunity to acquire some knowledge
about the world.
With the variations presented in the second
part of the studies we offer the occasion for reflection and/
or transmission of the first solution.
But most importantly
we can- ascertain how the stance of the "knower"— the person
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subject pool were used for a total of lk subjects, 5 males
and 9 females, ranging in age from 17 to 20.
Procedure:

There are two parts to this study and the same

two subjects (si and s2) participate in each part.

In the

first part of the design, the Ss are requested to enter the
experimental room and to take seats at the table.

On the

table in front of them are two microphones, a cassette
recorder,

two sets of goggles,

and an index card with the

experimental problem typed on it.

Behind them is the opaque

projector and another table.
The subjects are told that the experiment is concernedwith how individuals reach solutions to problems and are
read the following instructions:
Let me explain the first part of the experiment
in more detail.
As I've said we are concerned
with how individuals reach solutions to
problems.
The pattern of dots that is now
projected on the wall (screen) provides the
problem that you will have to solve.
On the
table in front of you are a pair of goggles.
When you place the goggles over your eyes a
figure which is not apparent without the goggles
will appear.
It may take some time for the
figure to become clearly visible.
The tape
recorder is present to record how you both go
about solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you
must solve ijs to mutually come to an agreement
on how far in front of the pattern of dots the
figure that appears is. This part of the
experiment is over when you have cooperatively

whose knowledge will be challenged— influences the ability to
renegotiate the results.
As such, with the exception of study
1, the names given to each study are meant to evoke how that
"knower" acquired what was known— directly through his or her
own experience or vicariously, through the experience of others.
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agreed on how far in front of the dots the
figure is.
The problem must be solved jointly,
and in no case can the experimenter be asked for
help once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place
the goggles on. Take a few moments to adjust
to wearing them. You can begin to solve the
problem as soon as the shape has become clearly
visible.
So you do not forget what the problem
is, it is typed on the index card in front of you.
Again, the problem is to mutually come to an
agreement on how far in front of the pattern of
dots the figure that appears i s .i8
When the problem is resolved with the first stereogram
(a diamond),

the subjects are asked to remove their goggles

and rest their eyes.

During this rest period a second

stereogram (a triangle) is projected on the screen.

The

second part of the experiment begins when the E returns the
goggles to the participants.

However,

as the second part is

always constructed to provide reflection on the previous
experience,

the E randomly selects one of the subjects and

presents that subject with a set of goggles whose color
arrangement is different than those worn in the first part.
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The detailed instructions for each of the studies is
in Appendix A. As there are different sets of color-coded^
goggles the subjects stand in a set of possible relationships
to each other and to the experimental instructions.
The set
of possible relations are spelled out in Tables 1 and 2 in
Appendix B. But each study proceeds in the first part by
having the subjects each wear goggles that enable- them to see
an extended display— that is the goggles have red acetate
over the right eye and green over the left.
What the subjects
view then matches the experimental task which requires a
judgment about extension.
The conditions which are omitted
provide other interesting twists to what can be accomplished.
But they are omitted so that the studies, given their
exploratory nature, can be standardized as much as possible.
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The other subject is given the set of goggles previously
worn.

The randomly selected S now views a recessed triangle,

while the partner continues to see an extended one.
Before the goggles are put on, the experimenter tells
the subjects that:
You can proceed as you did in the first part
of the experiment.
Your task is again to
mutually come to an agreement on how far in
front of the pattern of dots the figure that
appears i s .
Study Two (The Repeater):
Subjects;

Seven teams were used for a total of twenty-one

subjects,

13 females and 8 males, ranging in age from 17 to
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Procedure:

As with study number one there are two parts to

this study, but there are now three subjects (si, s2, and
s3).

Prior to starting the experiment, the subjects are

informed that they will be participating in a study which
has multiple parts,

that they will be randomly assigned to

these parts by drawing lots, and that the study is concerned
with how individuals reach solutions to problems.
part assignment is completed,

Once the

si and s2 enter the laboratory

while s3 remains seated outside.
When si and s2 enter the room they are read essentially
the same instructions provided to the subjects in study number
one.

The modification made is that they are told that one of

them, but not which one, will have to take part in the second
phase of the experiment and explain to the person waiting
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outside what the experimental task was and how it was
solved.
With the resolution of the task the subjects areasked
to remove their goggles and one

of the Ss— as determined by

the initial random selection— leaves the room and asks s3
to enter.

This departing S is also asked to remain outside

so that (s)he can take part in the debriefing.
subject enters,

When the new

(s)he is told:

As you know the person you are seated next
to has participated in the first part of the
experiment.
This individual will now explain
to you what the experimental task was that
had to be solved, and how it was solved in
the first part.
When this is done both of
you will have to reach a cooperative solution
to the same problem that was solved in the
first part.
In no case can the experimenter
be asked for assistance once the experiment
has begun.
The new subject (s3) is presented with a pair of
goggles which show a recessed diamond, while the remaining
subject (si or s2) continues to wear the goggles which show
an extended diamond.

In this study, and studies three and

four, the stereogram viewed in all parts is a diamond.
Study Three (The Watcher-Hearer):
Subjects:

Seven teams were used for a total of twenty-eight

subjects, 20 females and 8 males, ranging in age from 17 to
53.
Procedure:

Though there are still two parts to this study,

a team is composed of four subjects (si, s2, s3» and s*0 .
As with study two, the members are initially introduced to
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the study and randomly assigned to the part and role that
they will have.

When si and s2 enter the room they are given

the same introduction that the subjects for study one were
provided with.

In addition,

they are informed that another

subject, the watcher-hearer (s3), will observe them while
they solve the task and that in the second part of the study
it is that individual,
last subject,

s3, who will explain the task to the

s*K

After this introduction is given to si and s2, the
third subject is brought into the room and told:
As the other subjects work on the experimental
problem you will watch them and hear them solve
it.
It is important that you pay attention to
their efforts for even though you will not be
wearing goggles it is your responsibility in
the second part of the study to explain to the
subject now waiting outside what the experi
mental task was and how it was resolved.
After
you do that you will be asked to solve with that
person the same problem that was solved h e r e .
During this part of the experiment you can
not offer any advice, nor can the subjects ask
for your help.
Once they have solved the task
feel free to ask them any questions you think
are necessary to know for the second part of
the experiment.
The major modification that occurs in this study is that
one member— the watcher-hearer— observes two members solving
the task but has no first-hand knowledge of what they see as
(s)he is not wearing goggles.

What the watcher-hearer can

know is only what (s)he observes or hears.
part of the study concludes,

After the first

it is this third subject who

must convey the task demands to a new, and sighted, partner
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who views a recessed diamond.

When the original pair, si

and s2, depart and a fourth subject enters,

(s)he is told:

As you know the person you are seated next
to has participated in the first part of the
experiment.
This individual will now explain
what the experimental task was that had to be
solved and how it was solved in the first part
of the study. When this is done both of you
will have to reach a cooperative solution to
the same problem that was solved in the first
part.
When I shut the lights off you can put
on your set of goggles.
The other person is
not wearing goggles, and can not put them on.
In no case can the experimenter be asked for
assistance once the experiment has begun.
Study Four (The Hearer):
Subjects:

Seven teams were used for a total of twenty-eight

subjects,

12 males and 16 females, ranging in age from 17 to

Procedure:

While there are still four subjects (si, s2, s3»

and s*0 there are now three parts to the study.

The subjects

are again introduced to the experiment and randomly assigned
to parts and roles.

The first part begins when si and s2

enter the room and are read the same instructions as
presented in study number two.

At the conclusion of the

task, one member leaves and requests another to enter.

This

new member— the hearer— is told by the remaining subject what
the task was and how it was solved.
neither member wears goggles,

During this explanation,

and the hearer only knows about

the task through the comments of his or her partner.

When

the explanation is concluded to the satisfaction of the
participants,

the remaining member of the original pair

(si or s2) departs and asks the last and fourth member to
enter the room.

When this subject enters, the third part of

the study begins with a similar set of instructions as
presented in the second phase of study number three.

And

the hearer who has no visual access to the stereogram
explains the task demands to a partner who sees a recessed
diamond.
Subjects:

Overall a total of 91 subjects, 33 males and 58

females, were recruited from the Brooklyn College subject
pool, and each subject was randomly assigned to a study, a
part, and a task role.

The subjects were all taking

introductory psychology courses and ranged in age from 17

RESULTS

Two different descriptive approaches will he used to
assess the transcripts: one quantitative and the other
qualitative.

The quantitative analysis seeks only to set

a background for the more detailed qualitative description
of the conversations.

And the qualitative component will

attempt to systematically explore the dialogues and
sensitize the reader to relevant issues.
I.

Quantitative Description
Of the 91 subjects who participated in the studies,

four (*0 (two in study two and two in study four) could not
see both extension and recession.

However, three of these

subjects took part when it was necessary to see extension,
and each of them could see the extended figure.

The

remaining subject could only see recession, and served in
the second part of the experiment when recession was what
was supposed to be viewed.

All of the subjects who took

part in the studies were then able to see what they were
19
intended to see. *

■^Each subject was asked to describe what (s)he was
seeing in as much detail as possible at the conclusion of the
experimental chore but prior to the debriefing.
The first
subject requested to give a description was always the
individual who was seeing a recessed figure.
After this
description the goggles were switched and the same subject
was again asked what was seen.
After this the partner who

kl
(a): Time to Reach Solution
As the members in the first part of each* study begin by
seeing an extended diamond they are presented with a straight
forward tasks to mutually decide how far in front of the rest
of the display the diamond appears to be.
begins in the same manner,

In that each study

the time taken to resolve the

experimental task during the first part is not expected to
vary between the four studies.
later stages of the studies,

With the movement to the

the task becomes more complex

and with the discovery of the perceptual alteration more
difficult.

If we can assume that an increase in task

complexity and difficulty will be reflected in an increase
in the time taken to resolve the experimental.chore, we
would expect that the later parts of each study will take
longer to complete than the first part.

Furthermore,

the

third conjecture suggests that it will be harder to renego
tiate the task the more removed the "knower" is from the
original context.

As such there is a presumed direction of

difficulty as we proceed from Study One (the Base) to Study

had either extension or nothing was asked to describe what
(s)he was seeing, beginning with extension.
After this
description was completed any subjects who were waiting
outside were brought in and asked to provide similar^
descriptions, one at a time and starting with extension.
This check enabled us to determine what it was that the
subjects were viewing if it was not explicit^in^talk.
Though
each subject went through this process even if it was obvious
from their discussion what was being seen, this permitted
us to verify that the subjects could see both extension and
recession.
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Four (the Hearer) and we would now expect the times taken
to finish the task to vary between the studies— it should
take less time to complete the task in the later parts of
the first study than the second, third and fourth studies
and so on.

The times taken by the subjects to conclude the

task is shown in Table 3 and the following points emerge:

Table 3
Mean Time (in seconds) Taken
by Subjects to Conclude the
Experimental Taska

Study

Part 1

Part 2.

One

124.13

207.77

Two

270.79

288.24

Three

328.84

3^ 5.89

Four

105.80 '

286.91

a. In order to make the parts
comparable, part 1 excludes the
time in study 3 when the subject
asks questions of the Ss, and
part 2 excludes that part of the
study 4 which has the old Ss
explaining to the new S what has
occurred.
First, the first part of the studies show more
variability than originally anticipated as studies two and
three appear to take considerably longer to conclude than

do studies four and one.

A one-way ANOVA on the means for

part 1 shows a significant difference (F 3,24 - 3*77
p < .05), and a Scheffe test at the recommended level of
.10 (Ferguson, 1971) reveals a significant difference for
the comparison between the means of studies three and four
(F' 3, 2k= 6.99 p < .10).

An examination of Study Three

shows that there is one interaction which takes quite a
while to conclude and which brings up the overall mean for
that study.
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If the analysis is adjusted to exclude this

interaction, the one-way ANOVA is no longer significant.
Yet, there is the suggestion that some differences between
the studies may exist as the times taken to conclude studies
two and three are still longer than the times taken for
studies one and four.
Second, while it seems that the second part of the
studies take longer to conclude, with the exception of Study
Four (t = -2.47 P <-05) these differences are not statis
tically significant.

Third,

the supposed direction of

difficulty in part 2— an increase in time from study One
to Four— appears to be only weakly suggested.

And fourth,

the one-way ANOVA on the means for part two reveals no
significant difference so the anticipated variability between
the studies has not occurred.

^^With this interaction omitted the mean for Study Three
becomes 249.20.
It should be noted that the time taken to
conclude the task is not being considered as a measure of
cognitive processes.
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However,

an important qualification must be made.

A

task was presumed to be more difficult only when the
perceptual anomaly between the parts was discerned.
majority of cases (17/28 or 60 .71?o),
revealed.
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In the

the anomaly was never

It then is necessary to separate those cases where

it remained concealed.

In scrutinizing those cases where a

difference was noticed (Table 4-), it is clear that the second

Table 4Time Taken (in seconds) by Subjects to
Conclude the Experimental Task when the
Difference Between the Parts Is Noticed

Study
One

Two

Three
Four
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Part 1

Part 2

89.0
98.3
171.3
4-9.1

305.3
153.5
221.6
198.7

258.5
4-81.8
318.4-

4-26.8
677.3
366.7

806.?

912.7

115-5
30.414-3.8

24-3.4399.1
617.3

That such a substantial number of teams did not
unearth the perceptual differences between the parts is an
integral part of the qualitative analysis which follows.
The
breakdown of those cases which found a difference and those
which did not is listed in Table 10.

-

part of the studies always took longer to complete.

But

even in this analysis there does not appear to be any strong
support for the assumption of increased difficulty as we
proceed from Study One to Study Four.

If this particular

argument is to be maintained we must find support for it
elsewhere than the analysis of time.
(b): Distances Reached
Requiring the subjects to arrive at a decision about
distance and then having that outcome passed on to someone
else is the closest this research comes to replicating the
"arbitrary tradition" literature.

It is then interesting to

probe the data to see if any comparisons can be made.
One initial difference between this work and the earlier
research must be elaborated before any similarities are
discussed.

In the "arbitrary tradition" research the subjects

always work with the same task, but in these studies if a
disparity is revealed, the different parts take on a
radically altered nature.

To make the appropriate comparisons

at least two criteria have to be met:
a: that the same figure be seen in both
parts;
b: that the subjects do not realize they
have varied relationships towards the
stereogram.
Some further criteria need to be specified before we can
proceed to contrast the data.

These additions are:

c: that reaching a distance is part of
the task conveyed to a new member;
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d: that the earlier decision be given
• to the new member;
e: that the task is seen as being a
cooperative venture.22
There are five (5) cases which satisfy the criteria
listed above, but before making any statements about what
this data represents a further discrimination between this
research and the "arbitrary tradition" literature should be
made.

The studies presented here have a very short life.

What is transmitted is done only once or twice, while the
earlier work had generational cycles of at least four.

Any

thing that appears to be transmitted should not be thought
of as a norm.

The five cases are listed in Table 5. and the
Table 5

Distances (in inches) Reached
Across Parts

Study^
One
Two

Three
Four

Part 1

Part 2

----

----

9
12
12
2a
5

8.6 to 9
12
12
2 to 3
6

a. The actual responses here were
a "couple of inches" and a "few
inches."
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These criteria automatically exclude all of Study One
where two different stereograms are viewed, and the eleven

closeness of the distances derived in both parts is
suggestive.

It seems plausible to propose that what the

"arbitrary tradition" research produced is also generated
here with talk, though weakly.

A previous decision has

been created and transmitted, however short-lived.
(c): Talk Assessed
The results presented here provide the first entry
into the discourse,

and the coding offered should be

considered as a preliminary grid— suggestive and descriptive
rather than conclusive.

Furthermore, as no inter-rater

reliability is available for the talk coded here, this
analysis of the C-acts should be interpreted cautiously.
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The coding scheme used was borrowed from Cole, Dore,
Hall, and Dowley (1978) and permits the coding of
conversational acts (C.-acts) into eight broad categories:
(1) requests;

(2) responses;

(5) acknowledgements;

(3) descriptions;

(^) statements

(6) organizational devices;

cases where a difference was discovered.
Criterion (e) is
related to (d) in that the remaining S may suggest that it
is only the new member who has to provide a distance.
In
this case the remaining partner does not need to rely on
the prior decision and everything is left up to the new
subject.
In these cases there is then no issue of something
being transmitted and maintained.
^ A n additional problem should be indicated: that some
of the coded utterances could fit more than one category.
That a C-act, or speech act, can serve a multiplicity of
functions and can be equivocal is a well recognized problem
in the literature (Labov & Fanshel, 1977? and Dore, 1977)*

(7) performatives; and (8) miscellaneous utterances.

In

using these categories a word, phrase, clause, or sentence
was assessed to see if it was a C-act.

No unit larger than

a sentence was coded and the Cole et al. classificatory
scheme was abbreviated as we omitted such concerns as topic
shifts, grammatical form, illocutionary force, and inter
actional value as these issues seemed less relevant to the
task at hand.

The distribution of the discourse is shown

in Tables 6 and 7, and in each study the bulk of the
Table 6
Conversational Act Analysis of Discourse
.by Study for Part One

Study 2' Study 3

Study 4

Category

Study 1

Requests

27-2

21.9

23.3

25.2

24.0

17.2

13.7

21.3

Descriptions

10.2

14.0

20.9

22.5

Statements

17.8

20.2

19.6

10.6

Acknowledgements

16.3

18.2

17.5

16.'9

Organizational

0.0

1.7

0.6

0.0

Performative s

0.0

0.9

1.8

0.0

4.5

..liS

...2.5

_3^i

Total Percent

100.0

100.0

99.9

100.0

Total C-Acts

246

441

Responses
•

Miscellaneous

r

.

755

254

k9
Table 7
Conversational Act Analysis of Discourse
by Study for Part Two

Category

Study 1

Study 2

Study 3

Study k

Requests

22.9

2k.6

22.3

26.6

Responses

18.0

15.5

lk.6

18.0

Descriptions

16.0

19.2

22.5

16.7

Statements

22.8

22.7

22.0

23.k

Acknowledgements

Ik.5

13.6

15.3

12.8

Organi zational

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.0

Performative s

0.9

1.2

0.1

0.3

Miscellaneous

k.9

3.0

3.2

2.2

Total Percent

100.0

100^0

100.0

100.0

Total C-Acts

kk9

572

690

718

utterances (75% or more) fall into the first four categories—
requests, responses, descriptions,

and statements.

While it

may not be surprising to find that in this particular context
the subjects spend a good deal of their time exchanging
information and describing what they see, their restriction
to the topic suggests their involvement with the task-athand.

Indeed that the conversations recorded here seem to

minimize small talk, restrict greetings, and downplay the
side sequences which occur in other conversational contexts
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should serve as a reminder that the conversation is topic
constricted and limited in a certain "way— it is what can be
called task-focused-talk.
As with the description of time taken to reach a
solution, we would presume that the talk recorded in the
first part would show somewhat similar patterns— with the
divergence occurring in the later parts of each study.

The

first point to note is that if we examine the total C-acts
coded for the first part of each study (Table 6) the
variability between the studies suggested in the time
analysis resurfaces: studies two and three show a higher
number of C-acts than do studies one and four.

Again,

as

with the analysis of time, the same interaction in Study
Three is inflating the total C-acts.
contributes about

This encounter

of the C-acts (309 out of 755 C-acts),

but even if we exclude this interaction the number of C-acts
coded for studies two and three remain higher than studies
one and four.

While it is possible that the increase in

C-acts is in part attributable to the presence of an
observer in Study Three, this could not be the explanation
for Study Two.

So again the issue of a possible difference

between the initial conditions of studies two and three from
those of studies one and four arises.
When we compare the Tables, we can see that with the
exception of Study Three the number of C-acts increase from
the first to the second part of each study.

The higher
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number of C-acts is in part a result of the explanation that
the members must provide to each other in the later parts of
studies two, three, and four.

But as no explanation is

required for Study One, we can suggest that some of the
additional talk is occurring for reasons other than providing
an explanation of the task.
Another point can be raised if we compare the first
four categories as they appear in Tables 6 and 7 .

As noted

in the analysis of time, there again seems to be less
variability in the later part of the studies than in the
first part.

For example, Table 6 shows that across studies

the category of "descriptions" ranges from 10 .2$ to 22 .5$
(a range of 12.3$). whereas in Table 7 the -range is much
narrower (from 16.05 to 22.5$).

A similar statement could

be made about the other three categories.
While this classification of the discourse raises some
concerns about what is happening in the conversations,

it

does not reveal what we wanted to get at: the construction
of typifications.

And in a very real sense the heart of the

proceedings remains masked— the role that talk may have in
concealing the altered visual perspective.

A closer, more

focused and detailed examination of the transcripts is
required.
II.

Qualitative Description
It is the burden of the qualitative description to

provide a more nuanced and precise formalization of the role

52
talk may play in developing a shared social world.

To begin

to move to this detailed examination of the discourse, I
want to present, without analysis,

the entire first part of

two face-to-face encounters which occur in Study One (the
Base), and ask some straightforward questions about these
exchanges.
Consider first transcript # 12 :
s i : hum
s 2 : I would say...a foot...I d o n ’t know
it's hard to tell
s i : I know...it's hard to say...I hate things
like this...a half a foot? A foot?
s 2 : It's really tough. My first impression
was a foot.
sl: A foot?
s 2 : What did you say?
I would think maybe a foot,
Sl: I don't know.
or something like that,
s 2 : uh huh
s l : We could compromise and say three quarters
of a foot.
s2 : Yeah, Ok (chuckle)
(chuckle)
Sl:
s2 : Should we put down the same dimensions?
It's about eight or nine inches?
sl: yeah, I guess so
s 2 : yeah
sl: alright... that was easy
s 2 : O k . ..now what?...now what?
e : Ok, have you reached an agreement?
sl: yeah
s 2 : yeah
and then transcript # 3 :
si:
s2 :
si:
s2 :
si:

see it?
yeah
how far do you think it is?
m m m m m ...mmmmm...a foot...what do you say?
it's less...it looks like eight inches,
nine inches.
I thought it was a foot first.
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sl: you don't think it's any less than a foot?
s2 : uh no...I'd say it's really about a foot?
Turn your head a little bit and see if you
can make the background come out before and
then see how much...can you see that?
s l : nnno
sl: I still think it's like, you know, a little
less
s2: I'd say 10 inches...is a little less, no
more than, not less than 10 inches
sl: no I think it's like 10
s2 : ten inches?
sl: yeah
s 2 : I'll go along with that
sl: ten inches
s 2 : yeah
How is it that these numbers,

10 inches, one foot,

and a continual reference to some-thing,

"it," are heard as

being germane to the experiment: for the participants,
E, and for the reader?

for

How is it that these exchanges can

be considered to have reached a satisfactory conclusion
for these parties?

Obviously,

the appropriateness of the

talk has been shaped and influenced by the experimental
instructions.

In these two interactions,

the protocols

provided, as Berger and Luckmann noted " . . .

the background

of a world that is silently taken for granted."

The members'

dialogue is heard as being responsive to the experimental
task and as correctly resolving the problem because each of
the participants,

and E and the reader,

share the same

instructional set and rely on the presumptions included
within that frame.
just posed,

While this may answer the questions

it is incomplete for it does not articulate what
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that taken-for-granted world is nor specify the precise role
that the instructions play.
(a): An Entry Point
To elaborate these issues, I want to connect two topics
raised in the introduction— Sherif-.'s discussion of norm
formation and the phenomenological concern with the takenfor-granted world— with the concept of figure and ground.

In

writing about norm formation, Sherif cites Koffka's statement
about the basic decomposability of the relationship between
figure and ground:
. . . the ground has a very important function
of its own.
It serves as a general level . . .
upon which the figure appears. Now figure and
ground form a structure, consequently-the,
former can not be independent of the latter.
On the contrary the quality of the figure
must be largely determined by the general
level upon which it appears.
(Sherif, 1935.
pp. 37-38)
Sherif then adds:
The ground is especially important in social
psychology.
Studies in social facilitation
would gain much sense if the subtle relation
ships between figure and ground were taken
into consideration.
For example, when two^
people are talking in a public theater their
conversation and behavior are tinged by the
properties of the whole atmosphere.
(1935.
p. 39)
Figure and ground relations are then not to be found or
presumed only in a perceptual domain but are meant to
encompass social relations.

Two senses of figure and ground

can then be offered: a literal or physical sense,
metaphoric or social sense.

and a
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But in either domain what emerges as "figure" can not
be divorced from its relation to some "ground."

The issues

of norm formation and taken-for-granted make similar points
in that what stands forth as figure— normative or culturally
appropriate— takes place against some set of social
presuppositions which serve as "ground"— "a preparedness to
see."

Even if these grounds can not be articulated. Within

the context of these studies, the instructions provide

a

detailed and explicit ground from which talk and action can
emerge and be "heard" and "seen" as responsive to the taskat-hand.

In each study the protocols structure the following

grounds:
i: that there is a non-visible event yet to
be seen (FUTURE)
ii: that with a visual aid the two dimensional
display before them will unveil this still
non-visible dimension (GOGGLES)
iii: that this as yet unidentified dimension
will be some figure (FIGURE)
iv: that this figure will stand in a set
relation to the visual display seen
without the visual aid (RELATION)
v: that the emerging figure will appear to
be in front of the two dimensional display
(EXTENSION)
vi: that the separation between the two
figures can be assessed along some scale
of distance (DISTANCE)
viis that the determination of the distance
is to be cooperatively achieved
(MUTUALITY)
viii: that each member will see the same visual
display and have the same relationship to
it (SAMENESS)
ix: that one of the members will have to
explain the problem to a new member
(RIGHTS)
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x: that the same problem will be addressed
and repeated in later parts of the
study (REPEATABILITY)24
During the first part of the experiments the instructions
will then accomplish two things.

First, they will formulate

a set of relevant concerns that will both guide and constrain
talk; and second,

they will provide the grounds from which

the conversation can be "heard" as relevant to the task-athand.

If the analogy between figure and ground, talk and

instructions,

is to be taken seriously we need a way to

assess these two claims.
If the instructions do orient the participants to the
task and do establish an opening set of relevant domains,
we can check the first claim by examining each initial query
or opening comment.

For a question or opening gambit should

address one of the ten points listed— either implicitly or
explicitly.

However,

there is one additional tactic that

may arise:
xi: that any participant who does not
understand the instructions can ask
that they be repeated or clarified
(CLARIFICATION)

ph

The instructions obviously present more information than .
is noted in these ten points.
For example, the Ss are told
that there is an index card on the table, that the mikes are
on, and that E can not be asked for help.
These issues will
arise in talk and are important, but as they usually arise
when trouble occurs in the second part of the experiments
they are left out.
Also, points (i) through (viii) and (x)
are operative in each study, whereas (ix) is not a part of
study number one.
Furthermore, point (ix) will become an
issue in the second part of studies three, four and two.
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In examining the opening comments, there are only three
instances (3/28) which fall outside these eleven concerns.
Of these three cases, two occur between friends who start
with "Are you ready, Sal," and "Dirty pictures."

The

remaining exception is a query to E as to whether the study
is going to be timed.

It is plausible that this remark can

be accounted for by the stopwatch held by E.
temporary diversion,

After this

each of these conversations return to

the concerns specified in the instructions.
We can examine the second point by returning to the
dialogue previously cited.

It must be noted that what- is

not said is as important as what is said.

In each

conversation neither member identifies the figure seen (a
diamond), and each reference to an "it" works off the
instructional presumption that they see some-thing which is
the same-thing for each of them.
to this formulation,
specific designation,

As neither partner objects

"it" can stand in place of the more
diamond.

Besides this omission, the

partners never clarify the relationship of the diamond to
the rest of the display— that it is "in front."

And in

transcript # 3 , we find the expression "how far do you think
it is?"

Again, as there is no protest about this usage by

the partner a distance is offered.
As with "it," this less specific phase takes for granted
the presumption that the same-thing is seen and that each
partner sees the figure in the same manner— as an extended
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image.

The presumption that each member sees what'the

"other" views legitimates their use of synonyms.
of expressions,

A variety

less specific ones, are able to stand in

place of "diamond" and "in front" which if unchallenged
permits the exchange of numbers and the resolution of the
experimental problem.

And enables the members to continue

believing that the reference and meaning of these alternate
designations are unproblematic.
With the emergence of these synonyms we can see how the
members heard their talk as germane to the task at hand.
But it is not necessary that members remain silent about what
is viewed,

and we can contrast these dialogues with ones

where the presumptions are considered a topic to be discussed.
Consider transcript #20, part 1, study
s l : what do you see?
s 2 : a diamond
sl: yeah...it's a diamond.
How far in
front does it look?
s 2 : urn...it looks about
sl: I don't know maybe a foot
s 2 : about a foot?
sl: yeah looks good
s 2 : yeah
sl: that was quick
s 2 : fair enough
sl: Ok...we're supposed to let him know?
and then transcript # 17 , part 1 , study 2 :
s2 :
sl:
s2:
sl:

do you see a figure?
yeah
Ok can you tell me what you see?
i t 's a diamond shaped square, smaller
than the other o n e , i t 's in front of
the larger one
s2: now I'm having difficulty because, uh,
I don't see that.
Are both of your, uh,
both of your glasses have a colored
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screen, do your lenses have a colored
screen?
s l : right
s 2 s only one of my lenses has a colored
screen
sl: what do you see?
s2: as I see it, although you know I,
there may he a problem here, cause I
have astigmatism and use only one e y e .
It may require that uh...we need both
eyes to uh see that
sl: is the eye with the ast...
s2: Oh now I see, now it's coming into
focus. Ok how far away do you assume
that it is from the uh...
sl: a foot?
s 2 : a foot
s l : what about you
s 2 : well yeah, uh, I...I guess it's a foot.
Can you think of any other way of
verifying that?
s l : that's what I don't understand, it just
seems a foot but I don't know how come
it seems a foot
s2: a foot Ok
sl: when I close one eye it disappears
s2: yeah, well that's why I wasn't seeing it
for a while, because I was having to focus
both eyes...Ok the thing is that this is
an illusion anyway
s l : uh huh
s 2 : and uh whatever we say is incorrect
s l : right
s2 : so u h ...hum
s l : do we have to know why it appears in
front of the other one or do we just
have to say how much
s 2 : ...how far in front...
sl: just how far
s 2 : in front of it it appears...I find it
difficult to say anything...because I
know that it's not really from it...I,
I, well you want to say a foot?
sl: yeah, that sounds good to me
s2: and uh, my problem is I don't want to
say anything
sl: you don't want to say anything?
s 2 : do you feel that way at all?...any conflict
in saying that it's a foot when you realize
that it's just an illusion?
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sis you're right about it being an illusion,
it's not really a foot...but it appears
to be a foot
s 2 : it does?...Ok as far as appearances...
since we can't be sure, I guess...
anything will do. If I said six inches
would you agree with that?
sl: um...it looks like more than' six inches
s2: Ok, you're pretty sure that it's a foot
and y o u ’re seeing with two eyes and I'm
only seeing with barely two, so...OK
we'll agree then
s l : Ok
s2: Ok, it appears to be a foot
s l : alright
s2: Ok
These two conversations clearly demonstrate that some of
the instructional presumptions may be placed in words and
evaluated.

The shape can be identified and the relationship

specified.

However, an issue is brought out in transcript #17

which has not appeared before.

For the first time "new"

topics are placed on the floor and the subjects briefly
discuss the color of their goggles, the question of whether
the image seen is really an illusion, and how a precise
figure can be derived.

But note that these topics are placed

on the floor for a specific reason:

one of the partners, s 2 ,

is having difficulty either in seeing or agreeing to a
distance.

When some problem arises the members can put these

difficulties into words for each other, yet these "new"
topics are not bizarre.

They are related to thetask-at -

hand and are heard and understood as pertaining to the
member's ability to reach some solution to the experimental
chore.

While the preliminary concerns structured by the

instructions constrain the task and what is talked about
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they are not binding.

In the face of an obstacle whatever

is needed to resolve the problem will be talked about.
A further point needs to be addressed, and it is similar
to the one raised in the brief examination of transcripts 3
and 12 .

After the participants conversed about the relation

ship and shape seen, after the presumption of sameness is
verified,

the specific designations were replaced by synonyms.

We again see "it" employed as a substitute for "diamond," and
"far away" sometimes used as a replacement for "in front."
The range of synonyms used by the participants in the first
part of the study to replace the specific designations are
presented in Table 8 .
What this table permits us to see is the subtle evolution
of a member's vocabulary.

As long as these terms go

unchallenged, the participants have available to them a
variety of expressions, each of which is presumed inter
changeable with the more precise designations.

For members

who rely on the supposition of a shared world, these phrases
can be offered and taken as having a clear and unambiguous
reference and meaning.
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Table 8
Synonyms Employed by the Members in
the First Part of Each Study
Figure

In Fronta

diamond .
it
small figure
little thing in
the middle
square
pattern of dots
dots
thing
box
image
geometric figure
geometric box
baseball diamond
triangle
shape

far away
far forward
far
sticking out
further away
further
away
comes out
before
out
raised
towards me
far from the screen
from the dots
front of the dots
.in front of you
close to us
far from the dots
away from the square
far from the center
close to the screen
from the screen
from the back

a. The issue of synonyms to express the
relationship is intriguing.
There are a
variety of orientations which can be
taken.
And if we include as synonyms
body position we can add such phrases as:
close to me, adjusts to us, in front of
machine, and moves back with us.
Table 9 allows us to determine the number of conversa
tions which specified the figure seen and its relationship to
the rest of the display, and the number of dialogues Which
employed synonyms.
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Table 9
Number of Conversations which use Specific
Terms and Those which use Synonyms8-

Study

Specific
Figure

Synonym
Figure

Specific
In Front

Synonym
In Front

One

3

7

3

6

Two

5

7

k

7

Three

6

7

3

6

Four

5

7

k

5

19

28

Ik

2k

Total

a. During any conversation members can use
either the specific'expression or the
synonym.
That the "figure" is more frequently specified than the
relationship is clear, but what is interesting is that in

50?* of

the transcripts the precise relationship of the diamond

to the rest of the display is not articulated.

And that in

some encounters, k, it is not even expressed with synonyms.
However,

some comment about the figure is made in each

conversation.
All of this may appear a rather tedious way to state the
obvious:

that the experimental instructions provide the

"silent background" for the members' conversation and frame
a set of pragmatic concerns.

Simply put, the members'

dialogue allowed them to complete the task at h a n d .

But more

6b
than this has been accomplished.

A vocabulary has evolved

which represents a history of the interaction and which
depends on the presumption that the members share a common
visual world.

In knowing in detail the taken-for-granted

world and the range of expressions the members use to convey
this detail, we can offer a way to see how "new" realities
emerge and a means by which the original conjectures can be
assessed.
(b): The Presentation of a Problem
With the conclusion of the first part of each study
there are two culturally sophisticated members who have
developed a vocabulary to express what they know about the
figure and its relationship to the rest of the display.
the later parts of each study,

In

one of these members speaks

with, or conveys the task demands to a partner whose
perception of the stereogram is altered— a recessed diamond
is viewed.

But as the enculturated member is ignorant of

this switch,

(s)he enters the other phases of the study

initially relying on the presumptions which have worked
before and on a vocabulary which takes these suppositions
for granted.
The perceptual disparity introduced into the later
parts of each study was to provide a challenge to these
presumptions,

and have the culturally knowledgable member

reflect on his or her prior experience.

It was this

backwards glance at lived experience which was to provide
the occasion to watch for the formation of a type.

The

problem to be raised is that in the majority of these
conversations (60 .17$, 17/ 28 ), no disparity was revealed.
That the perceptual modification is systematically
concealed represents a surprise and suggests that a critical
experimental manipulation failed to work as planned.

But

before this conclusion is accepted, we need to assess two
questions:

(1 ) did something occur between the participants

so that their dialogue did not permit the unearthing of this
anomaly; and (2 ) did a member's positiori--as a direct or
indirect knower— towards the display influence the ability
to discern a difference?
It is important to note, however,

that there are two

ways to decide whether or not a difference was discovered.
First, we can consider a difference to have been recognized
when the culturally knowledgable member realizes that there
has been a shift to recession for the partner.

If this

procedure is employed, 67 *86$ (19/ 28 ) of the conversations
never locate the disparity.

The second way of counting

differences is to consider that any alteration between the
parts which the members argue makes the parts incompatible
represents a difference, regardless of the dimension on
which the irregularity is noticed.

With this method,

60 .71$

(17/ 28 ) of the interactions do not find a difference.
Table 10 shows the different methods of counting, and it
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Table 10
Number of Differences Found

Study

Difference
found for
recession

Difference
found on other
dimensions

No
difference
found

One

k

0

3

Two

3

0

k

Three

0

1

6

Four

2

1

Total

9

2

17

is apparent that differences are not located on the
"correct" dimension— recession— only for studies three and
four.

Furthermore,

there is no study where the anomaly is

uniformly discovered.

Even in study 1, where the same

participants serve in both parts of the encounter, the
difference remains concealed in three out of seven inter
actions.

Also, if we consider the column which shows the

number of differences discovered on the proper variable,
the uncovering of a difference appears systematic.

The

individuals in study 1 were more likely to discover the
irregularity than those in studies two, three, and four.
Why is the perceptual alteration so difficult to find?
Here for example is the entire transcript (#3) for the

2K
second part of a conversation which occurred in study 1 :■ J
e: Any questions? Just begin whenever
you are ready,
si*: I'd say a foot and a half
s2**: No it's less...more like
s i : What?
s 2 : fifteen inches, fourteen?
si: could be ... fifteen?
s 2 : (to e) fifteen!
It should be noted that the only way a difference can be
discovered is if S** mentions it.

But would the raising of

a difference be sufficient for the disparity to be
discovered?

Consider,

for example, transcript #22 from

study 1 which has the following exchange:
si**: I think, I think we're looking at it
differently
s2 *: Wha, I don't think...it makes much of
a difference
si: I think w e ’re seeing it differently'
s 2 : urn, it's definitely a rorschach...I
see a whole bunch of faces in there
...gee...maybe eighteen inches...no
less
si: eighteen inches...less?
So a difference can be raised by S** but this does not mean
that the difference will be heard, or taken as a relevant
difference— that the presumption of sameness no longer works.
Indeed, in this example the disparity is reworked in a manner
that effectively returns the dialogue to the task of finding
.a distance.

-**: indicates the subject whose perspective is unaltered
and whose goggles have red acetate on the right eye
**: indicates the member who sees recession— and for study 1 ,
the member whose perspective is altered between the parts
+: indicates that no goggles are being worn
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Has the difference been so easily dismissed because
the relevant dimensions of in front and behind have stayed
out of their talk?

Transcript #29 (study 3, part two)

produces the following conversation:
-

s3+: Ok, so how far away do you suppose
uh, it seems to be about. . .uh. . .1
don't...eight feet from it...it
seems to be behind the screen
s3 • it seems to be behind?
s^: yeh, behind the screen
s3 • cause they kept saying that it was
s^: uh huh
s3 : in front of
s^: no, it isn't coming...it's about...
it's a foot square
s3 : a foot square?
s^: standing on its end, right?
directly in the middle of the uh
s3 : cause it says here...how far in front...
it appears to be
s^: oh, oh
s3 : so maybe they were sitting at a different
angle?...I don't know
s 4 : (laughs)
s^: in front? huh...it seems...Oh yeah right.
It's in front of the uh...it seems to be
a hole, out, out like a diamond shape
s3 1 right
s^: with the pattern set back
s3 i right, so how far is the diamond in front?
s^: from the front of the pattern its u h . ..
it could be about 2 feet
s3 : sounds alright, we're finished.

Here the difference always seems to be on the verge of being
explicitly formulated, yet the subjects manage to come up
with a judgment that satisfies both participants.

Is it

that the alteration is neatly tucked away by changing in
front to from the front?
These examples are a limited set of what happens
repeatedly in the talk when the disparity remains hidden,

and on many occasions when it is revealed.
us at a very simple position,

But this leaves

and the attempt is to offer

some further discussion so that the conversations can be
more carefully scrutinized and more systematically explained.
How can we begin this analysis and make the examples noted
above and those yet to come more clearly demonstrative as to
what talk is accomplishing in these encounters and where it
is accomplishing it— what space does talk fill?
(c): Concealing a Disparity
In scrutinizing those transcripts which do not reveal
the perceptual alteration,

it is useful to clarify whether

or not the member has access to the original instructions
26
'
provided by E.
This information is displayed on Table 11
Table 11
Members’ Access to the Original Instructions 3
Part

Study 1

Study 2

Study 3

Study ^

One

sl+,s2+

sl+,s2+

sl+, s2H-, s3-

sl+,s2+

Two

s l+,s2+

s_+ , s3-

s3-, s*f~

s_+,s3-

(na)

s3-,s*J~

Three

(na)

(na)

a. (+) means that there was direct access to the
original instructions; (-) means that there was
indirect access— through the talk of others; and
(na) means that this part was not applicable for
that study.

.The expression subtext and text will be used as a
substitute for instructions and talk and assume the same
relationships
i.e., subtext is a backdrop for text.
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and it is clear that in studies 3 (the Watcher-Hearer) and

U- (the Hearer) the last subjects (s3-, s*i~) have no first
hand knowledge of the original instructions and can only
know the task demands from the information conveyed to them.
In studies 1 (the Base) and 2 (the Repeater) there is at
least one member who always retains access to the original
subtext.

The studies can then be separated along a dimension

of direct versus indirect knowing, and it should be indicated
that it is only study 1 (the Base) where no transmission of
the original protocols is required.

In the other studies,
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the culturally informed partner’s ' instructions will
direct and frame the task just as the initial instructions'
did— regardless of the modifications introduced.
As it is only the first study where no retelling of
the task demands occurs,

it is instructive to examine those

three conversations where the difference remained masked.
We can begin with a dialogue already cited (transcript 3,
part 2 ):

^In discussing these transcripts we need a terminology
to designate what task the subjects perform.
As such any
member who sees recession and is presumed to potentially offer
a challenge will be called a foil or spoiler and is noted in
the transcripts by S**. A member whose perspective remains
unaltered and who has actually seen the stereogram (s*) will
be labelled an old member, an original member, a culturally
informed member op task conveyor. The member in study three
who never views the stereogram but who overhears the conversa
tion will be called either the monitor or the abstracterh earer. And the person in the fourth study who is t o l d a b o u t
the task demands by an old member, and who in turn relays it,
will, be labelled a recipient-hearer.

si*:
s2**:
si:
s2 :
si:
s2 :

I'd say a foot and a half
No it's less...more like
What?
fifteen inches, fourteen?
could b e ...fifteen?
(to e) fifteen!

The first point to be raised is to again note that for the
anomaly to be found, the foil (s2 ) must place the switch into
speech so that the partner (si) can offer comments and
possible corrections.
about the alteration,

As long as the foil remains silent
si can continue to silently and

unproblematically rely on the presumption that what has worked
before works again.
difference,

Indeed with s2's muteness about the

it appears as if both members abide by the

supposition that what held sway in the first part does so
again.

The spoiler's quietness about the change in her

perception successfully masks the discrepancy which exists
between the partners— that one views an extended triangle
while the other sees a recessed one.

If we assume that both

participants continue to depend on the belief that they see
the same-thing an error appears to have been m a d e .

But if

the spoiler thinks that si also sees recession— for this
would enable her to suppose that the same image is shared—
while si believes his partner sees extension, the "error" is
visible only from the stance of an E who "knows" that the
members "really" view altered stereograms.
As the difference is kept out of words, it is not certain
that the foil did see something which was counter to her
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previous experience.

In the debriefing, however, this member

(s2 ) expresses the disparity and asserts that she knew there
had been a change but that she remained silent because it was
necessary to reach a mutual decision.

So while we can not

argue that the foil uncritically invoked the original
presumptions, we can indicate that s 2 's speechlessness about
this disparity permitted her partner to trust his previous
experience'and continue believing that once again they each
saw the same visual display.

The mistake made,

however, remains

invisible to s i .
We suggested earlier that comments about the irregularity
can be made but that they need not be heard as a correction of
the subtext.

In Study One, the remaining dialogues v/here the

disparity remained concealed fall into this category.

This

problem can be illustrated by considering transcript 21 , part 2 :
si*: see it?
s2**: yeah, I see it, urn
sis it looks fa, further away than the
other one
s2 : it looks like that, the image is on
the screen and the rest is behind it
or something like that like it's
behind it
si: yeah
s 2 : does it look like it's cut out?
si: yes
s2 : yeah?
si: it moves with you?
s 2 : what?
si: and it moves with you
s 2 : yeah
si: this is more like the...urn this is
further
s 2 : behind?
s i : do you agree with that?
.s2 : behind it right? you mean
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si: yeah
s 2 : yeah that's what I think too
si: it's further away than the other one was,
right?
s 2 : yeah
si: so we said fourteen last time...maybe
eighteen, twenty inches?
s 2 : behind, behind the picture right?
s i : yeah
s 2 : urn...I guess around eighteen?
si: yeah, eighteen
s 2 : eighteen?...Ok
It is si's perspective that is unaltered,

and who starts

the exchange with previously accepted synonyms— "it" and
"further away"— which express what is being seen.

While the

presumption of a repeatable world lurks beneath these
expressions, the foil does raise the salient issue.
triangle, or more accurately "it," is behind.

That the

Yet the person

who views an extended display appears to accept a description
of recession.

How is this possible?

Three answers seem plausible.

First, as with the

previous conversation, the member whose perspective is
unaltered may hear the difference but decide not to voice
it because a mutual decision is required.

Second, as the

dialogue never clearly articulates the exact figure and
ground relationship, all that is available in words is that
one thing is designated as being behind some other thing.
A description whose vagueness can accommodate either recession
and extension and enable an agreement to be reached.

Or

third is the possibility that "behind" is being misheard:
it is not taken as indicating a perceptual change, but rather

as a state of confusion.

That is, as si's orientation to

the stereogram remains the same,

(s)he can rely on the

previous and current visual experience and accept that what
has been ratified once can be depended upon once more— right
now, at this moment.

As the foil also participated in the

initial interaction which was unproblematically concluded, a
dispute which arises over the presumption that the same world
can be invoked suggests to si that the "other" is confused,
not seeing properly,
correction,

or mislooking.

The offering of a

"behind," is then not first heard as depicting

an altered perspective.
While all three answers work, the third one is supported
by si's remarks during the debriefing.

This member maintains

that the foil was confused and that "behind" really meant in
front.

The remaining interaction for the Base (study 1),

transcript 22 , fits the same pattern in that statements which
the foil makes to suggest that the same world can not be
relied upon, presumed to be shared, are not taken as
corrections (page 68 ), and are literally talked away by the
partner whose perspective.is unchanged.

At least for study 1,

while differences may stay masked because the anomaly is
never precisely placed into a comment-able domain, to speak
about the disparity is no guarantee that the corrections will
be properly heard— that the member who continues to assume
a shared visual world should no longer do s o .
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As we move from the Base study, the original protocols
are accessible to new partners only through the details
conveyed by the culturally informed member.

And this old

member has no reason to suspect that the current and prior
experience is no longer shared.

Like study 1, study 2 (the

Repeater) has each individual viewing the stereogram,

and

transcript 13 » part 2 , begins with the task-conveyor (s2 )
separating what is seen with the goggles and what is viewed
without them.
s 2 * : Ok, here see take them off for a
minute...now you see how this here,
it's a square, right, you see red
and green?
s3-3Hf: yeah
s 2 : now, Ok, when you put these goggles
on you're going to see another square
and it looks like a little, a little
square, and it's gonna look like it's
projected forward,- so what we have to
do is figure out together how far
away it is from the back square, that
little square that's forward.
So put
on your goggles and stare at it, and
then you'll see like it's projected,
it's closer to you...do you see it?
s3 •
’ uh hum
s2: Ok take a look a while...now when you
think you can tell me how far away it
is...then we'll come to an agreement
on distance from it.
The task-conveyor (s2) places into words those aspects
of the display which will enable the partner to complete the
experimental problem— task demands are conveyed (what to look
for and what to do with what is seen).

But in the first part

of this interaction, no precise figure was identified and the
figure to ground relation was never articulated clearly.

In
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the opening transmission, a similar non-specific vocabulary
is again employed, and we see the use of synonyms--little
square, far away— which imply that the foil (s3 ) sees what
the culturally informed member views and which assume that
these expressions can be unproblematically used again.
Yet as the culturally informed member does not detail
what it is that is in front, s 2 's terminology can be made to
fit a display where any two items are separated from each
other.

The phrases which hint at extension--"projected

forward," "closer to you"— are too general and easily
adjusted to conform to the recessed stereogram which the
foil views.

Indeed,

s2's request for a judgment about "how

far away it is" is carefully answered by the spoiler (s3 ):
s3 : i t 's about one foot away
And an expression which only requires that one item be at
some distance from another is used to conceal the disparity
and resolve the task.
I want to argue that the expression "far away" as used
by the task-conveyor is not carelessness.

It is an expression

with a history, and is spoken by the conveyor because it is
presumed that the foil has the same orientation to the
stereogram as the original member:

what is "far away" from

what will again have a clear and unproblematic reference and
meaning.

The spoiler, however, has to take these words and

apply them to a visual world where recession is seen.
n e w member (s3 ) successfully does this and the task is

The
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resolved.

It should be noted that in contrast with the Base

study, the spoiler has no access to the original instructions,
and to have raised the question of a difference this member
would have had to be oriented by the task-conveyor.
The reciprocal use of "away" allows the resolution of the
experimental problem and the masking of an anomaly.

But this

disparity has the potential of being unearthed at some future
time,

for "away" covers two contrary locations:

for the

conveyor "away" means "in front," whereas it means "behind"
for the foil.

The completion of a task where the perceptual

irregularity remains cloaked but where the potential for
uncovering the disparity remains,
agreement.

I will call a pragmatic

What has yet to be brought out is that the

spoiler's muteness about recession catches the transformation,
the beginning creation, of a new, but silent subtext.
We can explore this construction in transcript 16,
part 2, study 2 (the Repeater), where the use of "away" and
the lack of an explicit figure to ground relationship allows
the evolution of another pragmatic agreement:
si*: Ok you're supposed to look through these
goggles and you're supposed to, you're
going to see a figure in front of this
s3**: yeah
s i : thing on the screen
s3 : yeah
s i : and you have to determine how far
away it is from the screen, how you
know.
What's the difference between
the screen and the figure you'll see
s 2 : Ok
s i : alright
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s3: alright...I'm not good at that but
alright...hee hee
si: is it comin, now (inaudible) Ok, so
s3 : what is the thing, you mean the box?
si.: what do ya see, what do ya see?
s3: I see that red thing
si: right, so
s 3 : Ok, it's done (???)
s i : so how far away from the screen does
it look?
s3 : doesn't look like, like, it's on it
si: but doesn't it look, doesn't it look
closer to you, than...
s3 j than what?
si: than the screen? you have to, you
have to determine
s 3 : yeah
s i : the difference between
s3 : that square in the middle?
si: shape, and yeah whatever, the diamond
shape and, and the whole screen, how
far apart...
s3: Oh...about a foot
s i : Ok
s3 : now is that all we're supposed to do?
si: yeah...we're finished
s3 s this is the whole thing?
s i : ha ha
e: what did you decide?
si: tell him!
s3 : are you, did you look at these glasses?
si: at those, no
s3 : alright, a foot
e: Ok
As with the term "away" the vocabulary which the
culturally informed member (si) uses must be heard against
the details of her previous encounter and her awareness of
the original subtext.

In the first part of the interaction,

si and s2 discussed "how far away it was," "how far away
from the dots it was," "that it was comin out" and, in
referring to the figure,
like that" and "object."

"it," "figure," "shape," "something
To repeat the point, in that context
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it was unproblematic for the participants to use these
expressions,

synonyms, in place of the more specific words.

What was "away" from what and what "it" referenced was clear
and presumed shared, and the appearance of these synonyms in
the second part of the study are immersed in that presupposi
tion.

And as with the conversation just presented (transcript

13 ) these looser phrases enable the foil (s3 ) and the taskconveyor to again manage to hide the "fact" that two different
displays are being referenced.
The task-conveyor's instructions direct the foil to find
some aspect of the stereogram which can satisfy the dimension
of "away" and as such s3 is guided by the old member’s
instructions just as si remains directed by- the original,
silent subtext.

but

But a critical difference exists between the

hearer (s3) and the speaker (si).

For as noted,

the speaker

can hear himself or herself in terms of the silent subtext-that "away" really means "in front"— but with no access to
that mute background the hearer must take the talk-as-heardas-grounds.
It is not just that the foil remains divorced from the
perceptual details of the partner,

(s)he is also separated

from the history of "away" and takes.the expression as
offered— as a public word useable and understandable by anyother.

To accept the talk-as-heard-as grounds is to try to

use the words in the spirit they are presented— as public
words useable without difficulty by any partner.

And it is
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the spoiler's attempt to employ the phrase as if it were anypO

one's that enables s3 to present a judgment about distance.
That this phraseology is offered as if it were accessible
to any-one, and taken on those terms unwittingly lays the
foundation for the transformation of the original subtext and
the construction of a new version for the foil.

The

representation of the problem as one of assessing the separa
tion between the diamond and the screen carries for s3 the
silent dimension of "behind" and for si "in front."

With this

mutual silence there is also a deafness, for there is no way
for s3 to hear that extension lurks behind si's "away," or
for si to hear recession.

Each remains ignorant about the

perceptual depth of the other's use of "away,1
; and there is
no knowledge that the other means any-thing else than what
is said.
To determine if anything else can be discerned as to
why the visual disparity is not discovered and what it is
that talk is accomplishing, we need to investigate studies 3
and ty.

We can start with study 3 (the Watcher-Hearer) where

one member has the opportunity to both see and hear the
partners resolve the experimental problem.

Consider the

.entire first part of transcript 7 ?

^^With this recognition that the foil tries to use the
words in the spirit presented, we can better grasp the claim
made in transcript 13 that the expressions which hint at
extension are made to fit recession.

81
si:
s2 :
si:
e:
si:
.
s2 :
si:

you're ready?
yeah
Ok, I don't see any number, I see uh
could you speak a little louder
a box, oh yeah sure, I don't see any
number do you see a number?
a number? no
like you .see a geometric box in front
of you, right?
s 2 : yeah
si: right...how far
s 2 : it's all one color
si: uh huh (inaudible) uh huh how far do
you think it's- out?
s 2 : five inches
si: uh huh, I'd say like half way between
where the table ends and the screen...
s 2 : I think it's closer to the screen?
si: you know
s3+: could you talk louder please
si: yeah, sure
s 2 : it gets, I think closer to the screen
s i : excuse me
s 2 : it gets closer to the screen
si: you think it's closer to the screen?
yeah, to the screen...uh...it moves
anyway
s 2 : oh god
s i : if you go more to the side it seems
to go closer towards the screen...
right?
s 2 : yeah
si: well, I think it's your guess cause
I figured it out
(reading index card) to mutually come
to an agreement on how far in front
s 2 : the figure that appears
si: yes, y e a h . ..in other words, in feet,
inches,...I'd say about twelve, let's
say fifteen inches
s 2 : from the screen?
si: y e a h . ..alright, uh a foot is what?
A foot's like this? Fifteen to eighteen?
s 2 : about fifteen
si: fifteen?...I say eighteen...wanna
compromise...sixteen and a half
s 2 : sixteen and a half
si: Ok that's what I think uh huh...you
know w h a t . ..you move backwards it goes
further away from the screen right?
s 2 : uh hum
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si: if you go forward it looks like it's
closer so from what position do you
want to estimate it? When you're
sitting nearer or further?...now
it looks as far in front as the table
ends...see where the table ends?
s 2 : yeah
si: now look up, right, like that, isn't
it about even now?
s2: no I still think it's further back
si: you still think it's further back?
s 2 : just a couple of inches though
si: Ok
s 2 : like
s i : than figure what the screen is from
the table is what...2 feet. Twelve
wha now twenty inches
s 2 : yeah
si: twenty inches uh huh...we've come to
an agreement
e: Ok what did you agree to?
si: twenty inches
There is a great deal of conversation here about the
partner's orientation to the screen and the effect that body
movement has on assessing the distance.

But the full dimen

sions of the task and the problem are silent for the monitor
(s3).

Neither member (si or s2) finds it necessary to bring

these issues into a comment-able domain, and they use a
series of synonyms with each other that we've encountered
before.

What does the abstracter-hearer, who wears no goggles,

ask, and how do the other members respond?

The next phase of

the study continues:
s3+J the goggles help you see anything?
s 2 : yeah
si: yes, the goggles take away the green
dots, I think, no
s 2 : it's all one color
si: it's all one color,
but these goggles
are green and red...one is green the
other is red. The two lenses on the
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s3:
si:
e:

s3:
e:

one eye so, so on one eye you see it
takes away the green, on the other eye
you one takes away the red dots...
that's the only thing I can say, and
...and if you move hack and forth it
goes close as you closer and further
as you go further, if you move sideways
it moves also
you, you're trying to find out how
far away, away from you?
yeah...that's it...uh want to add some
thing?...no? I'll do all the talking
do you feel that you have enough
information to proceed to the next
part of the experiment?... I t 1s up
to you.
it's not much, but
Ok

It is intriguing that the 3-D effect of the goggles are
not clarified for the monitor (s3 ), for this is the most
salient dimension of the task.

Instead the subjects who view

the display clarify the colors of the lenses.

But note the

vocabulary that the culturally informed members use when
talking with s3 -*

it's the vocabulary which si and s 2 have

unproblematically employed with each other.

And the task s3

repeats is responsive to those comments and what was overheard
and seen.

The entire dimension of some-thing which is being

assessed as being in front of some-thing else is omitted from
the dialogue.

The abstracter-hearer (s3) starts the next part

in the following manner:
s3+:

Ok what they had to do, they had to
see how far away this thing was from
the table right?
Ok
s3 • ...mutually come to an agreement how
. far in front of the pattern...
s^: I can't see it

8/+
s3 : they had. to see how far the dots were
from the thing, you know from the
outside of the pattern, right, and
what they did, they would like move
from side to side, and back and forth
you know, and they would add inches,
they say when they move back with the
goggles on that this thing, this
thing moves closer you know, move
back also when they moved, an, and
they moved from side to side also
s^: yes
s3: and they uh star, I don't started
adding inches and feet and came up
with twenty feet
s^: twenty feet?
s3: twenty inches
s^: twenty inches
s3 : that's how they came to uh, you know
I couldn't hear them very well, they
were mumbling
s^: they were moaning?
s3 : mumbling
s^: Oh...so I'm supposed to figure out
how far away the dots are
s3 : we have to figure out
s^s from us
s3 : yeah, the dots are, right...mutually
come to an agreement how far in front
of the pattern of dots the figure that
appears
s^s how far the front of the pattern is? You
see...with these things on it's two
different things.
This is amazing...
there's like a...tri...
s3: well I haven't seen through the goggles
but I asked them, one's red.
What does
it look like?
s ^ : wha?
s3 : what does it look like
s^: it's, there's a, there's a triangle, a
diamond and urn the dots inside the
diamond are further away than the
outside ones
s3 : so then we have to figure out together
how far they are
s4: well are we supposed to, we do the
inside ones or the outside ones?
s3 : well here...this
ski mutually come to an agreement on how
far in front of the pattern of dots...
oh alright, Ok
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s3s since I'm looking at it with normal
(unintelligible) I don't see it
s^: uh, uh...in front...Ok well it's not
that far...it's only about...
s3 : they either said 20 inches or 20 feet
s^: they couldn't have said 20 feet
s3s yeah, I know, twenty, it had to be
twenty inches
s^: I'd say it's about...oh god...I can't
tell in depth, you see it's going
in
s3: I can't tell cause it just looks
normal to me you know, like dots...
move back a little, see what it does
...do they move?
s^: yeah they move further away, well this
is supposed to be done from back there
or up here?
s3 j well they said you can, you can move
anyway, move to the side and see what
happens
s^: can I, it doesn't matter, this is
amazing.
How (unintelligible) I'd
say it's about 10 inches.
I don't
know how they got 20 inches
s 3 : I. ten inches?
s^: yeah, that's what I'd say
s3 : we have an agreement
e : Ok
What the monitor (s3) has acquired from the original
problem solving team (si and s 2 ) is their short hand
vocabulary which presumes that the meaning and reference
of the expressions are and will again be apparent to anyother.

With the introduction of the foil,

s3 conveys what

is known about the world by offering these public words with
the assumption (hope?) that their use will be unproblematic
for the foil.

But all that the abstracter-hearer knows is

what (s)he has heard or seen,

and s3 is literally bound by

that information and can add nothing else for s^ in the face
of a problem.
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The shape can not be identified by the monitor, and
s3 can only begin to acquire a feel for this from the foil's
description.

The spoiler (s*f) can describe the stereogram on

a critical dimension— in depth— but not having been informed
of its importance s3 is not clear how to use this information.
The only task demand provided was that some-thing must be
found which can satisfy an assessment of "far away."

And as

the foil must rely on s3 's words in order to know how to use
the stereogram before him, some dimensions of the stereogram
are found which can fit the task demands and permit the
resolution of the experimental problem.
The foil has accepted the vocabulary from the monitor
as it was offered— as public words useable by any-other.

So

again two disparate displays remain tucked av/ay beneath
expressions which presume-one subtext but rely on another.
The problem encountered in the Repeater study (study 2) has
resurfaced here.

In accepting the spoken words as ground, the

monitor is separated from the details which could explain the
origin of the expression and presents these words to an-other
who again uses them but quietly slips in different details.
But there is a critical alteration here.

With the

departure of the original team (si and s2 ), the new members
(s3 and s^) are literally caught in a web of words presumed
useable by any-one:
s3 j

well I haven't seen through the
goggles but I asked them.
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What the unintentional consequences are for these indirect
knowers who are captured by a vocabulary assumed useable by
any-otherf needs to be more forcefully documented.

Consider

the following dialogue (transcript 6 , study k, part 2 ) where
a culturally informed member conveys to the recipient-hearer
what has transpired:
s2+: Ok what happens is he gives you
these goggles that are red on one
side and green on the other, Ok?
And when you put them on, even
though you don't see anything,
you only see'now, it looks like
. a diamond, a diamond shape, like
this comes out of the screen and
comes at you...Ok? And what he
asks you is how far in front does
that shape appear...to be in front
of the screen, Ok? . In other words,
when- y o u ’re looking at that thing
it just looks like there is one
flat surface, right? But...
s3+ : right
s2 : but when you put on the goggles
with two different colors it
looks like something comes out
and is standing right in front
of that
s3j I see
s 2 : in front of that!
So you see that
and you see a diamond shape in
front of it
s3: Ok
s 2 : and he wants to .know how far away
that shape is
s3 : the diamond shape?
s 2 : from the screen
s3 : uh huh
s 2 : Ok?...and uh I thought it was twelve
inches and she thought it was eight
so we all, we decided
s3 : yeah
s2: it was ten inches from the screen.
Ok?
s3 : yeah
s 2 : got it?
s2: you say what? He gave you two goggles
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s3: one for each
s 2 j a red and a green?
s3 ' no, one, one pair of goggles with red
on one side and green on the other
s3: Ohhh, and green on the other side
s 2 :. right
s3 j is the glass white, or is it red
glass
s 2 : it's colored, it's red plastic
s3 j ohh, the glass is colored
s2 : right
s3 : with a red plastic and a green plastic
s 2 : right
s3: Ok, and the
s2 : and when you look through it
s3 : when you look through it...at those
goggles...at those things there, those
patterns
s2 : yeah
s3 : you saw diamond shapes that were
s 2 : one diamond shape
s3 •* one shape?
s 2 : one shape
s3s Ohh, only one
s 2.: right, one shape
s3 : that came off the screen towards you
s 2 : towards us, right
s3 : right...and he asked you how near, how
far from the screen do you think it
was?
s2: right, from the screen, right
s3: I see...that's all?
was there any problem in the pattern,
then? anything to solve, just that
alone?
s 2 : that's it
e: Ok? you're ready?
s3 • uh huh
Neither participant wears goggles here, and the task
conveyor tries to lead the recipient-hearer through the
problem very carefully.

The shape is identified, and there

is an attempt to specify what is in front of what.

And we

see that s3 's repetition of the task— ...and he asked you how
near, how far from the screen do you think it was?— is
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accepted by the old member.

But this terminology is a short

hand and, as we know from the other conversations, contains a
possible "error" if it is repeated in that manner to the foil
(s^).

How s3 transmits.the task demands becomes critical and

the dialogue begins:
s3+: Ok, urn, well you know, you have on
the glasses, right?
: yeah
s3 : you're looking at those patterns...
now what you're supposed to see, you're
supposed to see a diamond shape coming
off the screen towards you
sty: yeah
s3 : right in front of the goggles
s^: yeah
s3 : before you had the goggles on you
saw a flat screen, didn't you?
sty: yeah
s3 : there was no shape,, now you have the
goggles on you see a diamond shape ,
coming off the screen, towards you,
right?
sty: right
s3 • now the problem is how far do you think
that diamond is from the screen?
s^: how far do I think?
s3 : yeah, the diamond shape, how far do you
think that diamond is from the screen?
twelve inches, ten inches, eight inches
how far?
sty: Oh, you're saying from, from the
background?
s3 i yeah from the background, from the
pattern, how far do you think it is?
s^: the diamond is?
s3 : right
s4: I would say approximately two and a
half feet
s3 : (inaudible) two and a half feet? the
diamond is towards you two and a half
feet?
s^: you're saying how far the diamond is
from me?
s3 * no, from the screen
s^-: yeah, yeah there's a pattern in the back
and there's a diamond
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S3:
s^:
s3 :
s^:

right
in front, right?
right
you're saying how far is that diamond
from the hack of the pattern?
s3 s right

What has happened here?

As set into words hy s3, it

seems clear that the diamond shape seen is to be in front.
But the foil, s^, "sees" recession yet agrees to a description
of, indeed seems to offer a description of, extension.

Where

we previously had extension called recession, we now have the
opposite:

recession labelled as extension.

To understand

what has happened three points must be assessed:
relation of the recipient-hearer to the foil;

(1 ) the

(2 ) the

perspective of the foil; and (3 ) the vocabulary utilized.
First, as we've indicated,

s31s indirect access to the

original task limits what can be known and talked about.

We

must realize, however, that for this recipient-hearer there is
no visually accessible entity that can be used to verify what
(s)he has been told.

It is literally correct to claim that

for this member the three-dimensional world exists in no
place but in-words.

Yet this individual must convey and

describe a location, must lead this new sightful(l) partner
to some-place.

A translation problem has emerged.

For the

recipient-hearer must describe to the foil some location that
can satisfy the "seeing" of the new partner and can be
considered as meaning the "same" thing which the recipienthearer knows.
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Second, this movement between no-place and some-place
must be managed by an exchange of words.

And it is s3's

offering of a public vocabulary which the foil must use as
a guide to the material before him.

And it is the spoiler's

attempt to use the terms of the task demands in the spirit
offered that has led his perception to the wrong-place.
Let me try to demonstrate this by citing two segments
of dialogue as evidence.

There.is the just reported exchange

about the stereogram as it arises between s3 and s^:

s^: you say how far the diamond is
from me?
s3 : no from the screen
s^: yeah, yeah there's a pattern in the
back and there1s a diamond
s 3 : right
sty: in front, right?
s3 • right
s^s you're saying how far is that diamond
from the back of the pattern?
s 3 : right
and then there is s V s description of the stereogram during
the debriefing while wearing the goggles worn above:
s^: what am I seeing?
e : yeah
s^: well, what I'm seeing is a...is a
pattern a square shaped pattern with a . ..
diamond shaped hole in the middle with
the same pattern in the background you
understand? There's a diamond shaped
hole in certain said square, right? With
the same pattern in the background
e: why don't you take those goggles off and
try these on...and describe to me whether
you're seeing the same thing or not
' s^: exactly the reverse, I'm seeing the same
thing but reversed.
This time there's a
diamond square coming out and then
there's a square in the background.
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The recipient-hearer has presented the foil with the
problem of locating some event— a diamond shape— that could
be considered as being in front of something else.

It is

this sighted member’s (the foil, s*0 task, in part, to take
these words and try to manage that seeing and locating,

just

as it is the recipient-hearer's chore to determine whether the
talk and seeing of s^ matches what has been conveyed— whether
they are talking about the same-thing.
If we examine the foil's description during the
debriefing there is a clear reference to some "diamond-shaped
hole," and-that it is this "diamond shape" which is viewed as
being in front of some-thing else— the pattern in the back
ground.

What is this "diamond shape"?

When the stereogram

is looked at with the visual aid there is a hole in the center
which has as a frame, or border, the outlines of the diamond
which is extended or recessed.

I want to suggest that this

is the "diamond-shaped hole" which the foil takes as the
place to locate the recipient-hearer’s chore:

to find a

diamond shape which can be considered in front of something
else.

And when s^ agrees that there is a diamond in front,

it is this center frame which is being referenced.
As the recipient-hearer remains located in no-place (only
in words),

it seems reasonable to accept a current partner's

comments about a "diamond shape" as meaning and referencing
the same "diamond shape" that the task-conveyor spoke of.
With the foil finding some shape which satisfies the recipient-
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hearer,

"diamond shape" functions just as "far away" did:

it enables different perceptual details to be unintentionally
substituted behind the "same" phrase.
Once again the perceptual anomaly is masked and a
resolution reached.

But with the departure of the task-

conveyor, there is no way for the foil and the recipienthearer to realize the alteration which has taken place, now
or in the future.

Related issues are highlighted in the

conversation shown in transcript 9 . study 3 , where most of
the original subtext is not available to the monitor:
s3+: are there dots around it?
sty**: yeah, there's many dots
s3s I think you're supposed to find out how
far the dots are from...are they equally
around it?
'
s^: the dots? are they equally around the
square?
s 3 : yeah
s^: there's no real dots, I mean, I mean, I
see a lot of just rectangular
s3 : red shapes?
s^f-: types of shapes
s3 s how far are they from it?
s^-: uh, the, they're right on the outside of
it.
They're inside of the square and
they're outside of it. All around it...
anything else?
s3: I think that's it...I don't know
s^: am I supp, it looks like, it's like urn,
it looks like the square is in the back
of...the um...the actual...you know,
like you have the face, and then you
have like a square in the. center, then
it looks like that's behind it, like
that's almost a window, a square window
and behind it I see more of the uh
rectangular items
s3 • yeah
s*f-: is that it?
s 3 : I think so
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-

s^: what, what's that supposed to, what
does that say?
s3: I don't know...there's no ' pattern of
dots in there?
s^: I see, um, let me see, I see, yeah
I see a pattern...it looks like.
What do you mean by a pattern? You
mean like a set pattern, where, like
you know, like a plaid shirt would
have a set pattern throughout the
whole entire shirt?
s3 s yeah, only it's a bunch of dots and
a figure in the middle
s^: let me see, I don't, I don't see a
set pattern at all, like, like I see
you know, it doesn't um it's not
like it's uniform, you have a certain
pattern repeated many time, it looks
just like you know all jumbled up
s3 j is there a distance between the dots?
s^: between the dots?
s3 : the pattern?
s^-: um, yeah like there are white spaces
I don't know if those are supposed to
be anything part of the formation or
if that, that's supposed to be, I
guess the white space you could call,
yeah that's the distance between the
uh, the uh, diamond and the dots.
With the foil, the monitor tries to accomplish the task
demands which the task-conveyor expressed— of finding some
place where distances can be offered.

But a problem arises

for the foil reports a multitude of possible places where
distances can be used.

The monitor caught by words presumed

useable by any-one can not now obtain those silent, missing
details requested by the foil.
problem
to,

The abstracter-hearer's

is that she does not know what place to lead the foil

nor know whether the things and places described

by the

foil are the "same" things and places she has heard mentioned.
At the same time the foil is immersed in an attempt to use
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the words offered by s3 but finds an uninterpretable
stereogram.

The utterances of s^ can be heard as a request

for assistance in locating the correct place.
can be paraphrased as:

"Look,

Perhaps it

I can tell you what I see,

but I need your help to tell me if I'm looking in the
right place," or "How do you want me to use what I see before
me," or "I need your help, your talk, to put the display in
order for me."

Or in the language developed here— what

satisfies the place you described to me.
With the loss of the subtext but with the knowledge
that some task must be completed, the monitor and foil
locate some-place that concludes the experimental chore.
Yet by not knowing how to hear the many places offered, the
task concludes hesitantly and in the wrong place.

Once

again the disparity between the parts remains hidden from
view.

And we return to the unintentional consequence

mentioned earlier:

that the monitor,

the recipient-hearer,

and foil's efforts to re-use the public words— to take the
talk-as-heard-as-ground— let's them slip in a disparate world
and unwittingly substitute different perceptual details
beneath the "same" terms.
The massiveness of the member's inability to reveal
the disparity is a surprise, but it does not represent a
"failure" of the experimental manipulation.

Rather it
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demonstrates a consequence of having taken the transmission '
in the spirit offered— as words whose meaning and reference
will again be unproblematic to any-other.

In accepting a

•vocabulary of synonyms, the foil, monitor, and recipienthearer are caught in an attempt to make the display fit the
words.

With such an effort, two disparate worlds can rest

side by side, unnoticed.

And the old member, believing in the

repeatability of the task, can find it hard to hear a
difference.
These negative cases

30

have sensitized us to possibilities

which could have remained unseen had only differences been
found, and as such represent a discovery.

But as it was

precisely the finding of the irregularity which was to probe
the original conjectures,

it is premature to conclude the

analysis without examining those conversations.
confirm,

disconfirm,

How do they

or modify what has been presented?

%*his formulation excludes study 1 where there is no
transmission, though the issue of heard differences includes
it.
Study 1 raises some interesting questions for future
research.
As the same Ss participate in both parts, what
separates those who bring up the disparity from those who
don't? What would happen if the disparity were heightened so
it could not be avoided? As the results for study 1 are a
surprise no probing answer can be given, but I sus p e c t t h a t
the presumption that the experience is unchanged is_quite^
strong, and hard to overcome for the member whose vision is
unaltered.
•^Negative in the sense that they are counter to the
presumption that the anomaly would be discovered.
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(d): The Revealing of a Disparity
We can begin our analysis of these conversations with
transcript 15 1 study 1 (the Base) after the goggle switch has
been made s
s 2*: do you see it?
si**: yeah, it's coming ...1 don't see it that
well though, yeah, now I see it
s 2 : it's a triangle, right?
s i : right
s 2 : it's far away, right?
s i : what
s2 : it's fa, further away than the other
one?
s i : yeah
s2 : much further
How are we to take this piece of discourse?

The exchange

begins with a ratification that the partners again see the
same figure— a triangle.
in the first part,

S2 uses expressions that have worked

"far away," and "further away," and carry

the implication that the partner's perspective remains
unchanged.

Yet this presumption is a concern for si and she

proceeds to place that issue into words:
si: it looked like it's right on top
of it?
s 2 : you think it's right on top of it?
si: well, well what does it look like to
you?
s2 : it looks very far to me
si: behind it?
s2: behind it? Coming towards me, it looks
like it's, the patterns here...and the
triangle like out here
si: so you mean, the triangle closer to, to
the thing?
s 2 : no, it's further, further
si: it's closer to you?
s 2 : it's closer to me
si: it doesn't look that way to me
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s 2 : huh, you want to switch seats again?
si: I don't know, wait let me see
s 2 : maybe you don't see the right triangle
Two points need to be made about this exchange.

First

is the careful, almost hesitant, checking which the foil, si,
engages in to ascertain whether her relationship to the
stereogram differs from her partner's.

And second is s2's

continuing reliance on the supposition that this relationship
is unaltered.

A claim evidenced by "maybe you don't see the

right triangle."

The final portion of the conversation

continues:
s2 :
si:
s2 :
si:
s2 :
si:
s2:
si:
s2 :
si:
s2 :
si:
s2 :
si:
s2 :
si:
s2 :
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:

maybe it's your glasses
maybe...are we allowed to switch?
you want to?
I don't know
let's try it
you sure?
Oh, no wonder why.
It's the glasses.
Now it's right up, in the pattern
yeah, uh huh
...it's right in the pattern, right?
so now we d o n 11 know what to say?
the problem has to be solved...depends
on who's wearing what goggles...
that's true, that's right.
So how do we
solve it?
we can't, we, we'll solve it on one
person's glasses, probably
that's nice
hum?
with those glasses like, I, I even
thought it was in back of it
uh hum
at first
I see it r i g h t ...right in the pattern
right
know what we'll do? We'll use those
glasses...both of us...and we'll solve
the problem
alright.
So I'd say this like...twice,
twice the distance... like
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s2 : four feet
s i : four feet
s2: yeah, I think it's about four and a half
feet
si: four and a half?
s 2 : ha, it's not much closer...so we're using
my goggles and we
s i : alright
s2 : we decided it's like four feet
s i : alright
s 2 : Ok?
e: Ok?
s 2 : we've solved the problem
What we could previously raise only as a possibility
in the conversations where the disparity remained hidden is
visible

here:

the

reworking of a pragmatic agreement.

initial

exchange which presumed acontinuing, unaltered,

The
and

shared perspective could be renegotiated once the foil makes
the switch noticeable.

But we have something here that has

not previously been encountered.

With the realization that

they no

longer see the same-thing,

the foil raises a telling

point:

"So now we don't know what to say."

What has been used as a silent guide for their talk—
the instructions,

their previous experience and shared

vocabulary— can no longer be unproblematically invoked for
the major presumption that they have retained the same
orientation to the stereogram has been violated.

Yet they

must find something to say, for the text still demands, as
s2 notes,

that "the problem has to be solved."

And as their

speech starts to explore the details of their perspectives,
it enables them to place in words— for self and other—

100
for the first time those dimensions of the 'world which will
enable them to complete the task.
Consider also transcript 11, study 1 (the Base) where
the opening remark in the second part is the offering of a
difference:
si**: this one is
s 2* : it's further, it's further
si: this is different, you know what I
see? I see them in different ways.
Sometimes the triangle seems like it's
behind...the screen.
Sometimes the
big...uh...the square seems like i t ’s
behind the screen
s2: I can't see that...it's further out
than the first one though, isn't it?
It is...definitely.
Again,

for the partner whose orientation remains the same

and takes the previous encounter for granted, it is hard to
hear the difference raised as one that indicates an alteration
in that previously shared perspective.

Not surprisingly,

s2's

last comment invokes their previous interaction and reinvokes
the claim that they still see the stereogram in the same way—
as further out.

The spoiler,

si, will continue to assert a

difference, but s 2 will reply with:
s 2 : you really can't see it as being, as
being further but...than the first
time?
Given their prior experience,

the experimental protocols,

and the current perception of s2 , s 2 still presumes,
hesitantly,
Indeed,

though

that the foil is having difficulty seeing.

s2 isn't the only one who makes this assumption:

si: maybe if I look away from it for a
second I'll see it...Ok?
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and eventually s 2 will ask the foil:
s 2 : you're not lying?
The issue of veracity brings to the fore the concern
with whether the previous and current experience can be relied
upon.

31

-

We can display this point by paraphrasing the

discourse in the following manner: s 2 : "now look,

first we

saw the same thing, and now all of a sudden you claim we
%

don't.

And what's more, I still see it as in front,

like the instructions say I should.

just

Are you fooling with me?"

The foil recognizes the power of the partner's claim— that
the shared history they have continues to be shared— in his
own attempt to re-examine the stereogram.
Again, a difference in perspectives is hard to hear for
the member who remains immersed in an experience which repeats
what has come before.

As in the previous transcript,

the

foil will continue to suggest that a disparity exists and
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The point of all these analyses is to try and select
those aspects of the discourse which seem most germane to
the empirical problem.
The issue just discussed (veracity)
indicates that there are additional topics and issues which
can also address what is "really" happening in the talk.
For example, we can consider s2's comments as a challenge
to the foil's social competency which si must re-assert.
This will not be achieved until the partners discover that
different goggles are worn, and s2 can alleviate
the attack
by claiming that they were both r i g h t .
In addition, we can also examine how members rely on
social knowledge they bring into the experiment with them-e.g., how to bargain and use numbers. Each level of concern
will add some further dimension to the analysis,
for there
is no one thing that is "really" going on.
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eventually he will offer the guess that the goggles have been
switched.

After si's comments about "looking away" the

interaction proceeds:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:

switch to the, to, to the red side
Ok
is there a red side
yeah
on your goggles?
right, there’s a
Ok switch to it, when you switch to
it do you see no triangle at all?
s i : right
s 2 : just a flat
si: right, it has to be both of them:
s2: Ok the green also?
si: you have a green side on the right?
s2: on the left
si: uh huh...ha, ha there’s the solution,
that's what it is.
They did give us
different goggles
s 2 : they did?
s i : yeah
s 2 : they switched the lenses
s i : Ok
s 2 : that's our solution
si: Ok, we figured it out, alright
s 2 : but still that's not really the
solution
si: you pulled a switch on us, hey
s 2 : you can't really say it's a
solution because
s i : sure
s 2 : how far is it from the screen? It
was right near you
si: Oh
s2: we're both right, ha ha
si: yeah that's the solution.
We both
see it differently so we can't agree
. on it
s2: yeah, Ok
s i : Ok
The essential point here is what can be accomplished when
the anomaly is discovered.

The "knowers'" direct relation to

the original subtext and equipment permits all aspects of the
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task to be placed before the members.
disparity a reason can be sought.

In the face of a

And by bringing forth what

had been previously silent and unproblematic— the effect of
the goggles— an answer found.
Contrast this with the following conversation from
study k (the Watcher-Hearer), transcript 20.

First there is

the explanation given by the task-conveyor in part two to the
recipient-hearer (s3)s
s2+: Ok, he has these goggles over there
and when you put one on a figure
shows up in the pattern...and you
have to decide how far in front of
the pattern the figure is
s3+: that's all
s 2 : that's all
s3: Oh, so now Itake the goggles and put
it on, right now?
s2: no, when theother person comes in
si: so what am Isupposed to do right at
this point?
s2: you're supposed to understand what
I'm telling you
s 3 : take the goggles, put it on, look at
the figures and then you have to figure
out how far in front
s2 in front of the dots
s3 in front?
s2 right
s3 of the goggles it is?
s2 in front of the dots the figure appears
to be
The recipient-hearer,

s3» knows that "in front" is a

critical dimension of the task and she will take this talk-'
as-heard-as-ground and offer it to her partner,
s3+: look with the goggles you're supposed
to look there and see the dots, how far
the dots are in front of the picture...
that's how I understand what I'm

the foil:

supposed to do.
I d o n ’t have goggles,
haven't looked at it so I don't know
(15.2 seconds elapse here)
s^**: what is it they saw?
s 3 : how far the dots are in front of the
picture
s^i um, the dots are not, they're not...
they don't seem to me...in front of it...
they don't seem in front, they're in back
it, it looks like
s3: she said it was in front to me...she
kept repeating
s^: she said it was in front of it?
s3: uh huh...I'm merely repeating what she
said to me...cause I have not put on,
I haven't actually put on the goggles.
The recipient-hearer is right.
what has been told her.

All she can do is repeat

And as what she has been told was

stripped of its detailed history, the foil's request for the
specification behind those public words can not be provided.
But with the unearthing of a difference,

listen to the

question the foil asks:
s^J-: how could one see one in front
and one see one in back? That's
what I'm trying to figure out...
makes one of us wrong.
And who is to answer this question?

It is precisely the

recipient-hearer's indirect knowing that prevents her from
doing anything but "merely repeating."

Nothing can help her

locate those silent details which the task-conveyor has kept
out of talk.
seeing,

Of course,

the foil can describe what

even misdescribe it, in an

attempt tohelp his

s^*: and then there's a triangle, there's
a kinda like a triangle, you know, in

he is
partner
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the dots, right it has a kind of
triangle, it has another surface
you know behind it
But again, as s3 notes, she has only one recourse:
s 3 • I'm taking your word for it...I
don't see any of that cause I'm
looking with my bare eyes
The participants are caught with a disparity they
can not resolve and they begin to seek some alternative
resolution:
s 3 : are we supposed to find out what we
see one with goggles and uh the other
one without the goggles? Is that what
it is?
e: well
s 3 : what I see with my bare eyes?
e : you resolve the problem according
to the information that's been
handed, presented to you by the other
person
s 3 : but it doesn't, but does the problem
consist in finding out what that
represents say like as a work of
art,
as a painting, or something, whatever?
e: I can't help you, you just have to
resolve the problem as you see fit
In discovering the disparity,

the foil and the recipient-

hearer encounter what the task-conveyor has taken-for-granted
and stayed silent about:

that the meaning and reference of

the words would be unproblematic.

And with no procedure for

uncovering that quiet history, the current partners (s3, s^)
are left

with public words they can not re-use. The foil and

the recipient-hearer are unable
alteration,

to find a

reason for the

and can not re-negotiate the problem as can
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members who retain access to the full context (the direct
32
lmowers).
There is another dilemma which has arisen here for
either the monitor or the recipient-hearer:

whose account

is to be accepted in the face of a disparity?

It is an

interesting question to speculate on and I want to suggest
that it is the current partner's description which will be
accepted.

It is almost as if the recipient-hearer or the

monitor will abandon what (s)he is told in deference to the
"seeing" of the current partner, the foil.

Is this what s3

conveys when she asserts— "I'm taking your word for it"?.
This conjecture is supported by the exchanges which occur
in transcript 8, study 3 (the Watcher-Hearer )r
s3+: it's behind?
sV**: it's behind, right
s 3 : you think it's behind,
behind is it?

so how far.

This dialogue concludes a long introduction where the
abstracter-hearer has conveyed the information that the
diamond is in front of the screen.

The monitor readily

accepts the foil's description that it is "behind," but she
repeatedly requests to use the goggles'.

All of which the
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^ In this encounter the members do proceed to accomplish
some task--to describe the stereogram in as much detail as
possible.
But it is not clear whether this pushing forward
on some task is a result of their inability to rework the
original problem or an implicit direction given in E's
comments.
The other encounters seem to conclude when the
difference is realized— that is for studies 3 and
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foil turns down.

During the debriefing,

s3 clearly states

that her request to use the goggles was because she was
confused about the discrepancy between the parts.

And that

she decided to take the spoiler's "word" for it because he
was there, with her.
When differences were concealed our,analysis suggested
that pragmatic agreements allowed the members to uninten
tionally combine two disparate worlds.

In the conversations

where the irregularity was revealed we see support for the
rest of the conjecture— that the agreement could be unravelled
and reworked if at least one of the participants retained
access to the full details of the original subtext.

But note

that in the Bas-e (study 1) and Repeater (study 2) studies the
differences unearthed are always located on the "proper"
dimension— noticing the alteration from extention to recession.
As we move to the Watcher-Hearer (study 3) and the Hearer
(study *f) studies we begin to find that differences found are
not necessarily located on the "proper" dimension.

Consider,

for example, transcript 27 , study 3, where the monitor over
hears a great deal of the conversation between si and s2.
However, much of their dialogue was devoted to discussing
whether the stereogram was an illusion,

and how the movement

of their bodies influenced their judgments of distance.

Again,

what the monitor knows are the public expressions presumed
useable by any-other and it is only with what has been caught
in words and deeds that the abstracter-hearer can direct the
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foil.

The introduction given to the foil proceeds as

follows;
s3+: well you know, those 2 girls they were
seated over here and they saw this and
then they put the goggles on and it
seems, I didn't have the goggles on, that
um, the dots seem to come closer to them,
and a distance between the dots and the
backwards, you know background.
And they
were trying to come to a, come to a
conclusion about how far away the dots
actually were away, from you know, from
there, there was sort of a diamond
shaped figure that appeared and that
you know they were trying just to see •
how far it was and they tried different
angles and they saw from different
angles that it appeared different
distances, um, it was hard for them to
come to a conclusion, but they finally
realized that from different angles, it
appeared differently and the closer up
to it, it seems closer to the background,
but the further back you go the dots
seem further away from the back, and
that's more or less I guess about it,
you understand?
After a discussion of t h e .task and what s^ sees,

the dialogue

continues:
s^*"*: that's the opposite of what you told
me...right? When I go closer the dots
come closer?
s 3 : it seems further away?
s^: no, yeah which is the opposite of what
you told me
s 3 : are you sure? I thought I told you that
when you go back it comes closer to you?
sbt well yeah, that's right, you said^when
I go back it comes closer to me, it
doesn't
For the nth time, the monitor has set-up in words the
relevant dimensions which are to orient the foil.
taken the previous talk-as-heard-as-ground,

Having

the monitor has

no way to realize that her rendition has unintentionally
constructed a new dimension on which the foil locates a
difference.

And with no access to the original subtext,

there is just as much the introduction of new perceptual
details as there was when the disparity was masked.
Being able to find a difference by being located in
the wrong-world is a twist introduced in transcript 23,
study ty.

The recipient-hearer is told that the shape to

be seen is a triangle, and so orients the foil:
s3+: now in that square there is a
triangle
sty*'*: do I have to?...Oh
s 3 : can't ask him any questions
sty: yeah
s 3 : in that square there's a triangle
and you, you have to find where
that triangle is
sty: Ok, the (inaudible) where in the
square is the triangle?
s3s it's in the center
a bit later
sty: I see, you know what I see? I see
a, I see a diamond
s 3 : you see a diamond?
sty: a rhombus.
You know geometry?
s3: yeah
sty: it's right in the center... i t 's a, I,
I, suppose you could call it a triangle
if you divided it into two parts, but
then you'd have two triangles not one
s3: that's right...so then there isn't a
triangle there
s^: I don't see a triangle, I mean, I, I
suppose, I, I, can't even really stretch
my imagination I don't see a triangle...
it looks like there's a rhombus that,
that's cut-out so that there's an
empty space which, which is that shape
you know
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s3i could, did you look at it everywhere,
all over the square?
and much later:
s3:
s^:
s3 j
s^:
s3:
s^:
s3:

■sbs
s3:
s^:
s3:
s^:
s3:
e:

what do you see?
nothing
nothing?
not a thing, I can|t find the triangle
there isn't a triahgle?
no that's right, there isn't a triangle
there isn't any triangle... but there's
a rhombus
yeah
a distinct rhombus
oh, oh it's more like a square really
just turned on end, like a diamond
uh huh
are we done?
yeah, I guess so
I think we're done, hey?
Ok?

What has been presented to the recipient-hearer as being
in the world can not be located, and with no way to uncover
the error the task is finally terminated.
back to a previous point:

And this leads us

while talk can set forth some

place to be located, not any place will work.

When no place

can be found to satisfy the foil's "seeing" and the recipienthearer 's "hearing" the task concludes and we are again reminded
of the translation problem.

A point the .subjects themselves

are keenly aware of (transcript 27 , study 3):
s3s right, I understand what you're saying,
I,* I really don't understand because I
. don't have the glasses
s^: yeah, I'm trying, I'll have to explain
it in the abstract
Regardless of the distinctions which may be made as to
how a disparity is revealed,

the later part of each study

Ill
begins with the same problems.

That an old member must be

divested of his or her previously ratified presuppositions,
and that the vocabulary of synonyms presumed useable by anyother must be challenged so what has been kept silent can be
put back into speech.
arise

But to notice that the same issues

(synonyms, talk-as-heard-as-ground, pragmatic agreements,

translation problem) whether or not a disparity is concealed
is to suggest that we are not just engaging in a tedious
repetition and confirmation of points already made.

It is

to advance a much broader claim— that in each encounter talk
has been responsible for what is made known and how it is
33
known. ^

And it is to notice that the position of the "knower"

binds what can happen when what has been taken-for-granted
becomes problematic.
informed member,

For with the departure of the culturally

there is no way to recover what has remained

silent and the members are unable to renegotiate the task on
its original terms.
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^ It is worth repeating a point already made.
Questions
continually arise as to whether some people are more likely to
find a difference than others: .whether some people are
hesitant about placing differences in words.
The point I want
to make is broader.
There is something that talk is accom-^
plishing in each interaction and this question--as to what is
being accomplished-.-remains even if we knew which members would
be most likely to uncover a difference.
Indeed, even if the
particular analyses used to explain why no differences occur
in an encounter suggest some alternative explanation— e.g.,
cognitive.style, demand characteristics, evaluation apprehen
sion, conformity— the problem at hand still remains.
The
fascinating thing about talk is how it is sensitive to all of
the personal and situational concerns while it may also be
constructing some-thing else.
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(e )s Some Further Comments
Let me begin this section by trying to clarify a question
which has been bothering me:

why do the original pair remain

silent about certain details when they transmit the task
demands to a new member?

More specifically, why are the

role of the goggles so infrequently mentioned?

We can begin

by probing how members decide what to tell and how they tell

i t . 3*
How the task-conveyor initially explains the task
demands is a point we are familiar with:

that the expressions

used are presumed to be unproblematic and useable by anyother who enters or remains in the same context as the
speaker.

The members can keep quiet about -certain details

because what is being referenced and meant is "obvious."
a sense,

the details are. not worth mentioning.

In

This account

is somewhat inadequate and we need to extend our analysis.

We

can proceed by considering three instances of transmission,
each where a difference is found.
First consider transcript k, study 2 (the Repeater):
s2*: Ok, there's a pattern of dots there,
uh, that you'll see the large, the
large rectangle is uh (inaudible)
of squares what we feel is a square
is a pattern of dots that the
experimenter has called a pattern
of dots and it's large. Now what

J The use of "decide" should not be taken as indicating
some active monitoring system or rule which is used to direct
talk. •
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you see in front of you immediately
is what we called the diamond or a
square on its side on, on one of
its corners and that’s obviously,
that you visually see that in front
of the large pattern of dots.
Ok?
You see that?
then transcript 27 , study 3 (the Watcher-Hearer), part 2:
s3+: ah, Ok, well you know those two girls
they were seated over here and they
saw this and then they put the goggles
on, but it seems, I didn't have the
goggles on, but it seems that when
they put the goggles on that urn the
dots seem to come closer to them and
a distance between the dots and the
backwards...you know...the background,
and they were trying to come to a come
. to a conclusion about how far away the
dots actually were away from you know
there and uh urn...first they realized
that uh there was sort of a diamond
shaped figure that appeared, and that,
you know they were just trying to just
see how far it was and they tried
different angles, and they saw from
different angles that it appeared
different distances.-, .urn.. .it was
hard for them to come to a conclusion
but they finally realized that from
different angles it appeared
differently and the closer up to it
it seems closer, the dots seem closer
to the background but the further back
you go the dots seem closer to you and
thus further away from the back...and
...that's more or less...I guess about
it...do you understand?
and then transcript 20, study k (the Hearer), part 2:
s2*: Ok, he has these goggles over there
and when you put one on a figure
shows up in the pattern...and you
have to decide how far in front of
the pattern the figure i s ...

114While what is conveyed may he expressed in terms which
conceal details, what is initially placed into words at the
time of transmission is what has been previously discussed
by the first pair.

And when this information is no longer

adequate, what has not been spoken about, what has been
taken-for-granted, must be put into speech for the first
time.

When asked to assess the distance in inches,

the task-

conveyor (s2) in transcript 4, study 2 (the Repeater) responds
with:

"I, I'm really, we didn't talk about inches.”
We need then to assess what was discussed during the

first part of the encounter.

While the partners may be silent

about the specifics of what is viewed, what is spoken about
begins with the grounds specified in the instructions:
a figure appears,
display,

that

that it is separated from the rest of the

and that the members must assess the extent of this

separation.

But additional topics will be placed into words

and for the most part these topics will indicate that the
members are having some difficulty in reaching an agreement
about d i s t a n c e . ^

They will note that the stereogram is

"really" an illusion, that their body position influences
the distance reported, and that their judgments are arbitrary.

^ D u r i n g the first part of the interaction there are
some comments made which are not related to difficulties.
They usually are descriptions of the stereogram— oh it's cute,
what nice colors— and occur very infrequently.
Sometimes
these comments are repeated in the next part, but not during
the first transmission.
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What is added to the conversation are those aspects of the
task which the partners find problematic.

And it is these

issues which may be added to the transmission when the task
demands are conveyed.
But look what remains unsaid.

V/hen members speak about

distance and offer comments about how "far away," "in front"
or "further out" the shape appears,
is silently invoked:

the effect of the goggles

the influence of the goggles forms a

background from which all talk proceeds.

The goggles make the

perceptual experience possible, and as there is no reason to
suspect that this experience will be altered their influence
can remain in the background,
once more.

silently relied upon to work

The rare times that the goggles' are referred to is

to either note that the figure disappears when one eye is
closed, or that each eye is covered with a different color
lens.

The frequency of these comments is listed in Table 12.
Yet if the anomaly between the parts is revealed,

it is

precisely what the goggles make possible that becomes
problematic.

All of a sudden a previously unproblematic

aspect of the task becomes troublesome and a taken-for-granted
presumption becomes worth mentioning.

And for the first time,

it becomes necessary to explore the effect of the goggles in
words.

But what has not been spoken about before,

can not

be recovered by the indirect knower.
What is it that is told?

The task demands and what has

been considered worth mentioning.

How is it told?

In a
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Table 12
Frequency with which the Role
of the Goggles was Explicitly
Mentioned During Part One

Study

One-eye
closed

Color of
lenses

3-D
effect

One

0

0

0

Two

2

1

0

Three

2

1

0

Four

0

1

0

n

1*

3

0

28

28

N

28

manner presumed useable by any-other.

And as we've seen, as

long as the task demands are expressed in a vocabulary of
synonyms which conceals details and unproblematic presupposi
tions two unintentional consequences occur:

members can fit

disparate perceptions under the same terms, and the indirect
knower is incapable of finding that silence.
Before we can assess the original conjectures,
additional issue needs to be addressed:
typification.

one

the concept of

It was suggested that type formation would

result from a backwards glance at lived experience— at points
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of reflection.

We sought to expose this thematic grasp at

three locations?

(a) with the task's transmission;

(b) with

the naturally occurring questions; and (c) with the intro
duction of the perceptual disparity.

It was also proposed

that a typification would conceal the details of its
construction and be offered to an-other in a public and
anonymous fashion— as useable by any-one else.

Is there any

evidence of type formation?
One suggestive link with the concept of typification
is the vocabulary of synonyms which the members use to express
their knowledge of the task demands.

The later part of the

studies begin with the presumption that what has worked before
will work again and a range of synonyms are offered which
function as we thought a type would— in a public and
anonymous manner.
of reflection,

But the transmission is only one instance

and only the task demands— what is seen and

what is done— seem to possibly reflect type construction.
What occurs when we examine the other times that reflection
takes place:

where questions were asked and disparities are

noticed?
Questions could be asked for many reasons,

and in the

first parts they generally relate to clarifying distances
and topics which are considered problematic.

In the second

or third part questions still serve to clarify distances,
directions,

and problems.

But when a disparity arises the

queries' acquire a deeper thrust.

Further details are
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requested and the public words,
unravel.

the synonyms, begin to

For in seeking reasons for the disparity members

must bring into words what has been previously silent.
where possible,

And

this re-examination starts the re-negotiation

of the task and brings into relief what was previously takenfor-granted.
The backwards look at lived experience has worked
differentially,

for it is only the recognition of the

perceptual anomaly that causes a world thought to be reuseable by any other to be re-examined.
what has remained silent becomes visible,

And with this probe
and it becomes

apparent that the list of synonyms were offered matter-offactly:

as if any other could use them unproblematically.

If these expressions which emerged during the initial
encounter are offered matter-of-factly are we justified
in considering the list of synonyms typifications?
furthermore,

And

if these expressions evolved during the initial

encounter, has type formation occurred without reflection?
The discovery of the disparity reinforces the argument
that the synonyms are initially offered unproblematically—
their meanings and references are presumed obvious and
useable by any other who enters the "same" context.

As such

I would propose that the synonyms which have emerged be
considered "types."

That a vocabulary thought to be useable

by any other has evolved from the mere exchange of words
between partners cooperatively engaged with the task-at-hand
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further suggests that typifications were produced without
reflection.
(f ) :

Assessing the Original Con.jectures
The original conjectures set a broad frame in which to

explore the consequences o'f using'talk in face-to-face
interactions, and we are now in a position to determine how
to support, modify,

or reject those entering claims.

The

first conjecture was split into two parts:
Given a problematic context:
la: talk during an interaction provides the
elements from which a common world can
be constructed;
and
lb: reflection on this preceding tallr
generates typifications which select
from this step-by-step construction
those elements which permit the
grasping of a pragmatic result.
If the arguments presented so far carry any weight,

(la)

is supported in each study regardless of the "knower's'*
orientation to the stereogram,
modifications.

while (lb) requires some

While types have been constructed they were

not the result of reflection and it is not clear that they
represent a "pragmatic result" of the encounter.

What has

happened is that the members' vocabulary of synonyms expresses
what they know and saw while concealing the specifics.

And

in some cases it conceals details which were built up stepby-step and never spoken of again.
be rewritten as:

This conjecture can then
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l b ' : during the interaction a vocabulary
will emerge which will conceal the
details of what the members see and
know, and that these words may be
typifications.
The second conjecture will also require modification.
Originally it was suggested that:
2: the transmission of this result to
others omits its social construction
so that the result can look like
anyone's .
The term "result" is at issue here, but what is conveyed
is presented with a series of expressions which take it for
granted that anyone can unproblematically use them.

This

conjecture should be rewritten as:
2': when the task conveyor presumes that .
the context is unaltered, the task
demands will be expressed by a
vocabulary which conceals details
but which is presumed useable by
any-other.
The third and last conjecture was
3: as the knower of the result is
further and further removed from
the original situation, the harder
it is for that recipient to
renegotiate the result.
The same comment about "result" can be made here.

But a

further specification has to be made as to what it is that
is harder to renegotiate.

This refers to the distinction we

made between the participants who know the world directly or
only through the talk of others.

It is the indirect "knowers"

who are further removed from the initial situation,

and as

we've seen there is no way to recover what has b e e n .left out

121
of speech.

This was true for both the monitor and the .

recipient-hearer so there does not seem to be any fine
distinctions to be made between those two indirect knowers.
Neither could renegotiate the task on its own terms— of
extension to recession— once the disparity was revealed.
The third conjecture should then be modified to read:
3': as the indirect knower is separated
from the task-conveyor and handed a
vocabulary presumed useable by any
one, (s)he is caught with a public
terminology which omits the details
of the original situation and unable
to renegotiate the task on its
original terms when those silent
details are requested.
V/hat are the consequences of talk?
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DISCUSSION

During the first part of the study the members'

speech

has taken those "elements" from the world needed to resolve
the task-at-hand.

And from these initial face-to-face

'if.

conversations

an

experiential short hand has emerged.

The

precise details of the partners' relationship to the display
(extension) and the figure seen (diamond) are obscured by a
vocabulary which presupposes that the meaning and reference
of the expressions,
and shared.

e.g.,

"it" and "away," are understood

With the introduction of a new partner,

a

stranger, we can see that as the short hand vocabulary forms
the base of the transmission the utterances are offered
anonymously— as public words useable by any-other who enters
the same context— and the history of the encounter is masked.
And if the stranger takes the remarks in the spirit offered
disparate worlds can remain hidden beneath the "same"
expressions.

The mundane,

ordinary, common-place, and

typically unremarkable use of talk-in-context has the

•^It is important to re-emphasize our concern with, and
restriction to the use of speech during face-to-face inter
actions.
As Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (197*0 note, this
is only one example of what they call the speech-exchange
s y s t e m . Besides face-to-face encounters, the speech exchange
system includes lectures, trials, seminars, press conferences,
therapy sessions, etc.
The question as to whether speech has
the same consequences in those encounters remains open.
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consequence of placing an order in the ’w orld which is takenfor-granted-until-further-notice.
In that the studies presented here have permitted us
to document the formation of an understanding, view the
.extent to which the history .of that understanding was
communicated to a stranger, grasp when the history of the
initial encounter could he recovered,

and suggest when the

understandingmight he renegotiated or abandoned, we have,
in some sense, a verbal analog of the "arbitrary tradition"
literature.

For we have seen how a history has been acquired

and transmitted.
To elaborate and clarify such expressions as order,
history,

context, consequences,

and social construction,

it

is helpful to recognize and distinguish between two levels of
the argument:

a context dependent one and a context

independent one.

That is, we need to understand that in

any face-to-face encounter context and interests will
influence what is talked about and made known (context
dependent), and that conversation is presumed to make some
thing known in any face-to-face interaction (context
independent).

But it must be stressed that this division

is formed for the purposes of analysis only and fragments
what is otherwise whole.
created,

For whatever is made known, socially

always occurs in some context.

Before pursuing the context independent arguments, we
need to reiterate how the initial instructions sustained

124a particular context and formed the background for what was
put into words and made known--to self and other.

It should

be clear that it was the experimental protocols in each of
the studies reported here that informed the participants as
to the nature of the interaction which would prevail
(cooperative),

that prepared the members as to what would be

seen (extension,

figure), and which specified how what was

seeri was to be assessed (distance).
By establishing domains of relevance— distance and
extension— on which to appraise the stereogram, but by not
specifying what would be viewed when the goggles were worn •
and by not detailing what solution should be reached,

the

initial instructions frame and open a future which only
conversation can close.

By placing their orientation to the

display into words each member to the interaction makes
T

public his or her perspective and permits the other the
occasion to comment and co-operatively co-construct,
negotiate some resolution to the task-at-hand--e.g., reach
a decision about distance.

And in each and every interaction,

the experimental chore was resolved with an exchange of words.
But note that the partner's use of expressions such as
"away," "it," and "further than” do more the describe what
is seen.

It directs the partner on what to look for and how

to use what is seen— as a visual display which is to be
assessed in terms of distance rather than color or the number
of dots.

In designating how the stereogram is to be taken,
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we come to an integral part of what it means to "know" the
world through talk.

We are informed what "elements" are to

be selected from the world and how these "elements" are to
be used:

words order the world for both speaker and hearer.

Yet recall that this use of the stereogram can not be
separated from the task specified in the instructions
provided by the experimenter.

For as noted it is only from

this sometime silent subtext that the words and numbers
exchanged make sense.

And what becomes known here represents

a convention just as Sherif's autokinetic effect does:

how

the stereogram is used and the knowledge formed is a
consequence of the purpose-at-hand.

As such the stereogram

itself contains a future in that the- same visual display can
satisfy a multitude of purposes and, hence, uses— some of
which surface with the indirect knowers (the abstracterhearer and the recipient-hearer) during the second and third
parts of studies 3 and
Besides providing the background on how to use the
stereogram, the protocols also indicate how the interaction

37
*^fIt is the "norm" of distance which is generally thought
of as the convention in Sherif's research.
That is not being
questioned.
What is being noted is that the norms which
evolved are dependent on a particular use made of the auto
kinetic effect— how far the light moves.
And as here, the
numbers offered by the Ss take this use for granted.
One
could just as easily have requested judgments about how often
the light goes up or down, or how often it moves to the left
or the right.
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is to proceed— cooperatively.

The members' talk is

exquisitely responsive to these contextual constraints and
the discourse in the first part of each encounter reflects
these restrictions— implicitly or explicitly.

It should

be apparent that an exchange of words under altered controls
would change how talk proceeds, what is made known,, and what
becomes taken-for-granted-until-further-notice.

By

formulating zones of relevancies and irrelevancies, the
instructions define the context and present the members
with a purpose at hand--the protocols offer a set of concerns
OO

or interests which guide the members' talk.

And by placing

in words how the material before them is to be ordered, we
„ can begin to see what it means to co-construct social
reality.
It is from this notion of order and social co-construc
tion that the unintentional consequences of engaging some-one
in a dialogue can be brought into relief.

The short hand

vocabulary which emerged during the first part of the studies
assumed that the reference and meaning of the words are clear
and held in common.

But for the members to rely on this

presumption two related points must be made.

First, by not

•^Using instructions as a substitute for interests— as
a way to. focus the subjects looking and concerns— is a
standard practice in the literature (e.g., Cohen & Ebbesen,
1979 ; Loftus, 1975» Neisser, 1975» 1976). Indeed I would
argue that any set of experimental instructions serve this
pu rpose.
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raising a challenge to the use of the world involved in
such expressions as "away," the partner has accepted, for
the moment, the definition of use offered.

And second, as

long as the partner presents no evidence to the contrary,
"it" ratifies that the same visual world is being viewed
and "away" that they have the same relationship to the
stereogram.

Even in those cases where verification was

sought, these terms evolve and become part of the talk and
continue to be accepted without further question.
As long as these utterances remain uncontradicted,
they are spoken with assurance:

in a manner which supposes

that their reference is obvious and their applications
unproblematic.

An unintentional consequence,

then, is that

the reference and meaning of the vocabulary of synonyms is
taken-for-granted-until-further-notice.
Whether members appeared to "trust" the instructions
and utilize them as a silent background for their dialogue,
or whether members found it "helpful" to first ratify their
perceptual sameness, the expectations established by the
protocols were confirmed in the first part of the study.
With the move to a later part of the study there is no
reason to suspect that what has worked before will not
work again.

And to the extent that one starts where (s)he

has previously ended— with the assumption that the task
can be unproblematically repeated and that the meaning and
reference of the utterances are straight forward--we see
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the culturally informed member convey the task demands with
typifications--"it,” "away," "further out," and "closer to."
As the instructions provided by the experimenter framed the
task during the first part, the explanation offered by the
task-conveyor will so orient the new partner in studies 2, 3.
and ty.
Yet an important distinction must be drawn.

The first

part of the studies begins in a symmetrical fashion— each
paterner has equal status and rights and each can contribute
to the decision.
an

In the later parts of studies 2, 3, and *1*

asymmetry is introduced.

The task-conveyor,

the monitor,

and the recipient-hearer have the "right" to convey the task
demands and instruct the foil on what will be seen, and, also,
the "right" to suggest that the new member is misperceiving
♦•

or misunderstanding.
member,

But recall that the foil, the new

is directed by a series of public words:

a vocabulary

of synonyms which take it for granted that the meaning and
reference of the spoken word is'unproblematic and useable by
any-other.

We can now note the unintentional consequences

which occur during the later parts of the studies when the
disparity remains concealed.
First, when a new partner enters what is thought to be
the same context, the culturally informed members speak in a
manner which presumes that the synonyms can again be
unproblematically re-used by any-other.
partner accepts these words as offered,

Second,

if the new

(s)he implicitly

recognizes them as public and anonymous words--that any-other,
regardless of their biography,

knows what they mean and can

use them competently— and attempts to find a way to use the
stereogram that fits the initial description.

Third, as the

terminology provided by the task-conveyor hides the history
of the previous encounter,

two disparate worlds remain cloaked

behind the "same" vocabulary.

And fourth,

as long as the

descriptions offered are not contradicted they too become
taken-for-granted-until-further-notice--the reference and
meaning of the terms are presumed to be shared and understood.
To bring out the perceptual disparity,
member in studies

the unenculturated

2, 3, and ^ must, at a minimum, have

enough detailed information presented so that the grounds for
discovering the anomaly are possible.

Or this partner must

place into talk enough details about what is perceived so that
the culturally informed partner has the possibility of even
hearing a difference.

With the realization that the

partner's relationship to the visual display has been changed,
the members in studies 1 and 2 can locate the previously
silent presuppositions and resolve the task through a further
exchange of words.

But in studies 3 and ty, the indirect

knower is left only with the public, and short hand,
expressions of the old member and we see another unintentional
consequence of discourse:
departs,

that when the informed partner

there is no way to recover the missing history and

in the face of trouble no way to renegotiate the task-at-hand
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on its original,

founding concerns.

For the resolution

demands access to those quiet details.
The later part of each study was introduced because
we wanted to see how the taken-for-granted presuppositions
acquired in this context would be modified.

We know, however,

that in the majority of the conversations no perceptual
disparity was revealed and three reasons were offered to
account for this difficulty:

(1) that the anomaly was

successfully masked behind ambiguous words such as "away";
(2) that a difference was placed into words but not heard
as germane by the culturally informed member; and, most
generally,

(3) that the new member's attempt to use the

vocabulary offered engendered a search to find some v/ay to
use the stereogram that could satisfy the task-at-hand.
However, because of the asymmetry introduced into the
interactional relationship to place the disparity into
words is to also:

(a) question the culturally informed

member's presumption of sameness;

(b) question the culturally

informed member's assumption that (s)he has the authority
to direct the new member's looking;

(c) question the direct

knower's visual experience; and (d) question the experimental
presupposition that the members do continue to see the same
thing.

To suggest that placing the discrepancy into speech

raises numerous questions is to offer two alternative
explanations as to why the perceptual irregularity remained
hidden.

The first alternative is Goffman's (1959) "modus
vivendi" of interaction which proposes that a member of a
team will not want to create conflict by challenging the
definition of the situation.

The second is Orne's (1972)

concept of demand characteristics:

that a subject will try

to cooperate with what are perceived as the demands of the
experiment.

In the context of these studies, Orne's position

suggests that the partners accept and try to behave in accord
with the experimental suggestions that they see the "same"
visual array, that the culturally informed member does "know"
what is being viewed and has the "right" to direct that new
partner's looking,

that the "same" problem can once more be

unproblematically solved, and that cooperation is required.
Goffman's argument, however, informs us about an
additional concern.

His position implies that the partners

are not misled by the short-hand terminology, nor that they
actively seek to fit their perception of the stereogram to
that vocabulary.

Rather the members are thought to be aware

of the anomaly but from a desire to avoid creating a conflict
they chose to remain silent about the disparity.
context,

In this

it seems plausible to argue that Orne's perspective

overlaps with that of Goffman's;

For-example,

it is possible

that a member does know about the anomaly but keeps quiet
because (s)he seeks to fulfill the task demand of reaching a
cooperative solution.

An end which may not seem attainable

if the-altered perspective is put into words.

With these
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alternative explanations as to why a disparity may stay out
of the member's speech, let us re-examine a previously
discussed transcript (transcript #3, part 2, Study One,
pages 71-73):
si*:
s2**:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:

I'd say a foot and a half
No it's less...more like *
what
fifteen inches... fourteen
could be ... fifteen?
(to e) fifteen

In this particular interaction, and for all those in
Study One (the Base), each participant started by seeing an
extended diamond.

But in the second part of this study,

told during the debriefing,

as

s2 knew that her relationship to

the display had been altered.

Yet in the face of a partner

whose talk appears to presume an unchanged perspective,

and

in the face of experimental instructions which support the
assumption that the task is repeatable without problems,
what was s2 to do?
quiet.

In this encounter, the foil remained

For as she notes a mutual decision is required.

To

have put the seen disparity into words may have challenged
the experimental definition and possibly made s2 appear
uncooperative.
By proposing reasons as to why the foils may have "held
their tongues" and not forced the issue the criticisms of
Goffman and Orne obtain some force.

Each of these

explanations as to why the disparity remains hidden seems
plausible and they may partially explain why a perceptual

133
anomaly would not be put into speech.

What is the

consequence of accepting these alternative explanations?
When we examined the conversations, we emphasized how
in the second part a new member or foil takes the culturally
informed partner's talk as ground, how these comments may
conceal the details of what was seen and how one can not
know what has been kept out of words.

But with the Goffman

and Orne position we are forced to recognize the possibility
that the foil has also kept silent about the details of what
is seen, though for very different reasons;
cooperative subject or to avoid conflict.

to be a
In that the foil

is now assumed to be influenced by a set of interests and
concerns which are kept out of talk an interesting twist
to the analysis is raised.

The tables, so to speak, are

turned and the culturally informed member has no way to hear
this silence as (s)he also has recourse only to what is
spoken.

Each member then hears and exchanges words v/hich

are divorced from their perceptual grounds and guiding
concerns, but they are still able to co-construct some
resolution to the task-at-hand.
It is important then to recognize that when the thrust
of the Goffman and Orne critique are directed to what does
not get put into words,

each offers a reason why the foil

may fail to put the disparity into a public domain.

However,

these criticisms do not alter the general analysis of what

m
the conversation has accomplished— that the members'
pragmatic agreement with the task-at-hand will enable them
to trade words and co-construct some shared reality.
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Nor

do these alternative explanations challenge the presumption
that the culturally informed member uses terms such as
"away," "further than," and "closer to" because there is a
continuing assumption that the visual display remains
unchanged.

In stressing what is kept out of words,

the

interdependency between context, interest, and speech is
again highlighted and we are again reminded of the
tenuousness of the agreement reached.
While we've briefly considered why the foil may not
speak about the irregularity,

we

Goffman and Orne arguments offer

can also ask whether the
a reason as to why the

culturally informed partner does not hear the anomaly once
it is put into words— made commentable.

Again,

let's return

to a transcript we've already discussed (transcript #21,
part 2, study 1, pages 73- 76 ):
si*: see it?
s2**: yeah, I see it, urn
si: it looks fa, further away than the other
one
s2: it looks like that, the
image is on the
screen and the rest is behind it or
something like that like it's behind it
s i : yeah
s2: does it look like it's cut out?
si: yes

■^What it is that is shared will be addressed later.
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s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:
s2:

yeah
it moves with you?
what?
and it moves with you?
yeah
this is more like the...um this is
further
behind?
do you agree with that?
behind it right? you mean
yeah
yeah that's what I think too
it's further away than the other one
was right?
yeah
so we said fourteen last time...maybe
eighteen, twenty inches?
behind, behind the picture right?
yeah
um...I guess around eighteen?
yeah eighteen
eighteen...Ok

Has SI accepted the foil's description of the triangle
as "behind" in order to be a cooperative subject?

Or has

SI kept silent because he does not want to challenge the
definition of the situation?

It's important to realize that

in this case both the Goffman and Orne positions need to
presume that (a) the foil has placed enough precise
information in the conversation for the disparity to be
heard, and that (b) the other partner understands the
correction being made but in order to avoid raising a
challenge and/or to remain a good subject keeps what (s)he
really knows— that the members no longer see the same
thing— out of words.

But recall that Si's comments suggest

neither of these tactics, but rather inform us that "behind"
was misheard.

That is, SI thought his parter was confused.
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Furthermore,

if the foil does put the disparity into words

explicitly enough for the partner to hear the challenge,
the questions and conflicts are already on the floor and
the force of the Goffman and Orne arguments appears under
mind.

For the thrust of their position appears to be that

these concerns not be made public.
I want to argue in this case,

and in the cases of

mishearing in .general, that where the disparity remains
masked the Goffman and Orne positions are weak alternatives.
First, for the most part the foil rarely puts the difference
into words in an explicit enough fashion.

Next we need to

recall that during the first part of the studies,

each

participant's perception matched the orientation described
in the protocols.

And it seems reasonable to argue that for

those members who do not explicitly verify this orientation,
they take it as a silent background for their utterances as
long as nothing to the contrary is

said. The next part of

the studies then begins with the presumption that the
experience is repeatable, and for the members whose
✓

perspective is unaltered the experience is indeed the same
as before.

Even with an explicit description,

to success

fully challenge the presumption of a continuing and
repeatable world, the foil must (a) overcome the partner's
assumptions iihat the experience can be done once more and
(b) implicitly or explicitly suggest that the partner is
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misled by his or her current experience and the experimental
instructions.
At this point a critical distinction between the direct
and the indirect knower needs to be drawn.

The member whose

perception is unaltered in Study One (the Base) and Study Two
(the Repeater) must hear the corrections while personally
immersed in an unchanged visusil'world.

In contrast,

the

indirect knower of studies three and four (the abstracterhearer and the recipient-hearer) are never visually engaged
and know about the task only through the speech of a now
departed member.

As such a disparity put into speech may

have different obstacles to overcome.

The direct knower's

current knowledge and engagement as well as-the history of
the previous encounter must be questioned:

the "I" of current

experience as well as the "we" of the prior interaction.
While the recipient-hearer or abstracter-hearer has no visual
immersion or past history to overcome,

only a web of words

conveyed by a now departed they.
The culturally informed member does not ignore—
mishear— the disparity from a desire to be cooperative or
to avoid conflict.

The member's difficulty is that (s)he

hears and sees from a continuing immersion in a repeatable
world and that it takes some effort to bring the member out
/lq
of this engagement with the world.
The member is involved

,^°This notion of effort is presumed to be different for
the direct and indirect knower.
We presume it is easier,

with something akin to Neisser's (1975.

1976) concept of

selective hearing and looking, and it is from within this
preoccupation with a continuing world, and a repeatable
one,

that a first move is to hear "behind" as really meaning

"in front" or to conclude that the partner is confused or
misperceiving.
With-the argument that the Goffman and Orne critiques
are not convincing when applied to the cases of mishearings,
we are left with the claim that they do manage to offer a
reason as-to why the members have chosen to stay silent
about the disparity.

The question then arises as to whether

one of these arguments is better than the other.

In Study

One, where the same members participate in both parts,

it is

hard to assess this question directly, but it becomes clear
during the debriefings of .Studies Two, Three and Four that
the members are surprised to learn that their orientation
to the stereogram differed.

This surprise intimates that

the participants did not conceal something they knew, but
rather that they were actively attempting to meet the task

less effortful, for the indirect knower to relinquish what
has been transmitted by a "they" than for a direct knower who
remains enmeshed in the world.
Whether this conjecture is
reasonable is an issue future research can address.
it 1

It is unfortunate that a video-tape was n o t _available
for then the members' slow pan and looks of disbelief would
display this point more forcefully.
It does become clear
during the debriefing that the partners are surprised to
learn and discover that they saw the stereogram differently.
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demands specified by their partner and the experimenter.
If the members were unaware of the disparity, Goffman's
critique is severely curtailed and Orne's explanation seems
more plausible.

But what can we say when a disparity is

clearly revealed?
At first glance it seems that even in these cases the
Goffman position is undercut.

For it is clear that the

members place the issue into a public domain and put the
conflict on the floor.

It could be reasonably argued that

what we are hearing are the consequences of O r n e 's demand
characteristics:

that to be cooperative you state what you

see in an earnest attempt to solve the task.
'separation is not that neat.

But the

Goffman's position has a

rejoinder which could claim that the member considered the
anomaly a "serious" matter and had to put "it" into words,
even if that meant challenging the definition of the
situation.

Since these claims can not be disentangled in

these cases, we can not argue which of these explanations
may be better and which is responsible for what the members
are placing into words.
Though the Goffman and Orne arguments can not be
conclusively discounted, note that their effect in this
context is always directed to what is put into speech.

So

while the general points made about the consequences of
talk in a face-to-face encounter remain unscathed,

if the

critiques are valid they have their influence over what any

.1^0
partner makes known to any-other partner.

And in deciding

"what is made known by what is said" (Rommetveit,

1979a)

we can move to another question.
When public claims are exchanged it is possible to
conceal the details of what is seen and known and make
disparate worlds accommodate the same expressions.

But

though each encounter will vary in the amount of detail
provided,

each conversation represents some alignment of

perspectives which enable the individuals to deal with the
task-at-hand.

With all the details which are concealed

beneath the same expressions what is it that is made known
by what is said?

What do the partners presumably share with

each other?
Rommetveit (1979a,

1979b,

1979c) has addressed these

questions and provides a dialogic truth table to explicate
the conditions under which discourse may enable the members
of a dyad to achieve a state of "perfectly shared actual
realty."

His definition can begin the analysis

as it will help to elaborate a series of problems.
Some representation Ri of S constitutes part
of pi's and p2's perfectly shared actual

l<2

Rommetveit's truth table is in Appendix D.
Briefly
there are two levels of falsity j fl claims that S is some
thing other than Ri; while f2 asserts a question about S with
no alternative beliefs offered.
In addition I and U are
values in the table.
U refers to an undetermined state as to
what S is or is not, and I means that p2 is ignorant about
which value, t, fl, f2, or U exists for pi.
This is
obviously abbreviated but it does carry the gist of the
ta b l e .

141
reality if and only if both of them believe
that S is Ri and each of them assumes the other
to hold that belief. (1979a, p. 11)
The statement that S is Ri represents the basic unit of
analysis for 'which "truth values" are assigned and is "...an
individual state of belief concerning some fragment of the
social world"

(1979a, p. 11).

While we have no data which

explicitly assess both members' actual and assumed beliefs,
we will proceed as if we had access to such data.

To make

the analytic task easier and more manageable we will only
consider the second part of studies one and two and omit
the question of social control that Rommetveit raises.

We

will act as if a symmetry between pi and p2 prevails:
listed as pl=p2(111(2); IV(6)) in the dialogic truth table.
For the purposes of analysis we can use a bit of
dialogue already reviewed (transcript # 15 , part 2, study 1,
page 99) ••
s2*: do you see it?
si**: yeah it's coming...I don't see it that
well though.
Yeah, now I see it
s2: it's a triangle right?
s i : right
s2: i t ’s far away right?
s i j what?
(1)
s2: it fa, further away than the other one?
(2)
si: yeah
and concentrate on the lines marked (1) and (2).

We can

complicate the analysis by considering both levels of
falsity,

fl and f2, but it seems adequate to concentrate

just on falsity fl and modify line (1) to read as:
triangle is fa, further away than the other one.

the
We then

Ik2
take the assertion (A), S.is Ri, to mean that THE TRIANGLE
IS FURTHER AWAY THAN THE OTHER ONE,

and we can proceed by

constructing the following abbreviated version of
Rommetveit*s dialogic truth table.
Table 13
Simplified Dialogic Truth Table

I

Case

Actual
old
member
pi in
wla

Beliefs
new
member
p2 in
wl

II
Assumed Beliefs
old
new
member member
p2(pl
pl(p2
in wl)*5 in w2)

One

t

t

t

t

Two

t

fl

t

t

Three

fl

fl

t

t

a. pi in wl represents the old member's
actual beliefs about assertion (A), while
p2 in wl refers to the foil's, or remaining
members in study 1, actual beliefs.
b. p2(pl in wl) represents the new member's
belief about what the old member thinks of
assertion (A); while pi (p2 in w2) represents
the old member's assumption about what the
new member believes.
A (t) means that the belief is assumed to^
be true, while fl assumes that S is not Ri
but something else.
Recalling the as if nature of the argument and the
simplifying assumptions, Case One represents an approximate
version of the argument assumed in the results section.
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The partner whose perspectives is unaltered believes
assertion (A) as does the foil, as evidenced in line (2).
As there is no evidence to the contrary each participant
temporarily believes that the other also accepts S is Ri and
(t) is listed under the assumed belief column.
joins the arguments made by Goffman and Orne.

Case Two
The partner

who remains immersed in an extended perspective offers
assertion (A) as a statement of his perspective,

and while

the foil can accept this description the more detailed, but
silent, and actual belief is that S is not just away it is
in back (S is Rm, in back, not Ri, away).
under the actual beliefs of p2.
mentioned,

Fl is then listed

As this detail is never

the old member incorrectly believes (t) for pi

(p2 in w2).

The foil however correctly assumes that (A) is

(t) for p2(pl in wl).

Case Three represents the possibility

that while assertion (A) can be accepted by each partner
neither really believes that S is Ri is an adequate
description.

Rather they each believe that something else

is true of S— S is Rk (in front) and S is Rm(in back)— but
manage to hide these details from the other.

So fl gets

listed under each member's actual belief but as neither
partner informs the other about these issues, for whatever
reason,

each "incorrectly" assumes that the other believes

assertion (A) as it stands and a (t) is listed under assumed
beliefs.
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As the conjunction of pi in w l ; p2 in w2; pl(p2 in w2) ,•
and p2(pl in wl) is true only for Case One only it is
considered as an example of a "perfectly shared actual
reality."

The other cases are imperfectly shared as there

are "errors" made about what the actual beliefs-are.

The

problem v/ith all this is what represents an adequate account
of a person's actual beliefs?

In a very real sense an

answer to this question complements the issue of what
members make known to each other and share.

For it asks

how much detail needs to be placed into the dialogue for an
other to make a "correct" assumption about the actual beliefs
of their partner.
Consider the first case.

The "old member" uses the

term

"away" but remains silent about the details— that "away"

is a

short-hand version of "in front."

need

to be brought into a public domain for us to argue that

we "know" pi's actual beliefs,

If these specifics

then Case One is not

perfectly shared but is better represented by the imperfectly
shared Case Three.

If, however,

it is not necessary to

place these silent presumptions into words, Case One can be
considered an instance of "perfectly shared actual reality."
It is apparent that a more plausible, and intuitively
satisfying example of a "perfectly shared" reality is found
in those cases where differences are found.

For here the

participants were able to proceed from the initial assertion
that S i s Ri to the realization that S is not Ri, but

Iks
rather that S is Rk and S is Rra.

Each member recognized

that they have incorrectly assessed their partner's beliefs,
and through further talk modify their assumptions about what
the other's actual beliefs are.

This seems to be a clear

instance of what Rommetveit's concern with how members of a
dyad, through sustained discourse,

overcome their private

interests and temporarily achieve that "perfectly shared"
reality.

The question remains, however, whether given the

simplifications made about Case One, and the analytic
outsider's stance which permits us to see that an "error"
has been made,

can we assume that it too fits Rommetveit's

definition?
Once we raise the issue as to how much- detail needs to
be placed into words before we can say that members share a
reality we broach an important issue.

For if we accept the

assumption that individuals live in a pluralistic and
fragmented social world,

it seems that more detail and more

history can always be provided.

We face an infinite regress

and need some way to cut this problem off so that we can
agree that enough detail has been presented.
The difference between Cases One and Two, and those
instances where disparities are discovered reside in what
the members take as being adequate to resolve the task-athand— even if this manages to gloss issues and leave the
future open to the types of problems we've seen with
pragmatic agreements and the indirect knowers.

The critical
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point here is that the other is not thought to mean anything
else than what is said, and neither partner is aware that
the other has glossed details and left a potential for
trouble.

I want to suggest that Rommetveit*s definition can

be redrawn,

and that the definition of shared reality should

address only assumed beliefs.

The definition could be

rewritten a s :
Some representation Ri of S constitutes part
of pi's and p2's shared reality if both of
them believe the other to hold to the belief
that S is R i .
With this definition Case One is represented as a case
of shared reality even though the members can be considered
to be mistaken about the other's "actual, beliefs."
points about this redefinition should be noted.

Four

One is that

it is the participant's decision about the level of detail—
what they take as adequate to resolve the task-at-hand—
which is given priority.

It is critical to realize, both

in the case of pragmatic agreements and in the examples
which Rommetveit cites, that the members are not aware that
their agreement masks a problem.

The person who is aware of

this is the analyst who somehow acquires access to what the
members "really" know.

Two, while there is no explicit

notion of sharedness in the "arbitrary tradition" literature,
I think that the research presumes a similar definition.

I

don't think this is surprising since social psychology has
consistently argued that imagined beliefs about others have
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real consequences for our own "beliefs and actions.

Three,

that what is shared or made known will vary in content during
any interaction.

And four, that this definition may "be too

weak— it may include cases we would obviously want to
exclude.

Rommetveit's original definition demonstrates a

set of problems that should not be lost sight of and which
are repeatedly found in the notion of pragmatic agreement and
Goffman's "modus vivendi" of interactions.
So what is made known by what is said?
the members share?

What is it that

As long as neither partner has any reason

to presume that an-other means anything else than what is
said, and as long as the talk exchanged is perceived as being
sufficient to resolve the task-at-hand a shared belief is
held for all practical purposes and is taken for granted until
further notice— even if the "actual beliefs" are misrepresented.
On the basis of this definition each case describes some
shared reality about each other's belief about assertion (A):
THE TRIANGLE IS FURTHER AWAY THAN THE OTHER ONE.
We need now to move to the issue of context independency
and see how the results described here fit into an expanded"
perspective.

To make this transition we need to clarify some

presumptions about what it means to be a member of a social
Zj,3
world, and what it means to talk about that world. ^ The

^ T h e s e claims about membership are not meant to be
exhaustive.
We are setting up beginning arguments so that
the function of talk can be put into perspective.
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basic argument about membership is simply that a person's
interests
be used.

influence how the world before him or her will
Bartlett's (1932) assertion is interesting to cite

in this regard:
We may consider the old and familiar
illustration of the landscape artist, the
naturalist, and the geologist who walk in
the country together.
The one is said to
notice and recall beauty of scenery, the
other details of flora and fauna, and the
third the formation of soils and rocks.
In
this case, no doubt, the stimuli being
selected in each instance from what is
present are different for each observer,
and obviously the records made in recall
are also different.
Nevertheless, the
different reactions have a uniformity of
determination, and in each case spring
from established interests, (p. 4)
as is the claim by Schutz (1971):
As we stated before, this world is to our
natural attitude in the first place not
an object of our thought but a field of
domination.
We have an eminently practical
interest in it, caused by the necessity of
complying with the basic requirements of
our life.
But we are not equally interested
in all the strata of the world of v/orking.
The selective function of our interests
organizes the world in both respects— as
to space and time— in strata of major and
minor relevancies, (p. 277» Vol. I)

While it may be useful to attempt to discriminate
between interests, beliefs, attitudes, schemas, intentions,
plans, engagement, set, attention, and purpose the terms are
used interchangeably here.
I take it that Neisser's (1975»
1976) argument about attention, Marinis' (1977) self-schemata,
Goffman's (1974) notion of frame, and Rommetveit's (1979a)
assertion about engagement and perspective make the same
point.
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To have some "established interests" in the world
along "strata of major and minor relevancies" is to propose
not only that our concerns influence what we take from the
world, but to argue that our use of the world cannot be
divorced from our interest in it.
risk.

At least not without

For to make such a separation is to leave only the

public mark accessible.

The finding of a knife in a tree

presents an observable and verifiable event for every
passer-by, but what is lost are the guiding interests and
history of the person(s) who put the knife in the t r e e / 1''*
If a question arises as to how that knife is to be under
stood, it is those silent grounds we seek to retrieve.

For

we attempt to rejoin the subject with his or her object to
find out how the knife was used and should be taken— as
indicating hostility,

forgetfulness or target practice.

If we stay only with the knife and accept it as a public
and anonymous expression,

the risk is that the knife, as

the word, will be fit to the possibly disparate world of

^Rommetveit (1979) and Menzel (1978) present an example
of a man mowing a lawn and cite it as an example of a
"trivial minimum."
It is something that any passer-by can
agree to but leaves open whether the lawn is being mowed
to keep up community standards, annoy the neighbors,
exercise his muscles, or avoid his wife.
Obviously, to
the extent that our purpose is to keep a record of whether
the lawn is mowed, or how many knives are found in trees,
the "trivial minimum" suits our purposes and is adequate for
it.
It should also be noted that to seek the person's reasons
is not to give a priority to that account, we can argue with
it and assume that there are "hidden" motives.
We are just
noting that there is an interest which guides.

the passer-by.

And if the knife was left as an object

presumed useable by any-other in an unproblematic manner,
again as with the word, the same "error" is made.
What does it mean then to talk about the world?

It is

to place our previously silent interests into a public and
(ac)countable domain— what Berger and Luckmann have called
externalization and objectiviation.

So, in speaking we

have temporarily transformed the world, for our utterances
catch our use of the world and order it into "flora" and
l±6
"fauna."
To talk about the world is to snare it, to
catch it in words for self and others, and convey what
elements are to be pulled from the ground— how the world is
to be ordered.
Everyday speech repeatedly warns us, especially at
times of anger or in the face of authority, to be careful
about what we put into words and make public.

Such phrases

as "don't say something now you'll be sorry for later,"
"be careful what you say, it'll come back to haunt you,"
and "I knew that once I said it things would never be the
same" indicate that one is not being warned about semantic
niceties.

You are being warned to keep quiet about "what's

on your mind," to keep your rendition of the world off the

^ C o n s i d e r Rommetveit (1979a )t "What is easily over
looked in such an analysis (of understanding what is meant
by what is said), however, is the 'innocence of silence' and
the subtle transformation of knowledge which at times seems
to be part and parcel of the very act of verbalization."
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floor,

to keep silent about your interest in and use of the

material before you.

To use "away" or "in front of" is the

same as using "flora" and "fauna"; our use of the world is
displayed for others.

Expressions such as "away" manage to

accomplish the same thing, but in their mildness we lose
sight of it.
But do these other words also function as "away" did?
Are they offered as public words--as types— presumed useable
by any-other in the social unit, and as such conceal a
situational history and personal biography?

To the extent

that they do, we are left with a figure separated from its
ground— with the knife in the tree-offered as re-useable by
any-other.

And to the extent that we take the words as

offered discrepant perspectives can be tucked beneath the
same term.
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1

One possible misunderstanding should be considered
before proceeding.

Though the experimental context severely

constrains the members' activities and defines their concerns,
interests and contexts are not always known in advance.

For

words can, as G. H. Mead (1935/72) argued, work to form
them:

^ I t is interesting to examine in this light the disputes
that have taken place over the uses of Ms. or Miss, Black or
Negro, Boy or Man, Girl or Woman.
The expressions represent
not a linguistic argument, but a social and historical one.
They are fights over how the world should be ordered and
attempts to make visible what has been concealed.
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Language does not simply symbolize a
situation or object which is already there
in advance, it makes possible the existence
or appearance of that object, for it is part
of the mechanism whereby that situation or
object is created, (p. 78 )
and Merleau-Ponty:
The search for the 'appropriate word' in •
order to make something known to somebody
else may often, in authentic speech, actually'
serve to make that something known to the
speaker himself.
The latter does not know
precisely what he intended to say until he
'hits upon' some word or expression by which
his thought can be completed. (Rommetveit,
197^, pp. 22-23).
But whether the interests are constrained in advance or
gradually emerge, if to talk is to order or create an object,
what does it mean to exchange words with someone--to engage
in a face-to-face interaction?

If we grant the premise

that no two individuals occupy the same temporal or spatial
location (Schutz,

1973; Rommetveit,

197^»

1979a), nor have

identical interests in the world, to participate in a
dialogue is an attempt to arrive at some mutually agreed
upon version of reality which can temporarily transcend
our private perspectives and engagements with the world
(Goffman,

1976; Mead, 193^/72; Rommetveit,

197^*

|,o
1979a)..

First there is Mead (1935/72) " . . . objects are con
stituted in terms of meanings within the social process of
experience and behavior through the mutual adjustment to one
another of the responses or actions of the various individual
organisms involved in that process, an adjustment made
possible by means of a communication which takes the form of
a conversation of gestures in the earlier evolutionary stages
of the process, and of language in its later states." (p. 77)
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As William James (Rommetveit,

1979a) asserted:

my verification of one thing,

I yours of another.

on each other's truth."

"You accept
We trade

And by trading words we are engaged

in an eminently social, and pervasively mundane enterprise.
This ordinary, routine,

and unremarkable activity allows us

to temporarily move beyond our private perspectives and
achieve some co-ordinated and shared reality integrally
connected to the purpose-at-hand.
But not every conversation proceeds with such
equanimity.

For when two people speak, different orders of

reality are placed on the floor and the issue of social
control— whose claim to reality will be temporarily accepted—

And then there are the comparable claims of Goffman and
Rommetveit;
Goffman (1976):
"What then is talk viewed interactionally?
It is an example of that arrangement by which
individuals come together and sustain matters having a
ratified, joint, current, and running claim upon attention,
a claim which lodges them in some sort of intersubjective,
mental world." (p. 328)
And finally Rommetveit, 197^:
"Once the other person
accepts the invitation to engage in that dialogue his life
situation is temporarily transformed.
The two participants
leave behind them whatever their preoccupations were at the
moment when silence was transformed into speech.
From that
moment on they are jointly committed to a shared here and
n ow established and continually modified by their acts of
communication." (p. 23) . . . and . . . "Message structure
must then be explored within the conceptual framework of the
spatial-temporal interpersonal coordinates of that act of
speech:
whatever is made known is made known by an I to a
you whose different though partially shared worlds are
temporarily brought into some state of intersection by
virtue of the intersubjectively established here and now of
their dialogue." (p. 39)
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surfaces.

ZQ

^

But whichever reality claim is accepted,

or

fought over, some use of the world is being brought into
relief in any face-to-face enounter.
And from this co-ordinated dialogue a manner of knowing
the world adequate to resolve the purpose-at-hand will
emerge.

<51

The positioning of the world according to interest

ho

^The issue of social control and its conversational
implications has been discussed by Rommetveit (1979a, 1979b,
1979c) in great detail.
His dialogic truth table attempts
to specify what is meant by what is said under varying
levels of social control.
The critical question, in part,
then becomes how to understand how to. achieve a shared
reality.
"The basic problem of human intersubjectivity is
. . . a question concerning in what sense and under which
conditions two persons who engage in a dialogue can transcend
their different private worlds." (1979a, p. 7)
■^Consider the claim that Goffman (1959) made:
"Each
participant is allowed to establish the tentative official
ruling regarding matters which are vital to him but not
immediately important to others, e.g., the rationalizations
and justifications by which he accounts for his present
activity.
In exchange for this courtesy he remains silent
or non-committal on matters important to others but not
immediately important to him.
We have then a kind of inter
actional modus vivendi.
Together the participants contribute
to a single overall definition of the situation which involves
not so much a real agreement as to what exists but rather a
real agreement as to whose claim concerning what issues will
be temporarily honored.
Real agreement will also exist
concerning the desirability of avoiding an open conflict of
definitions of the situation.
I will refer to this level of
agreement as a 'working consensus.'
It is to be understood
that the working consensus established in one interaction
will be quite different in content from the working consensus
established in a different type of setting." (pp. 9-10)
^ F o r simplicity's sake, I am assuming that the encounters
are cooperative ones.
When issues of competitiveness, and
questions of honesty arise other problems arise as to how the
talk will be heard.
These concerns can be temporarily
omitted, but even then some rendition of the world is being
offered.
Even if it is not to be believed.
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and purpose is what it means, here, to refer to a socially
constructed reality.

Constructed because some aspect of

the material available is selected,

"flora" and "fauna,"

and social because the arbitration is a joint venture— by
trading on.the "elements" placed into talk a shared world
can be temporarily attained.
for this construction.

But there is a price to pay

Consider Schutz (1971):

. . . it is characteristic of the natural
attitude that it takes the world and its
objects for granted until counterproof
imposes itself, (p. 228, Vol. I)
and:
To take the world for granted beyond question
implies the deeprooted assumption that until
further notice the world will go on
substantially in the same manner as before;
that what has proved valid up to now will
continue to be so, and that anything we or
others like us could successfully perform
once can be done again in a like way and will
bring about like results, (p. 231, Vol. 2)
Then there is the argument of William James (1971):
To continue thinking unchallenged is ninetynine times out of a hundred our practical
substitute for knowing in the completed sense.
(p. 39)
and:
. . . any object which remains uncontradicted
is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute
reality, (p. 289, Vol. II)
And what is made as a broader claim, that any uncon
tradicted experience becomes taken-for-granted, works for
a conversation.

A world ordered by speech, which snares

self and others, becomes taken-for-granted as long as it
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remains uncontradicted.

What has been made known with work,

is presumed known, natural, and obvious to any-other in the
same social unit.

But even though what is made known is

taken-for-granted, that it suits the here and now of-the
participants' interests and purpose-at-hand is a way to
remind us that it is a convention.

For with other purposes-

at-hand the material before us can be utilized differently,
and previously "hidden" aspects•become visible for the
first time.

The social world that we live in is composed

of fringes (James,

I 890) and horizons (Schutz,

1971,

1973):

what is in focus at one time leaves out of focus something
else which with a turn of our head becomes clear.

What

exists as a socially co-constructed reality is then located
neither "out there" in the world, nor "in the head" of the
individual.

It is created and sustained in the .inter

relationship between the members and their purposes-at-hand
(Dewey,

1929/60; James,

1971? Mead, 1 9 3 V 7 2 ) .

In any face-to-face encounter talk mediates between the
purpose-at-hand and the context and provides the material
from which a shared world can be co-constructed.
what is made known continues to go unchallenged,
taken-for-granted-until-further-notice.

And if
it is

The dialogues

reported here all fit within this broad framework, but the
details of the analysis enable us to gauge the specifics
of the process.
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From their engagement with the task the members begin
to unproblematically employ a terminology which obscures
the precise details of what is seen.

Yet these expressions

presuppose a mutually shared and understood use of the
world, orientation to the stereogram,
relationship.

and interactional

That the transmission starts with,

the monitor may overhear,

or that

this short hand version of the

world suggests that the utterances are offered as
typifications of that encounter and what was made known—
as anonymous public words useable by any-other in the same
context.
offered,

And in the foil's effort to use the words as
disparate worlds remain unexposed and an agreement

is. reached which works for all practical purposes.
In seeing how a history is acquired, how it is taken
as natural and obvious, how it is represented to a stranger,
and the possible consequences of this transmission we
approach the concerns of the "arbitrary tradition"
literature, and have, in a sense, a verbal analog of the
autokinetic effect.
With the mention of the autokinetic effect, we can
return to our starting point:

the concept of "norm."

How

do we relate what talk has accomplished to the formation of
norms?

In watching how the participants' pragmatic

engagement with the task allowed them to form,

share,

and

take-for-granted an understanding, we recover and begin to
answer a series of questions which prompted the analysis:
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(a) accounting for how a manner of knowing arises in some
social unit;

(b) accounting for how this manner of knowing

comes to be shared; and (c) accounting for how this manner
of knowing acquires its apparent naturalness.
Yet the problem of what is shared between the members
is troublesome.

For as we've seen from Rommetveit's dialogic

truth table, and with the notion of pragmatic agreement,
disparate,

even conflicting, perspectives can be concealed

beneath what members take to be shared agreements.

As the

presumption that members of some social unit share some
common frame of reference for their thought and action is
central to the concept of "norm," we can not just assume
that some standard is held in common.
the questions that we need to ask.

For to do so begs

When we assert that

members share a norm, what is it that they are thought to
have in common and what is the level of detail— how specific
is the thought or behavior shared— that norm is intended
to account for?
Let me try to clarify this concern by presenting a
hypothetical c a s e .

We undertake a survey and inquire whether

people believe that "help should be offered to someone in
need."

We find, for the convenience of the example, a

unanimous yes.

Within some social unit people appear to

share a standard of thought and behavior, and we may argue
that a norm exists.

But as a norm is always invoked in

some context, what is it that this statement of unanimity

..

makes known?
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Do we assume that the members of the unit

agree how to offer help, who to offer help to, or how to
recognize a person in need?

Imagine that we return to

these members and request more information:

have they ever

given help to someone in need; what do you consider to be
an offer of help; are there situations you can think of
when you wouldn't offer help; are there people you wouldn't
help even if they were in need; and how do you know that
some one is in need of help?
I d o n ’t think any one would be surprised if the answers
encompassed a rather broad and diverse range of responses.
Indeed our original question would probably have prompted
the comment,

"well, it depends."

In any case, we would

agree that our initially broad base of agreement has been
narrowed,

and explain this narrowing by indicating the

consequence of making the request more specific— of
contextualizing it.

How broad do-we need the base of

agreement to be before we consider if normative,

and what

is the level of detail that the members of a social unit
are presumed to share?
Figure 1 represents a schematic of the problem being
addressed, and we can consider the hypothetical unanimity
as occupying space (g)— there is a large base of agreement
but there is a low level of detail presumed to be shared.
As we obtain more information we moved from space (g) to
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Figure 1. A schematic of the Base of
Agreement and Level of Detail Shared

(e) and then (c)--as the arrow indicates.

The base of

agreement is a critical issue as norm has its force as an
explanatory concept precisely because of its assumed ability
to account for the behavior and beliefs of a large number
of people.

If we argue that the base of agreement is not an

essential component of norm, we are reduced to suggesting
that two people who share some reality share a norm.

At

this level norms cannot be distinguished from such concepts
as attitudes and beliefs and its force as an explanatory term
is severely diminished.

Y/e may then want to be cautious
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about claims which argue that spaces (c),

(f), and (i)

represent n o r m s . ^
What about the level of detail that is presumed shared?
We can use the concept of pragmatic agreements as an analogy.
If we suggest that the agreement is what the members take

,

as adequate for the task-at-hand, and if we accept that some
event can be considered shared by pi and p 2 as long as both
of them believe the other accepts the assertion that S is
Ri, we can pack a great deal of widely disparate,
conflicting experiences under the same rubric.

even

And if

divergent experiences can be called the same thing for all
practical purposes,

the base of agreement is increased to

a magnitude useful for the cpncept of "norm" though we can
not set a numerical figure for this base.

Many members

with varied experiences can then agree that "it's nice to
offer help to someone in need.”

There is an important

implication in arguing that norms may have low specificity,
and I want to bring this out from another direction.

^ This classification of norms by base and detail should
be considered suggestive.
For example, is a professional
argot to be considered normative— it has a small base but
high detail (c).
Is the fact that most Americans write from
left to right, high detail and high base (a), normative?
Perhaps it is misleading to suggest that norms fall in only
some spaces, perhaps they can occur at any point and all
that we need to know, at any point, is what level of detail
and base that particular norm is to account for. Though as
we begin to talk of universal norms as contrasted with^
particularistic ones, I think we are more likely to be in
space (g).
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Sherif's discussion of norm formation offered the
proposition that a norm was a "preparedness to see in the
nature that surrounds us much to what another period would
be totally blind"

(1935r P* 6k).

As no one in the "arbitrary

tradition" literature appears to question this supposition,
I will assume that they have accepted it.
bad assumption to entertain,

And it is not a

but it leaves open the issue

of what a "preparedness to see" is intended to convey.
I want to propose that the expression should be
considered as something akin to a social expectation, a
social preparation.

As all of the research in the "arbitrary

tradition," as well as the current work, has enabled the
members to come to know something about the" context they
are immersed in? and as in each of the studies it is the
experimental instructures which influence what use is to be
made of the world before them,
"preparedness to see."

they each set up a

It becomes interesting to, again,

consider the experimental protocols for this research to
assess what it is that is "prepared."
Simply put the instructions open a future which the
participants close.

The expectations,

the "preparedness to

see" did not provide a detailed map as to how to proceed,
but rather presented a broad frame within which the members
had to temporarily align the "here" and "now" of their
interests.

Whatever was finally shared and made known was

an achievement, a consequence,

of people interacting in
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context and concert.

For members the experiences which

come to represent the details of that "preparedness" are
not known until the task is completed.

And as I read the

"arbitrary tradition" literature this process operates in
each experiment reported.
What then does it mean to consider norm as a
"preparedness to see"— as a social expectation?
first to return to a point introduced earlier:
concept of norm represents a summary term.

It is
that the

That many

members with widely divergent experiences can accept the
broad claim that "it's nice to offer help to some one in
need."

And next it is to suggest that norms are social

ideals precisely because they enable the members of a
social unit to categorize a wide range of disparate instances
under the same rubric.

To consider norms as a "preparedness

to see" is to indicate that they function as a frame whose
details are temporarily filled within some context.
And in that context it is a member's continuing and
repetitive problem to determine the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of the linkage between action and thought
and norm— between context and ideal.

There is then an inherent

vagueness with "norms," for any context contains the
possibility that members will argue about how to use the
particulars before them.

And in this argument "norms" are

bandied about as are words:
in the world.

to select and order the material

For talk is being used to make sense of the
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context as it describes it— "the coherent, organized and
meaningful sense of the environment is contingent upon the
'describing' that members do" (Wieder, 197*0.

As Garfinkel

and Sacks (1970) note, maintaining a recognizable order is
through and through a member's accomplishment.^
And for all practical purposes these summary terms,
ideals,

are offered as adequate descriptions of what has

been seen or done— e.g., I offered help.

But in that these

pronouncements gloss the details of the specific encounter,
they function as did the synonyms that the members developed
in these studies— as public terms assumed useable and
comprehensible by any-other in the social unit regardless
of their biography.
in advance,

And as what is known is not specified

it is managed in retrospect.^

C3
-'•'Two senses of order have slipped in with this account.
One is how the members use and select the material before
them, while the other is how their talk makes the environment
appear orderly— coherent and rational.
Talk manages both
senses, but we've been primarily concerned with the first
sense.
This is probably closer to what Garfinkel and Sacks
(1970 ) have called formulating; "saying in so many words what
we are doing."
I think there is a subtle, but real difference
between order and formulating,for with order we don't tell
you what we are doing, we assume you know.
■^This point can be made in a number of ways and occurs
all the time.
We can consider a case where talk is not
involved.
There was the recent boxing fatality, the Classen
case, in New York City where an entire audience witnessed
the death.
The question asked was when should the fight
have been ended.
The outcome made it clear that what was
originally taken as a trading of blows should have been
considered as something else— a trading of fatal blows.
At
what point was the alteration in the nature of the punchy to
be noticed? Each blow as it occurred "appeared" to be like

165
What is concealed beneath the summary term are the
specific elements of the world used, and it is these details
which stand for the ideal, the norm, until further notice.
As such a future is left opens

when trouble arises the use

of the world, the details of the encounter,
reformulation.

are open to

To say that the members share a standard

of thought and action is to suggest that they share summary
terms— ideals, types— which for any particular context
leaves open how the material will be ordered.

It is a

sharedness for all practical purposes which cloaks an
essential fragility about the social world.

'any of the preceding blows.
Yet when the fight was over,
"everyone" saw that this was not how the blows should have
been seen.
The outcome influenced what had come before.
The
same issue arises in child abuse issues— when is a bruise
an indication of parental neglect and when an accident? Again,
many times we can not know until some future opens which
enables us to re-evaluate the first bruise.
Consider again the Kitty Genovese incident for the
party who is listening to the screams before the death occurs.
What does the first scream represent?
It can still be a
fight between friends that is very loud, it could be a prank,
or it could be serious.
Once the event ended it was clear
that the screams should have been taken as serious cries for
help.
I would suggest that to the hearer in context this was
not at all clear.
And the common expressions such as "you
had to be there" repeatedly point to this pervasive problem.
"Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be
lived forwards." Kierkegaard
-^Wilson (1970) has called this approach to norms an_
interpretive view:
"It is apparent that in the interpretive
view of social interaction, in contrast with the normative
paradigm, definitions of situations and actions are not
explicitly or implicitly assumed to be settled once and for
all by literal application of a preexisting culturally
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This claim about the fragility of the social world
enables us to introduce some remaining concerns.

Can we

assume that the understanding which individuals form during
an experimental encounter is an adequate representation of
norm formation?

It is the presupposition of the "arbitrary

tradition" literature,
it is.

and the research presented here, that

Yet it is just this presumption that we should be

concerned with.
Each of the studies in the literature, including this
one, proceeds by having some number of individuals inter
acting with each other, and by replacing culturally smart
members with cultural n a i f s .

V/hat they come to share may

be known in greater or lesser detail, but have we accounted

established system of symbols.
Rather, the meaning of
situations are interpretations formulated on particular
occasions by the participants in the interaction and are
subject to reformulation on subsequent occasions." (p. 69 )
The normative view which this is contrasted with states:
". . . the normative paradigms require an empirical
assumption of substantial cognitive agreement among inter
acting members." (p. 61)
In our consideration of the base
of agreement and detail specified, it is this presumption of
substantial agreement that is at question.
And from the
perspective taken here it is a presumption assumed but never
documented.
Zimmerman and Wieder (1970) also express this inter
pretive view: " . . . the ways that members employ rules
requires that they continually develop v/hat a rule means when
they come to treat actual cases and when they find that they
must defend the rationality of their choices. . . . The work
of making and accepting such descriptions of conduct makes
social settings appear as orderly for the participants, and
it is this sense and appearance of order that rules in use,
in fact, provide and that ethnomethodologists, in fact,
study." (p. 292 )
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for norm formation?

Perhaps we have just witnessed how

members categorize an event or form an attitude.

Moscovici

(1972) addressed a similar concern when he inquired whether
the research in social psychology had an adequate conception
of social if that term was always employed to represent one
person in interaction with another.
One wants to examine, for example,
and "intergroup conduct."

"social movements"

But the move to this level of

social is with the same intent pursued here:
The study of cultural processes which are
responsible for the organization of knowledge
in a society . . . which creates a common social
reality with its norms and values the origins of
which are to be sought again in the social
context. (1972, p. 57)
Whatever is known and shared is still constrained and managed
by some social context, but the situation is expanded beyond
that of face-to-face encounters.
There is another side to the question about the adequacy
of the context employed here.

Even if we can demonstrate the

formation of some shared reality as a consequence of people
interacting,
norm?^'

can we account for the presumed durability of

It is here that our notion of "social" may be
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J "When the ’social' is studied in terms of the presence
of other individuals or of 'numerosity' it is not really the
fundamental characteristics of the system that are explored,
but rather one of its subsystems— the subsystem of interindividual relationships." (p. 55)
-^Rommetveit (1979a) raises the interesting hypothesis
that the achievement of a perfectly shared actual reality will
result in a more enduring reality.
This claim is worth con
sidering as a topic for future research.
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impoverished and require elaboration.

Moscovici's warning

about the level of social utilized, suggests that we should
be wary of presuming that the understandings displayed here
adequately represent "norm" formation.

It is a point well

taken, but 'we should note that even when we expand our
horizons,
Culture is created by and through
communication, and the organizing
principles of communication reflect
the social relations which are implied
in them (1972, p. 57)
we are re-introduced to the issues already discussed:

what

is it that members have in common; what level of detail are
they presumed to share?

What is it that these other modes

of communication— e.g., media,
known?

Indeed,

theater, and books— make

I want to suggest that the question of

durability may be misleading.

If we assume that there is a

"substantial cognitive agreement," we have to account for
a sameness in detail which appears to me and to others as
brute facts,

the same for all of us over time.

challenge that substantial agreement,

If we

and consider what we

agree to is an agreement for all practical purposes what
is shared are labels, public typologies, under which
disparate specifics are concealed.

And with that wide

range of varied behaviors lumped under the same topic,
"norms" may only appear as durable because we have glossed
the changes which have taken place.

One interesting area

for future research are those durable, expanded contexts
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where the members are continually informed about how to
use the world before them:

family, school, and work.-*®

It is important to realize that the thrust of these
concerns is directed to the issue of how much we can come
to know about the social world if we restrict our attention
to face-to-face encounters.

It is not a criticism of how

these interactions influence what the members come to know.
And if we assume that what members share is not identical
in detail, but rather represents an amalgam of behaviors
and thoughts what is achieved in face-to-face encounters
may take us further than we think.

Furthermore,

as it is

words which will be exchanged in those broader contexts,
we can anticipate consequences similar to what has been
displayed here on a small scale.
But the point must be made that it is an interpretive
paradigm which is assumed operative.

Whatever the context,

^
Halliday (1978):
"in the development of the child
as a social being language has the central role.
Language
is the main channel through which the processes of living
are transmitted to him.
Through which he learns to act as
a member of society— in and through the various social
groups, the family, the neighborhoods, and so on— and to
adopt its 'culture,' its mode of thought and action; its
beliefs and values." (p. 9)

Bandura (1977):
"It should be emphasized again that
most rules of action are conveyed by instruction rather than
discovered by direct experience."
Bandura qualifies this
argument to assert that what is directly experienced is
more durable than what is learned verbally.
Again another
research area is to consider behavior accompanied by talk
and that which is not.
Which is more durable?

and however "norms" are acquired the members will still have
to decide how any particular context represents the ideal . ^
As it relates to conversation,

the task, in part, remains

as Rommetveit (1979a) described it:

to understand ". . . i n

what sense and under what conditions two persons engaged in
dialogue . . . transcend their different private worlds."
And it is necessary to repeat that while any context
influences what is made known and shared,

it is talk-in-

context which will offer the "elements" from which a common
world can be constructed.

For in mediating between interests

and context, talk pulls some figure from the ground and
offers it to self and others for comment.
. Yet the "elements" offered for comment in these studies
occurred in highly restrictive environments.
v/ere told how to interact,
before them.

The members

and how to use the visual world

The results need to be heavily supplemented,

and numerous studies and analyses conducted to probe in more
detail the work begun h e r e .

For example by using Tables 1

and 2 in Appendix B we can ascertain what transpires when
the original members begin by being differently oriented to
the display.

Will a difference be more readily unearthed

^ I f we begin to argue that there is a separate norm to
account for all of the details, and that all of this is
substantially shared and known in advance of a context, the
argument begins to become perverse and reminiscent of
McDougal's instincts.
Why did he help, because there is a
norm.
How do you know that there is a norm, because he
helped.
And so^ on and so on.

1?1
in this case?

Will less "be taken for granted when a new

member enters the room?

What occurs when both members have

the same orientation, but differ from what they have been
led to anticipate?

How will they convey this information

to a new member who will see what they could not?

We can

repeat the same studies, but use a confederate to make sure
that the disparity is made public.

We can also alter the

interaction so cooperation and agreement are not forced.
A fifth study can be added:

the task-conveyor in the

second part will not see the display, but speak with a foil
who does.

How easily will this task-conveyor relinquish

what has been previously and directly experienced?

And to

make sure the difference is made known, we can use a
confederate.

Another possible way to bring out the disparity

is to let the foil describe it, before (s)he. is told what is
being seen.
We can also begin to collect additional data on what
each member's actual beliefs are, and what (s)he assumes
the partner believes.

We can also obtain the member's degree

of confidence in these beliefs about the others.

In addition,

we may want to consider altering the stimulus material.
a'short hand vocabulary used to convey what has occurred
only because the visual display has very few items to be
separated?

If more objects were present and had to be

described, would the transmission rely less heavily on
synonyms?

Perhaps the stereogram is not social enough?

Is

Rommetveit (195*0 h&s suggested that the autokinetic
effect was not an effective "social" stimulus.

V/hat would

be made known under more "social" conditions could provide
an interesting contrast, but Rommetveit's (195*b 1979a) own
research with more social material suggests findings that
are. quite similar to what has occurred here.
more appeared to be masked.

Indeed,

even

An essential issue for further

research is that of the pragmatic agreements and what
Goffman has called "working consensus."

Is it the case

that most interaction proceeds by keeping a variety of topic
off the floor,

and as such shared realities are constructed

which hide essential details from the members?
But words should be kept in perspective,

and pointed

out that they are only part of the communicative picture,
even in a face-to-face encounter.

Dore and McDermott (1980)

show how easily non-verbal behavior can contradict a verbal
claim and be taken by the participants as the claim to be
"listened" to.

And as Goffman notes:

Words are a great device for fetching speaker
and hearer into the same focus of attention
and into the same interpretation schema that
applies to what is thus attended.
But that
words are the best means to this end does not
mean that words are the only one or that the
resulting social organization is intrinsically
verbal in character. (1976, p. 309)
So in studying what any member knows and assumes shared, we
need to step beyond an exchange of words.
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But in inquiring what it is that talk manages in a
face-to-face encounter, we have started to probe the
question which "haunts" social psychology:
How can the individual be both a cause and
consequence of society? That is to say:
how can his nature depend indisputably upon
the prior existence of cultural design and
upon his role in a pre-determined social
structure, while at the same time he is
clearly a unique person, both selecting
and rejecting influences from his cultural
surroundings, and in turn creating new
cultural forms for the guidance of future
generations? (Allport, 1968, p. 9)
For we have acquired a beginning grasp of how members
engaged with the pragmatic and mundane considerations of the
task-at-hand have developed a manner of knowing the world:
with an exchange of words they order the world, and construct
an experiential short hand which expresses v/hat is known by
presuming a history of the encounter.

And in watching how

that history is represented to a stranger, we've seen how
disparate worlds are concealed beneath the same, rubric and
how another, new, layer of the social world has emerged.

And

in indicating the unintentional consequences of speaking with
an-other, we've displayed how words used to create knowledge
order the world in a manner which becomes taken for granted
if not challenged, and how the indirect knower is left
without access to the history of the encounter when the
founding member departs leaving only a public word presumed
useable by any-other.

After examining what is an exceptionally common and
pervasively routine activity, we can re-ask the "oldest"
question in social psychology:

"...

how does one

generation impose its thought forms upon the next?" (Allport,

1968).

With words.

Appendix A:

The Experimental Instructions
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STUDY #1 (Instructions)
Part I

Hi.
I'd like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a
short description of the experiment which you'll be engaged
in.
I would appreciate it if you would not touch the equip
ment until you are told to, and if you would hold all your
questions until this description is oyer.
In this experiment we are concerned with how individuals
reach solutions to problems.
The experiment has two parts
to it.
In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively
solve a problem that will be projected on the wall (screen)
in front of you.
The second part of the experiment will have
you coming to a cooperative solution about the same problem
but with a different projected image.
Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more detail.
As I have said we are concerned with how individuals reach
solutions to problems.
The pattern of dots that is now
projected on the wall (screen) provides the-problem that you
will have to solve. On the table in front of you are a pair
of goggles.
When you place the goggles over your eyes a .
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible.
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about
solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is to
mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears is. This part of the
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how
far in front of the dots the figure is. The problem must be
solved jointly, and in no case can the experimenter be asked
for assistance once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.^
Take a few moments to adjust to wearing them.
You can begin
to solve the problem as soon as the shape has become^clearly
visible.
So you do not forget what the problem is, it is
typed on the index card in front of you.
Again, the problem
is to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

Study #1
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If there are no questions I will shut the lights off and you
can put your goggles on.
Begin whenever you are ready.

Part II
At the point of solution: Why don't you remove your goggles
and give your eyes a few minutes of rest.
E: Place the second image on the projector and project it on
the wall.
When this is done return the goggles to SI and S2
but give to the subject who has seated himself/herself in the
chair with the yellow index card on the bottom a pair of
goggles that has green acetate on the right eye.
The other S
retains the goggles with red on right.
You can proceed as you did in the first part of the experiment.
Your task is again to mutually come to an agreement on how far
in front of the pattern of dots the figure that appears i s .
The experiment is over when you have both agreed on a solution.
ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K.
I'm going to shut the lights and you can begin when you
are ready.

Part Is both Ss wear red over right eye.
Part II: the S who sat in the chair with the yellow index card
fastened to the bottom now gets goggles with green on right and
the other S retains the original pair of goggles.
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STUDY #2 (Instructions)

_

I appreciate your participating in this experiment.
The
research is concerned with how individuals reach solutions to
problems and is run in two parts.
The first part of the
experiment is conducted using a pair of subjects, and the
second part is set up so that one of the subjects who has
taken part in the first half of the experiment will be replaced
by a third subject who has remained here in the waiting area. This third subject will then participate in the second half
of the study with one of the subjects who. has already gone
through part I of the experiment.
As the experiment is run in parts it is necessary to assign
subjects to different parts.
We can determine which part of
the research you will participate in if you would each select
one of the colored toothpicks.
(E places down three tooth
picks on the table and asks each S to select one.)
O.K.
The people who have selected the yellow and red tooth
picks will participate in the first part, and the person who
has chosen the blue will take part in the second part of the
-study.
You may have to wait outside for about 15 minutes.
At that time one of these two subjects will return here and
ask you to come to the experimental room.
Part II'd like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a short
description of the experiment that you'll be engaged in.
I
would appreciate it if you would not touch the equipment until
you are told to, and if you would hold all your questions
until this description is over.
As I have told you, we are concerned with how individuals
reach solutions to problems.
The experiment has two parts to
it.
In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively solve
a problem that will be projected on the wall (screen) in front
of you.
The second part of the experiment will have one of
you explain to a new subject— the person sitting outside— what
the problem was that you had to solve, how you solved it, and
then solve .the..same._problem that you had ..in ..this....part of the
experiment with that person.
Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more detail.
As I have said we are concerned with how individuals reach
solutions to problems.
The pattern of dots that is now
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projected on the "wall (screen) provides the problem that you
will have to solve.
On the table in front of you are a pair
of goggles.
When you place the goggles over your eyes a
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible.
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about
solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is to
mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears i s . This part of the
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how
far in front of the dots the figure is. The problem must be
solved jointly, and in no case can the
experimenter beasked
for assistance once the experiment has
begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.
Take a few moments to adjust to wearing them.
You can begin
to solve the problem as soon as the shape has become clearly
visible.
So you do not forget what the problem is, it is
typed on the index card in front of you. Again, the problem
is to mutually come to an agreement on
how far infront of
the pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
If there are no questions I will shut the lights off and you
can put your goggles on.
Begin whenever you are ready.

Part II
At t h e ’point of solution; Why don't you remove your goggles
and give your eyes a few moments rest.
I'd appreciate it if
the person with the yellow toothpick would go outside and ask
the subject sitting there to enter the room.
Please do not
tell him/her about the experiment and please wait outside
until this part of the study is completed.
When it is over I
will ask you to come back so I can answer any^questions you
may have and explain the reason for the experiment.
NEW S ENTERS
E addresses S3: As you know the person you are seated next
to has participated in the first part of this experiment.
This individual will now explain to you what the experimental
task was that had to be solved, and how it was solved in the
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first part of the study. When this is done both of you will
have to reach a cooperative solution to the same problem that
was solved in the first part.
In no case can the experimenter
be asked for assistance once the experiment has begun.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K.
I'm going to shut the lights and you can begin when you
are ready.
E: E has returned the same pair of goggles to the subject who
has remained from part I— red on right.
The new S has been
given a pair of goggles with green on right.

The subjects who participate in part I are those who have
selected the yellow and red toothpicks.
In this part both Ss
are presented with goggles that have red acetate over the
right eye and green on the left. At the solution, E asks the
S with the yellow toothpick to leave and ask the other S
(blue toothpick) to enter the lab. After S is introduced,
E provides the new S with a set of goggles which have green
acetate on the right eye. The old S retains the same set
of goggles.
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STUDY #3 (Instructions)

I appreciate your participating in this experiment.
The
research is concerned with how individuals reach solutions to
problems and is run in two parts.
The first part is conducted
by having two subjects solve a problem while a third person
watches them.
The second part of the research requires the
two individuals who have solved the problem leave the
experiment and be replaced by the subject who has remained
here in the waiting area.
This subject will then participate
in the second part of the study with the subject left in the
room.
As the experiment is run in parts it is necessary to assign
subjects to different parts.
We can determine which part of
the research you will participate in if you would each select
one of the colored toothpicks.
(E places down four toothpicks
on the table and asks each S to select one.)
O.K.
The people who have selected the yellow and red tooth
picks will solve the problem in the first part, and the person
with the blue toothpick will watch them solve the problem.
The individual with the green toothpick will participate in
the second half of the study.
I'd appreciate it if the
individuals with the yellow and red toothpicks would enter the
experimental room with me.
In a few minutes I'll come back
and ask the person with the blue toothpick to enter the room.
The subject with the green toothpick may have to wait about
15 minutes before part II begins.

Part I
I'd like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a short
description of the experiment that you'll be engaged in.
I
would appreciate it if you would not touch the equipment until
you are told to, and if you would hold all your questions until
this description is over.
As I have told you we are concerned with how individuals reach
solutions to problems.
The experiment has two parts to it.
In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively solve a
problem that will be projected on the wall (screen) in front
of you.
The second part of the experiment is set up so that
the person who has watched you solve the problem is required
to explain to another subject what the problem was that you
had to solve and how you went about solving it. This person
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is then required to solve the same problem that you have
solved here with a new S.
Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more detail.
As I have said we are concerned with how individuals reach
solutions to problems.
The
pattern of dots that is now
projected on the wall (screen) provides the problem that you
will have to solve.
On the
table in front of you are a pair
of goggles. When you place the goggles over your eyes a
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible.
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about
solving the experimental problem.'
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is
to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears is. This part of the
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how
far in front of the dots the figure is.
The problem must be
solved jointly, and in no case can the experimenter be asked
for assistance once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.
Take a few moments to adjust to wearing them.
You can begin
to solve
the problem as soon as the shape has become clearly
visible.
So you do not forget what the problem is, it is
typed on
the index card in front of you.
Again, the problem
is to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears i s .
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K.
If there are none I will ask the subject who is to watch
you solve the problem to enter.
(E goes and recruits S3)
E to S3 s As the other subjects work on the experimental^
problem you will watch them and hear them solve it.
It is
important that you pay attention to their efforts for even
though you will not be wearing goggles it is your responsibility
in the second part of the study to explain to the subject now
waiting outside what the experimental task was and how it was
resolved.
After you do that you will be asked to solve with
that person the same problem that was solved here.
During this part of the experiment you can not offer advice,
nor can the subjects ask for your help.
Once they have solved
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the task feel free to ask them any questions you think are
necessary to know for the second part of the experiment.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K.
If there are no questions I will shut the lights off and
you can put your goggles on.
Begin when you are ready and in
no case can the experimenter be asked for help.

Part II
At the point of solution: Why don't you remove your goggles
and give your eyes a few moments rest.
To S3: are there any
questions you would like to ask these subjects?
After questions are asked, or if there are none:
I'd
appreciate it.if the individuals with the yellow and red tooth
picks would leave the room and ask the subject waiting outside
to come in. Please do not tell him/her about the experiment
and please wait outside until this part of the experiment is
completed.
When it is over I will ask you to come back so I
can answer any questions you may have and explain the reason
for the experiment.
NEW S ENTERS
E addresses S^: As you know the person you are seated next to
has participated in the first part of this experiment.
This
individual will now explain to you what the experimental task
was that had to be solved and how it was solved in the first
part of the study.
When this is done both of you will have to
reach a cooperative solution to the same problem that was
solved in the first part.
When I shut the lights off y o u c a n
put your set of goggles on.
The other person is not wearing,
and can not wear, the goggles.
In no case can the experimenter
be asked for assistance once the experiment has begun.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K.
I'm going to shut the lights- off and you can begin when
you are ready.
E has given to S*f a set of goggles with green over the right
eye.
SI and S2 had goggles with red on the right eye.

The subjects who participate in part I are those who have
selected the yellow, red, and blue toothpicks.
Red and yellow
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enter the room first and are explained the problem.
Blue
then enters, is seated behind SI and S2, is explained his/
her role and the experiment begins with SI and S2 wearing
goggles with red on right.
At the task's conclusion S3 is
given the opportunity to question these Ss. After this the
original pair leave and S4 enters.
This S is the one who had
selected the green toothpick and is given a pair of goggles
with green on the right.
S3 and
s.it at the table where
SI and S2 sat.
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.(Instructions)

I appreciate your participation in this experiment.
The
research is concerned with how individuals reach solutions
to problems and is run in three parts.
The first part is
conducted using a pair of subjects, and the second part is
set up so that one of the subjects who has taken part in the
first* third of the experiment will be replaced by a third
subject who has remained here in the waiting area.
The third
and last part is run by having one of the subjects from the
second part of the experiment leave and ask the remaining
subject to enter the laboratory and participate in the study
with one of the subjects who has taken part in the second
part of the research.
As the experiment is run in parts it is necessary to assign
subjects to different parts.
We can determine which part of
the research you will participate in if you would each select
one of the colored toothpicks.
(E places down four tooth
picks on the table and asks each S to select one.)
O.K.
The people who have selected the yellow and red tooth
picks will participate in the first part, the person who has
selected blue in the second, and the person with green in
the third.
The people with the blue and green toothpicks may
have to wait about 10 to 20 minutes before it is their turn
to participate.
Part I
I ’d like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a
short description of the experiment that you'll be engaged in.
I would appreciate it if you would not touch the equipment
until you are told to, and if you would hold all your
questions until this description is over.
As I have told you, we are concerned with how individuals
reach solutions to problems.
The experiment has three parts
to it.
In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively
solve a problem that will be projected on the wall (screen)
in front of you.
The second part of the experiment will have
one of you explain to a new. subject— the person sitting out
side with the blue toothpick— what the problem was that you
had to solve and how you solved it.
The third part will then
have this new subject explain to the remaining subject, the
one with the green toothpick, what the problem was, how it
was solved, and then solve the same problem you had in this
part of the experiment.

9
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Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more
detail.
As I have said we are concerned with how individuals
reach solutions to problems.
The pattern of dots that is now
projected on the wall (screen) provides the problem that you
will have to solve.
On the table in front of you are a pair
of goggles.
When you place the goggles over your eyes a
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible.
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about
solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is to
mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears i s . This part of the
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how
far in front of the dots the figure is. The problem must be
solved jointly, and in no case can the experimenter be asked
for assistance once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.
Take, a few moments to adjust to wearing them.
You can begin
to solve the problem as soon as the shape has become clearly
visible.
So you do not forget what the problem is, it is
typed on the index card in front of you.
Again, the problem
is to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
If there are no questions I will shut the light off and you
can put your goggles on.
Begin whenever you are ready.
Part II
At the point of solution: Why don't you remove your goggles
and give your eyes a few moments rest.
I'd appreciate it if
the person with the yellow toothpick would go outside and ask
the subject sitting outside with the blue toothpick to enter
the room.
Please do not tell him/her about the experiment,
and please do not talk to the remaining subject about the
experiment.
Wait outside until the research is completed.
When it is over I will ask you to come back so I can answer
any questions you may have and explain the reason for the
experiment.
NEW S ENTERS
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E addresses S 3 ' As you know the person you are seated next
to has participated in the first part of this experiment.
This individual will now explain to you what the experimental
task was that had to be solved, and how it was solved in the
first part of the study.
This part of the study is completed
when you think that you understand the experimental task and
could explain the task to the subject still waiting outside
and then solve the problem with him or her.
The only con
straint in this part of the experiment is that neither of you
can wear goggles.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K.
If there are none begin when you are ready.
This part
of the experiment is over when S3 feels he can complete the
task required in part three.
Part III
At the completion of Part II:
I fd appreciate it if the person
with the red toothpick would go outside and ask the subject
sitting outside with the green toothpick to- enter the room.
Please do not tell him or her what the experiment was about,
and please wait in the waiting area until the experiment is
over.
When it is completed I will ask you to come back so I
can answer any questions you may have and explain the reason
for the experiment.
NEW S ENTERS
E addresses S^: As you know the person you are seated next to
has participated in the second part of this experiment.
This
individual will now explain to you what the experimental task
was that had to be solved and how it was solved in the first
part of the study.
When this is done both of you will have to
reach a cooperative solution to the same problem that was
solved in the first part of the study.
When I shut the lights
off you can put your set of goggles on. The other person is
not wearing, and can not wear, goggles.
In no case can the
experimenter be asked for assistance once the experiment has
begun.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K.
I'm going to shut the lights off and you can begin when
you are ready.
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E has given to
a set of goggles with green over the right
eye.
SI and S2 had goggles with red on the right eye.

The subjects who participate in part I chose red and yellow
toothpicks and wore goggles that had red acetate on^ the right
eye.
In part II the subject with the yellow toothpick is
asked to leave and S3, blue, enters.
Neither S is wearing
goggles in this part of the experiment.
For part III S2,
red, is.asked to leave, and S^ enters, green.
S ^ i s given
goggles contrary to that of SI and S2— green on right.
The
third subject still does not wear goggles.

Appendix B:

Tables of Possible Relationships
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Table 1 : Interactive Relationships
Between the Subjects
Subject #
IMAGE DISPLAYED

s

Extended______

Recessed

Extended

HARMONIOUS

ANTAGONISTIC

Recessed

ANTAGONISTIC

HARMONIOUS
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Table 2 ; Subjects relationship to
the image displayed by the
instructional set.
Subject #
IMAGE DISPLAYED
Extended

s
u
b

I
M
A
G
E

Recessed

Extended

MESH

SPLIT

Recessed

SPLIT

CLASH

j
e
c
t
#'

D
I
S
P
•L
A
Y
E
D

Instructional Set: How far in front of the pattern of dots is
the figure that appears.

Appendix C;
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Appendix D:

Conversational Act Analysis

Coin,Definitions,andExamplesofConversation*)ActsHmtiliadon tb*Rani of
Grammatical Form, lilocsitiontrvFunction,and Conventional Conting-ncv*1

Codes
Rf)YN
RQWII
RQCL
RQAC
RQPM
RQRQ

RSYN
RSWII
HSCI.
Rsro

RSQL
RSRP

Dcnnlliomandexamplesofconversationalacts
REQUESTS solicitInformation,action.oracknowledgment.
frs-iVo
m k true-false judgment about ptopoiitioni: "It this an
apple?”
tteektpcclficfactualinfomtalion(includeeilhet-otand fill-ln-lheblankquestionformi): "Where's'John?"
seek clarification nf the content of a prior utterance:
"What didyou say?”
solicit a listener to perform (or cease to) an act (or process):
"Ciireme tomejuice!"
solicit a listener to pant permission In the speaket to per
formanact: “May Igo?"
reekan acknowledgment from alistenertoallowthespeaker
tocontinue "You know what Islid?"

questions
Il'h-qurstlons
Clarificationquestions
Actionrtquttts
Permissionrequests
Rhetoricalquestions

RESPONSES provideinformationdirectlycomplementing priorrequeue.
supply true-falsejudgmentsnfpropositions:"Mo."
supply thesolicitedfactualinformation: "John'shere."
supply therelevanttcpfllllnn: "Isaidno."
verbally express acceptance, denial, or acknowledgment of a prior
ActionorPermissionrequest: "Okay, I'lldo it.”
supply unsolicited Information In relation to the soliciting'ques
tion:"But Iwasn’ttheone who did it.”
tcpeatpartofprintutterances

Yes-Snanssvert
W'h-aniners
Clarifications
Compliances
Qualifications
Repetitions

DESCRIPTIONS eaptestobservabletutverifiable)facts,pastorprevent.
DSID
DSEV
DSPR
D S t.0

Identificationslabelobjects,events,etc.:"That'sahouse.”
Eventsdescribeacts,events,processes,etc.:"I*tnmakingplua."
Propertiesdescribe traits nr conditions of objects, events, etc.: "That's a red
house."
locationscaptess direction or location nf objects,events,eta: 'The 100 isfar
away."

STRU
STF.V
STIR
STAT
SfEX

STATEMENTS eapressfacts,rules,attitudes,feelings,beliefs,etc.
eapress rules,procedures,definitions, facts,etc.: "You have to shareyour
thingswithethers."
eapressattitudes.Judgments,etc.:"That'snice."
eapress emotions, sensations, mental events, etc.: "I tike to
play."(alsoIncludeintentstoperform futurearts).
report beliefsabout another's internal state: "He doesn't know the
answer."
expressreasons,causesand predictions: "Itwillfall.”

Rules
Evaluations
InternalReports
Attributions
Explanations

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS recognize and evaluate responses and nontequcsllrcs.
ACAC
ACAP
ACOS
ACRT

Acceptancesneutrallyrrcogniceanswersornnnrequestlves: "Yes,"“Oh."
ApprovalsfApeemmtspositivelyrecognizeanswers,etc.:"Right,""Yes."
PitappmvalsfOlsapcemenrsnegativelyevaluateanswersornonrequeatlves: "No,"
"Wrong." "Idisagree."
Returnsacknowledge rhetoricalquestionsand soma nonrequesilves,returningthe
"llror''tothespeaker: "What.” “Really."

ODRM
OOAG
ODSS
ODPM
ODAC

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVICES regulatecontactamiconversation.
Indicateopenings, closingsand changesIntopic: "III,""Bye,"
"By theway "
solicitattention:"Hey," "John.""Look."
explicitlylabelspeakerofnext turn: "John," "You."
indicateostensiblepoliteness: "Thanks,""Sorry."
maintain verbal contact, typically conveying Information re
dundant withrespecttocontext: "Here you are."

Rotmdarymarkers
Altenllon-fetters
Speakerselections
Politenessmarkers
Accompaniments

PERFORMATIVES accomplish factsby beingsaid.
rrpR

PI 10

Protestsregistercomplaintsabout thelistener'sbehavior: "Slop."
Jokesdisplaynonbelieftuwardapropositionfurahumorouseffect:"We throwed
thesoupintireceiling."

FFCL
PKWA

prrc

Claimsvtiablhhrightsby beingsaid:'That'sinirn-,""I'm first."
h'jeniucralertshelistenerofimpendinghum; "Watch out!"
Teasesannoy,num. orplayfullyprovokealistener "Yon tan Ido it."
MISCELLANEOUS COOES

NOAN

UNIP
K\CT.

tooanswerstoquestions(aftertwo secondsof-.iier.cei.
IJninicrprrtaHroruniurcllicihle,incomplete,nranomalousuiierin.-ci
Exclamationsexpress cnintlom! reactions and other nnnpri.porilioni! informslion.

Appendix E:

Some Selected Transcripts
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Transcript #1
Study 1

E:

You can put your goggles on and begin •whenever you are
ready.

si:
s2:
si:
s2:
si:

See it?
yeah
How far do you think it is?
m m m . ..mmmmm...a foot...what do you say?
Less...it's like eight inches, nine inches? I thought
it was a foot first

•
9

sl: you don't think it's any less than a foot?
s 2 : U h . ..no...I'd say it's really about a foot?...turn
your head a little bit and see if you can make the
background come out before and then see how much...
can you see that?
s l : Nnnno
sl: I still think it's like...you know, a little less
s2: I'd say ten inches...is a little less, no more than,
not less than ten inches
Sl: No, I figure it's like ten
s2: ten inches?
sl: yeah
s 2 : I'll go along with that
Sl: ten inches?
s 2 : yeah
e : Ok?
s2: yeah
s l : uh hum
e: why don't you take your goggles off
introduction, part two
e:
sl;
s2:
sl:
s2:
s2:
s2:
sl:

any questions?
Just begin
I'd say a foot and a half.
No it's less...more like
V/hat?
Fifteen inches, fourteen?
Could b e ...fifteen?
y e a h ...fifteen?
(to e) fifteen!

whenever you are ready,
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Study 2
E:

Why don't you put your goggles on and just begin
whenever you're ready.
If you wear glasses, those
will fit over your glasses because you won't be
able to see without your glasses.

sl:
e:
sl:
s2:
sl:
s2:

you want to know it in feet?
that's up to you...just talk amongst yourselves,
What do you say? It's a couple of feet
I don't think it's more than a foot
it matters how far you're back
Ok...is he talking about all those dots in the
white paper or that little thing in the middle?
how far the little thing in the middle
oh
is from the back
from
yeah
as you move back it goes further back
o h . ..a foot?
Ok
Ok (inaudible),
what are we supposed to say
excuse me?
we came to an agreement

sl:
s2:
sl:
s2:
sl:
s2:
sl:
s2:
sl:
s2:
e:
s2:

instructions, part 2 begins
e: do you have any questions?
S3**-: no
e: Ok, you know what you're supposed to do? Let me give
you your goggles back, put them on, and just begin,
sl: you see the triangle?
It's like a triangle, a diamond,
whatever, right in the middle?
s 3 : yeah
sl: well, we had to find out how far the diamond is from
the back
s3: from the back of what?
sl: (at the same time) you understand?
you know the background...uh how far it is front of it
s 3 : uh, I get it
s l : we came to an agreement that it was like around a foot
how do you feel
s3: how far in front it is?
sl: yeah, when you look at it
s 3 : yeah I know
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Transcript 2, page 2
Study 2
sl:
s3:
sl-:
s3:

it's not like right on top of it
yeah, I know...it looksit,it's
in back of it
no, how far the diamond is in front of it
yeah, Iknow

s3: doesn't it look like it's cut out? and it's in back
of the background?
sl: the diamond's in back of the background?
s 3 : yeah
s l : not really
s 3 : it does to me
sl: you saying the diamond's in back of the background?
the background's in front of the diamond? With a hole
(inaudible) to see the diamond?
s 3 : yeah

s3: don't it look like that?...it does to me.
s3 •• maybe i t ’s these glasses?
9

s 3 : the diamond ain't in front of it, it's in back of it

s3:
sl:
s3*.
sl:
s3i

how far in front?
(looking at the index card)
I'd say you're off
I'm telling y a . . .ha ha
let me see...you still don't see it?
It's not in front of it
I know why.
The red and the green on the glasses
are messed up.
sl: (laughs)
s3s it's on different sides...it's not in front of it.

sl: can I try these?
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Study 2
s 3 • t h a t 's the way I see it

s 3 j can we switch glasses
e: I'm sorry, I can't give you any information.
Try and
reach a decision
sl: switch glasses
s3: we can't
e: do you both agree?
s 3 : he agrees that the diamond's in front of it, I think
it's in back of it.
e: what do you want to do?
s l : want to switch glasses?
e : do whatever you want to reach a solution
s 3 : check it out with these
s l : that's right
s 3 : now it's in front
s l : I see it in back
s3: the glasses are mixed up

s3:
sl:
s3:
sl:
s3:

so we can't reach a mutual decision
I say it's a couple of feet in back
yeah, like a hole is cut out, right?
yeah
now, this looks in front

•

s3:
e:
sl:
s3•

we mutual on that?
whatever you want to do.
we can't really
it's the glasses

It's up to you

t

s3:
sl:
s3
e:
s3:

we figured out its problem
yeah, now this way it's the same thing
we figured it out
what?
we decided that it's different, the glasses, it matters
on the glasses you use
e: Ok, did you decide that you can't reach a decision?
s 3 : yes
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Study 3
e:

do you have any questions about what you have to do?
If there are no questions I'll ask the next person to
come in, Ok?
e:
(instructions to s3)...do you have any questions about
what you have to do?
s3: No, I got it.
e: Ok, so you can start whenever you're ready, just put
the goggles on and begin...if you wear glasses you'll
need to continue wearing the glasses the goggles will
fit over them

sl:
s2:
sl:
s2:
sl:
s2:
s3:
s2:
sl:
s2:

you understand the problem?
yeah right in the middle, a diamond
a diamond?
yea
it's like in a square?
yes
could you speak up
but it's turned at an angle
yes, yes, i t ’s more like a uh diamond
yes

s 2 : we're judging distances...Ok it does not seem to be
more than a foot, does it?...does it to you?
sl: yes it does
it's more than a foot?
s2: more than a foot?
sl: no, more like ten inches
s2: Oh, Ok
s l : we're saying that it's the shape o f ...it looks like
u h . ..a diamond... and it's almost about a foot away
s2: approximately, I'd say that
sl: yes
•
•

s2:
sl:
e:
s2:
sl:
e:

Is that all we have to do?
is that all we have to do?
did you reach a decision...um...what did you decide?
it's about approximately a foot away from the dots,
yes
Ok...do you have any questions you'd like to address
to them?
s3: well, what, what did you have to decide?
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sl: well, we see a shape like a square, a diamond shape,
and we have to decide how far it is from the dots and
it's about a foot away, we said it's about a foot away
s3: is that it
e: Ok, if you feel you have enough information to carry on
the next part of the experiment, that's it.
s 3 : I have to tell what they were discussing?
e: what the experimental task was and how they solved it
s3: I know what the task was, but I don't know how they
solved it
e: Ok, do you want to ask them?
s 3 : what were you discussing between you?
s 2 : we were discussing the fact that this diamond shape
or the thing that moves toward you, the square remains
back there, what's the distance between
s 3 : right
s 2 : and we decided it's about approximately about a foot
sl: about a foot
s 3 : Ok
s 2 : Ok
e : Ok
instructions, part two
e: Ok, why don't you start whenever you're ready
s 3 : Ok you should put them on first right?
now supposedly there's some sort of a diamond shaped
object
ski yeah
s 3 : somewhere in the middle of those dots, I don't see it
because
sk : right
s 3 : and two people had to decide how far away from the
dots it was
ski uh huh
s3: and they, they, they started to wait for it to come
towards it, it's supposed to, is it coming towards you
s^: No
s3: Or is
s^: No it's stationary right now
s 3 : it's not?
It's stationary right now.
ski yeah
s 3 : and they were discussing how far away it was
sk : uh huh
s3: and...I don't know
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sty:
s3 j
sty:
s3s

ski
s3:
s^l-:
s3*.
e:
s3:
e:
s3:
sty:
s3:
sty:
s3:
sty:
s3:
sty;
s3:
sty:
s 3 ••
sty*,
s3*
sty:

what do we have to do, we have todecide
we have to, I think we have to
how many inches?
we have to discuss the same thing but...I can't see it
obviously and uh
Ok, hold that well Ok it's a
but I think we have to...I think we have to, I'm
supposed to, we have to figure it out...but you
understand what they had to do?
yeh, yeh
do Iget a pair of goggles in the next part, or
Once the whole experiment is over
so Ihave to help him decide without seeing it, right?
just solve the problem however you see fit, I can't
offer any help
Ok so how far away do you suppose
uh, it seems to be about uh...I don't...eight feet
from the...it seems to be behind the screen
it seems to be behind?
yeh, behind the screen
cause, they, they kept saying that it was
uh uh
in front of
no, it isn't coming out...it’s about uh...it's a foot
square
a foot square
standing on it's end, right?... directly in the middle of
the uh
cause it says here...how far in front...it appears to
be
oh oh
so, maybe they were sitting at a different angle.
I don't know
laughs

•

sty: in front? huh...it seems to...wait, oh yeah, right
it's in front of the uh...it seems to be a hole cut out,
like a diamond shape
s3 i right
sty: with the pattern set back
s 3 : right, so how far is the diamond in front?
sty: from the front of the pattern it's uh...it could be about
two feet
s 3 : sounds alright...we're finished
e : Ok?
s 3 : yeah
e: did you reach a decision
s 3 : about two feet

Transcript #6
Study ^
e:

Do you have any questions about how to proceed? Ok,
why don't you put the goggles on and start whenever
you're ready.
Ok, if you wear glasses the goggles should fit over
your glasses.

sis
s2:
sl:
s2:
sl!
s2:
sl:

What do you see? I see a triangle
what?
I said you see a triangle?
yeah
right?
not, not a triangle, a, a diamond?
right, that's a diamond... right in front of the big
square picture
s 2 ! right
sl': right?
s 2 : uh huh
s l : and it's very much above, I mean before
s 2 : uh huh
s l : the uh...square picture, right?
s 2 : uh huh
s l : and it has the same exact pattern?
s 2 : uh hum
s l : I think...as...the big picture, right?
s 2 : yup
s l : now, how far would you say it is?
s2: uh, I don't know about a foot?
sl: maybe a little less, I think?
s2: a little less?
s l : yeah.
You think so?
s 2 : yeah, Ok
s l : so we, around eight
s 2 : if you close one eye it goes away, so?
sl: around eight to ten inches?
s2: Ok
sl: yeah, I think so
s2: ten inches
s l : ten inches? alright?
s 2 : Ok
sl: Ok
e: Ok?
s l : Uh hum
instructions, part two
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e: do you have any questions about how toproceed?
s2: no, do you?
s3: yeah, I have a question.
You mean that I will understand
from what she will tell me, and from what she will tell
me?
e : right
s3: this other person coming
in? Is this theperson who was
in the first part of the experiment, too?
e: No, the person who will come in
s 3 j yeah
e: after she finishes her part
s 3 • yeah
e: will be the other man sitting outside
s 3 : and I will have to tell him what the experiment
e : right
s 3 : how it was solved
e: what the experiment was, how it was solved
s3: tell him what she told me?
e: right, what the problem was,
how it was solved, and
then help that person solve the problem
s 3 : right
e : 01c do you
s 2 : yeah this has nothing todo with the solution to the
problem, just tell him what was done?
e: what it was, what, how it was done, and ifyou want
tell him how you solved it
s2: O k , ...1 can tell him what the answer was?
e : sure
s 2 : Oh, Ok
s 3 : yeah, tell me everything
s 2 : (laughs) Ok
e: Ok, whatever, and you proceed as long as you want until
you feel that you know enough to go on
s3 s yeah Ok
e: Ok? So just begin whenever you're ready
s2: Ok
s2: Ok, what happens is he gives you these goggles that
are red on one side and green on the other, Ok? and
when you put them on...even though you don't see
anything, you only see one figure now, it looks like
a diamond, a diamond shape, like this comes out of the
screen and it comes at you...Ok? And what he asks you is
how far in front...does that diamond shape appear...
to be in front of the screen Ok? In other words, when
you're looking at that thing right it just looks like
there is one flat surface, right, but, but...
s 3 : right
s2: when you put on the glasses with two different colors
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it looks like something comes out and is standing
right in front of you, like that
s 3 j I see
s2: in front of that!
So you see that and you see a diamond
shape in front of it
s3 j Ok
s2: and he wants to know how far away that shape is
s 3 : the diamond shape?
s2: from the screen
s 3 : uh huh
s2: Ok?...and uh, I thought it was twelve inches and she
thought eight so we all, we decided
s3 s. yeah
s2: it was ten inches away from the screen.
Ok?
s 3 : yeah
s 2 : got it?
s 3 : you say what? he gave you two goggles
s2: one for each
s3 •
’ a red and a green
s2: no, one.
One pair of goggles with red on one side and
green on the other
s 3 : Ohh, and green on the other side
s 2 : right
s 3 : is the glass white, or is it red glass
s 2 : it'scolored, it's red plastic
s 3 : ohh the glass is colored
s 2 : right
s 3 : with a red plastic and green plastic
s 2 : right
s 3 : Ok and the
s 2 : and when you look through it
s 3 : when you look through it...at those goggles...at those
things there, those patterns
s 2 : yeah •
s3: you saw diamonds shapes that were
s2: one diamond shape
s 3 : one shape?
s2i one shape
s3: Ohh, only one?
s2: right, one shape
s3s that came off the screen towards you
s2: towards us, right
s 3 j right, and he asked you how near, how far from the
screen do you think it was?
s2: right, from the screen, right
s3‘
* I see that's all?
s 2 : that's all
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s3 : was there any problem in the pattern then?...anything
to solve, just that alone?
s 2 : that's it
e: Ok? You're ready?
s3 s uh hum
e: fine
instructions, part three
e:
s3 :
e:
s3i
e:
s3:
e:
s^:
e:
s^:
s3s
e:
s3:
s^:
e:
s3:
e:
s3 j
s4*:
s3 :

s^:
s3 :
s^:
s3:
s^ j

s3 :
s^:
s3 :
s^:
s3 *

do you have any questions?
could you repeat that again?
yeah.
Your task in this part is to explain to him
yeah
what the experimental problem was
right
in the first part, how it was solved, once you do that
you're to help him
solve the
solve the problem
following problem
Ok
the problem that's projected on the screen
So I tell him everything I know
yeah
right, you tell him what you know
I see
Ok, why don't you put the glasses on and take a few
minutes to adjust to wearing them, just look at the
center and you begin whenever you're ready.
Ok, um, well you know, you have on the glasses,.right?
yeah
you're looking at those patterns...now what you're
supposed to see, you're supposed to see a diamond shape
coming off the screen towards you
yeah
right in front of those goggles
yeah
before you had the goggles on you saw a flat screen
didn't you?
yeah
there was no shape, now you have the goggles on you see
a diamond shape coming off the screen towards you, right
yeah
now, the problem is how far do you think that, that
diamond is from the screen?
how far I think
yeah
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sty: the diamond is from the screen?
s3 : yeah, the diamond shape, how far do you think it's from
the screen, twelve inches, ten inches, eight inches, how
far do you think it is?
sty: the diamond is?
s3 s right
sty: I would say approximately about two and a half feet
s3: Two and a half feet? The diamond is towards you two and
a half feet?
sty: you're saying how far the diamond is from me?
s3 •* no, from the screen
s^: yeah, yeah there's a pattern in the back and there's a
diamond
s 3 : right
sty: in front, right?
s 3 : right
sty; you're saying how far that diamond is from .the back of
the pattern
s3 : right
sty: I'd say about two and a half feet
s3 : that it you're saying it is...thirty inches, right?
thirty inches?
sty; u h . ..that's...
s3 : two and a half feet is thirty inches
sty; yeah thirty inches
s3 : so you're saying it's thirty inches away from the screen?
sty: I'm not sure, but that's what it looks, it seems
about
s 3 : yeah
sty: about that far.
I mean I don't think I ’m sure
s 3 • yes, well you said thirty, well I guess that's that's it
sty: that, that's what I think it i s ... something like thirty
inches away
s3: Ok
e: Ok you agree that it's thirty inches?
sty; right
e:
Ok
sty: I mean you agree with me?
s3: well I never look at it, they-told me, the people
sty: I see
s3 i in the last,
sty: I see, I see
s3 : well-they said, well they didn't say thirty, one said
twelve, one said eight and they agreed to ten.
sty; Oh, I see
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s3s I mean and you have twenty inches more than they do
s*H yeah I know...it doesn't seem to be that close...it's
ten inches you know...it depends how you look at it
from what angle I guess....
e : Ok

Appendix F:

Rommetveit's Dialogic
Truth Table
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